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A '1'heoX7 of the Cre&t1v1t7-InteUigence Inte:z:actlon.

An

Bnvirouental Suppressor Variable
APPJiOVID BY DMBDS OF TO TDSIS OOOI'l'J.'D

In the couonly held view. creativ1ty an4
in a imtually eDlancing _,..

lntelll~.

interact

Their 1ntemctlon, h.....~t ls assuae4

to be slight and. reJat1ve17 untaportant. and to titId 1til ceiUng at a
oertain IGl level.

Beyond th1a IQ ce1l1Dg, no in\;hraction ·1. belle"d

to OOCl1r, aBel the tw. variables are a8suae4 to be indepeaient.

It is

suggested that this vi•• and those theorists who hold. 1t cle 11ttl. to
e~la.1n

tne

rea.aOJJS

for the cell1Dg eU.at.

An attempt is ma4e to clevise a theoretical

S7S~.

whioh accounts

for and explains the ce1llDg effect. as well as providing new groWld.

tor the synthesis of existing experiaental
related fields.

data

tr. a

wlele range of

The theoretical 818"-. 18 'taaed. upon the hypothesis

that an envlronaelltal variable acts te suppress increased.

p~tent1al

foX' ereatlvit7 aceolll*nylng 11lCre&aes 1& 1ntell1pnce level, and. that
this va.r1able 1s able 1n effect to oanoel the h1glt.er potent1al for

creativ1ty which .y exist aaong those above the celling level of

1IltelUpace.
The r8s-.rcb is re'rie'" 1n search of aD7 suPJO~ tor or cr~

tical refUtation of the hJpotheai8 &Del 1ta corollari••, and suges

tlo. are .... aa to the posa1'ble
aUect.

~to:r:a

of the suppressor-variable

It ls eODCl.ud.ed that the 8U.,....SOr-va.r1a'b1e hJpethesls 1s a

vah1able one-one .bleb,

alo~.

witA 1'ts .ppleaeatart hypotheses. pro

vides a useftll .eana of br1ngisag together widely d1versified boties

of research data, aDd acoOUD.te for the ce1llDg effect without violating

J.ogical and intti.t1 ve concept1tms of intelUpnoe aDd. ezeatlvit1'.
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CHAPTER I
INTROWC!TION

If any oulture is to profit fully from its members, or any indi
vidual to derive raaxitnum benefit from his own potential, then the

. nature of intellectual and creat1ve abilities must be fully explored.
It 1s clear that we can only enhance and develop these mysteries if
they cease to be mysteries and become definable phenOltlena, however com"'"
plex the definition.
The importa.nce of' intelligence has no',. been overlooked by our
culture-as is troll attested to be our burgaonJ.ILZ 1n-t.erest in and E:ven

obsession with -The IQ" in our schools. businesses, and private lives.
hOll

even a casua.l e>amina:',ion of the intelligence 11tara.tura, 1t can

be swouised

~lat

we are zather more interested in our l&ck of intelli

gence than in our possession of it. Nevertheless o we have

oerta~y

not neglected placing emplas1s on the importance of \mdersta..nd1ng (and

acoeierating) intellectual abilities.
Our preoccurat1.on "".,.th oreativity is re1a.t1,"ely young.

J. Po

Guilford. (19.50) made the comment that only 186 titles had been pulilished
in PsyohoJ.ogiool Abstraots in the twenty-three years from 1927 to 1950

which could 00 indexed as relevant to the subject of crea.t1vi't,y.
sltuat,ion has

drastic~lly

changed in the twenty-three years

!..~

Ti'.k"1.t

19.50e

,A great amount of researoh and speculation has been done a.bout creativ

ity since t.hen, and it. ha.a become an important ooncern.
occupations go, creativity hoLIta a

dG:f~:tn1te

St11l, a.s pre....

second place ne:A."t to intelll

2

gellce, and many feel that the conceptual revolution which brought
significance to light has not been revolutionary

jJiS

enough~

The revolution has not gone far enough because it

difficuit.-

more difficult than we find it to be for intelligence--to specify the
importance of creativity.

Creative prqcesses are simply less clearly

related to successful functioning

withL~

our culture. ({hat do they

mean, in terms of potential benefit for the individual, or for the cu.I ......
ture?

For' thE) individual, Torrance (1962) has suggested that creativ
ity brings ment1C31 he.slth, full functiontng, and. better ab:'Llity tio cope
with stress, difficulty, and problem solving.

the same sort of conviction:

BaITon (1968) expressed

that creativity is somehcrN related to

health and vi'tiality, to ttcourage, resourcefulness (an4J .flexibili.ty_ .•
(p. v:i.). n

In short, it seemed "lio Barron that creativity was a culmina

tion of things good for individuals t.o be.
There is a rather strong Gt.hical tone to some of these pre
concept,:Lons, as I have suggested." But I would 'Llrge here that
we must avoid any ilTqJlicHtion that the healthy person psycho
logically must necessarily be a good person morally. For the
most part it is probably a healthy th:L1'1g to be rather well be
haved, and as a rule VIe are in better health when we are cool
and collected. . . . But thei'e are tilll€!S when it is a mark of
greater healt.h to be unruly and a stgn of greater inner re
sources t·o be able to unset one's OVlIl balance and to seek a
nevi order of selfhood (PP. 3-4).

Although it. is certainly not the intention

this paper to taka

a position 'as hu.1!k1nistic in tono as does this passage, )ve do not argll.€J
with Barron's assertion th:lt creati',ity

j.B

good for inmviduals..

Of

course, there are many differe:mt convictions as strongly held as this

one about what. it is good for people to be.

None of them; including

Barronfs, can be anything but beside the point if they suggest

ber~vior

patterns 1-lhich are "good" for individuals, .but bad for the survival of

3
their

cu1tur~.

That is an absolute which nrust be bas:l.c even to

ual goo.d, 'as icultural survival is basic to indivIdual surn'val.,

iilldivid~

And

creativity is not of overwhelmingly apparent value to a cultural organ
ism.

As B.

~.
,,

Skinner (1972b) qomments,

Many aqcidental cultures have been marked by uniformi'!:,y al'~~:t
regiment,tion. The e..'ti.genci~s of administration in govlttT.U1Bn
tal, re],.~gi.ous, and economicl systems breed uniformity, .beC:~iJse
it Simplifies the problem of control. Traditional educationFl
establishments specify "w'lhat the student 1.s to learn at 7lhat
age and administer tests to mak~ sure that th9 specifications
are met. The codes of government and r,eligicns are uS}lally
quite explicit and al1a~ little room for dive~sity or change

(p. 162).

Although most cultural institutions have

al1'iay~,;

seem to 1::e, unaware of the advantages of encouraging

in their

member~,

Oe.en, and still
Cl"e3 tive

beh8vior
I

the advantages do exist, and it is t::Lme t,hey were rec

ogni?ed, along with the very real dangers of conformi ty.

Sk:in.'1.tn.~

con·..

tinues:
If man were very much alike, they would be less likely.to
hit upon or design new practices, and a culture 'Vlhich made

people as much alike as possible might slip into a standard
pattern from which there 'W ould be no escape (p. 162).
The principle means of survival in an evolutionary system.
alw~ys

been adaptability and flexibility.

r.~ve

Species have been able to

survive because they were able to adapt to .changing environmental cir-,
cumstances.

Man has survived and flourished chiefly because of his

great flexibility and his freedom from fixed,

reflexiv~

behaviors.

This is an absolute, a fact of and an explan<.ltion for his continued
existence on this planet.

It is good, in one of the 'few senses of the

word ttgood ll which can be universally agrood upon:

its applicability to

solutions for the problem of survival.
There is no reason to believe that the value of flexib:ility is not'

4
as real at a cultural level as it is at the biological level.

For ever,y

culture there is a changing environment, and ours is no exception.

Haw

are we to adapt to physical and social changes if we, as a group and as

individuals, have destroyed our capacity for flexibility?

As Torrance

(1962) points out, the "future of our civilization-:our very survival-

depends upon the quality of the creative imagination of

OU1"

next gener

ation (po 6).!t
In the -face of this biological absolute of adaptability, our own
culture seems to be intent upon

elim.in~ting

members, and the flexibility withln them(l

the differences among its

Friedenberg (1959) argues

that Americans began to use their school systems as a kind of homogeni
zation process

V8r,y

early, because of a need to unify their melting-pot

culture--and they have never recovered from the tendency, now that the
need for it is past.

Thus, creativity, originality, and individual dif

ferences are seen as inequalities in need of stirring up, not as assets
and potential for cultural grO'tvth, flexibility and survival.
From a cultural st.andpoint, then, there is no need or possibility
of avoiding an evaluative quality in our interest in craa'liive behavior.
We can often assume that when a behavlor can be placed a long a creativ
ity continuum, it can be evaluated.

Of

cour~e,

And thaif "creativetr equals "good. 1t

there are li.m.:i.ts as to how much individual eccentricity is

valuable for a culture, but these lit'llits can be allo"r'1ed for if we incor

porate into our criteria for creati.vity some qualification of applica
bility or appropriateness.

A more serious danger, to which we must constantly be alert, is
the assumption that \t:;hat is a good degree of individual variation and
creativity for a culture is the degree natn:rally recognized and retn

forced by that culture.

Unfortunately, the evolutionary and accidental

nature of the development of cultures usually precludes foresighto
culture may respond to its present environment

~

shaping its members in

a way which will eventually mean its own destruction.
cially possible in a

r~pidly

Any

This seems espe

changing Culture, where the future demands

maximum flexibility, but the present shaping processes and structures

are the result of a more stable time.
of the cultural status quo.

We cannot trust to the wisdom

It may be our job to instigate a process

of change--to begin encouraging creativity in the members' of our culture
so

that it can survive, in spite of its own

noncr.eative
I.

a~~erence

to the shaping of

behaviors. l

PRESENT VIEWS OF THE CREATIVITY-INTELLIGENCE INTERACTION

The need for creativity among the members of our culture, and the
add.i.tional need for an increased emphasis upon creativity and apprecis
tion for it, are well reco"gnized here.

They are indispensible and vital.

But it should not require argument to assert that intelligence is also
necessary for the full realization of cultural and individual potential.
The assertion seems superfluous.

Yet, there seems to be little willing

ness among intelligence researchers to stipulate the importance of crea
~ivity,

and vice versa.

a polarity of

vi~vpoints,

Their natural dichotomy of interests has become
and then a battlefront of values.

Torrance

(1962) went so far as to suggest that in its traditional conception,

IWa qre here asslli"Iling that creativity and other behaviors can be
reinforced
shaped by the cultural environment--an assumption which
will later be demonstrated.

or

6

intelligence is a kind of conformity which is actually antithetical to
creativity (although he did admit that both kinds of thought are neces
sar.y for survival).
Does it come to that?

Are they, in fact, that different? As

Barron (1969) has suggested" it would really be much more in line with
our expectations if intelligence and creat,ivity turned out to be very
closely related--and if those we suspected of great intellectual gifts
were also creative,
case.

wit~out

exception.

This does not prove to be the

Even Barron concludes that, although creativity and intelligence

have a low, positive correlation with each other over most of their
range, there is a ceiling effect in their interaction.
Another way of putting this is to say that for certain
trinsically creative activities a spe~ifiable minimum IQ
probably necessary in order to engage in the activity at
but that beyond the minimum, which often is surprisingly
creativity has little correlation with scores on IQ test
(p. 42).

in
is
all,
low,

It is verY widely accepted that the data from studies of the cre

ativity-intelligence interaction are best described as a ceiling effect
--although some theorists emphasize the independence of the two variables
to a greater degree.
one to accept.

But the fact of the ceiling

effe~t'is

a

diffi~ult

For, if intelligence contributes to creativity at lower

levels, why does it act completely independently at higher levels?

It

is not adequate to say that any amount of intelligence is simply enough
intelligence for creativity. Whatever it is that intielligence provides
which is necessary for creative processes, it could automatically be
argue4 (at least) that this variable does not a'l'Ti va in chun.l{s of
"enough" or tlnot enoughtt--that if some of it, enhances creativity, more

of it might continue to etlhance creativity. Whal'e there is a reason

7
for an inter-relationship, it is essential that the reasons the rela
tionship ceases to function be specified•
. In spite of its difficulties, let us examine evidence of the exist

ence of the ceiling effect.

Most of the evidence we have to present

provides strong support only for its first assumption:
all relationship
itive one.

be~~een

that the over

intelligence and creativity is a weak and pos

For example, the highest correlation with IQ among the

Getzels and Jackson (1962) battery of creativity tests is .38 (uword
association") •

Torrance (1959).9 in a review and

summa~J

of much of the

creativity-intelligence correlational literature, reported that the
median correlation

be~~een

the two variables was 020, with the median

among verbal t eats of creativity with intelligence at .21 nonverbal
creativity correlated at merely .06 with intelligence).

In his own

analysis of existing data, Barron (1969) estimated that the average
correlation was .25 between IQ and i.rnaginativeness or originality.
our own

revi~~

In

of obtained intelligence-creativity correlations, few ex

ceptions to the expected ranges of

cal examples, see:

~20-.30

have been f01xnd (for typi

Saugstad, 1952; Schlicht, Anderson, Helin, Hippe,

Listiak, Moser, and Walker, 1966; and Getze1s & Jackson, 1962).

But there are exceptions to this .20-.30 range which seem to
prove the second assumption of the ceiling-effect description:

that

after a certain IQ level, creativity is not enhanced by increases in

IQ.

For example, an Institute of Personality Assessment and Research

(IPAR) study, using a group of creative architects as subjects, obtained
a correlation of -.08 betv/een creativity measures and the Concept Mas
tery Test (Barron, 1969).
for

~~nparison

Two other groups of architects were chosen

with the creative group--one randomly, and one matched

8

for age, background and experience with the creative group.

The crea

tivity level of the creative group was higher, even though the mean IQ's
of all of the groups were within one point of 130 (Wechsler Adult In
telligence Scale, or WAIS).
for increases in creativity
130.

These results seem to indicate a ceiling
~ith

increases in intelligence at about IQ

The creative architects were of the same average intelligence as

the other groups, and among themselves shcwlad no net correlation be
tween IQ and creativity.
However, the generality of these results is limited, not only be
cause of the narrow range of creativity found in the group of what

Barron descr:i.bes as very udistinguished" arem tects, but also because
of the artistic nature of their profess:i.on, which

~ould

automatically

limit the lower ranges of their creativity at a relatively high level.

It should also be pointed out that correlating ratings of professional
creativity with intelligence may as a general rule involve significantly
stronger threshold effects, because of the basic intellectual qualifica

tions required for different professions.

This may not be the case with

ttereativityU as opposed to "creative architecture n as the focus of atten
tion.

The professional creativity rating has been Barron's purview, and

he therefore emphasizes the variability of

ce~ling

levels.

This varia

bility in where the ceiling effect is to be expected in any particular

group of subjects does not obscure the fact that cail:i.ng effects are

carw~

tainly evident in the work of Barron, and of IPl1..R.

other investigators, who do not have this particular emphasis,
place the ceiling at a more or less constant ievel of intelligence (for
example, Terman and Oden,

1947).

9
But ths overwhelming body of research indicates that the ceil
Correlational studies of intelLi.gence and
creativity yield results in the neighborhood of r = .2-.3 when a
wide range of intelligence levels is used. Thlt when the intelli
gence range is narrmv and the overall level is high, zero or neg~
ative correlations are the rule (MacKirmon, 1959; Holland, 1961;
Taylor, Smith, Ghiselin, and Ellison, 1961--a11 reviewed in
Taylor and Holland, 1964; see also P~pp1e and 1~y, 1962).
ing effect does occur.

The idea that intelligence and creativity are

L~dependent

of each

other above a certain level is supported to a certain extent by the lit
erature dealing with creativity, intelligence, and achievement.

Getzr~ls

and Jackson (1962) found that an extremely high-IQ group had achievement

levels in various subjects no higher than those of a less intelligent
(but still bright) group who were also high in creativity..

The convic

tion of Getzels and Jackson seems to be that high creativity· and extreme
ly high IQ are equally effective, independent factors which enhance
achievement.

Their results ware replicated, and similarly interpreted,

by Torrance (1962).

Anderson (1960) formulated a view similar to that of Getzels and
Jackson about achievement, with a few important exceptions.

As tested

and sunnnarized by Cicirelli (196,), this view hypothesizes that trIQ has
an effect on academic achievement up to a certain threshold IQ level,
where further increases in IQ would have no further effect on achieve
ment but '.'there creativity would begin to have an effect (p. 305) 0 1t

If·

achievement is seen as a measure of effectiveness, then a t low levels of
intelligence IQ
and

creativ~ty

ness.

:;:$

the critical determinant.

At medium levels, both IQ

interact, enhancing each other and increasing effective

At high levels, creativity enhances effectiveness, while further

IQ increases do not.

This hypothesis would not validate the description

of the creativity-intelligence interaction as a

ceilL~g

effect, since it

10
only treats their interaction with respect to achievement.

However, it

does put emphasis upon creativity as a critical factor capable of' alter~

ing intellectual effectiveness independently of intelligence (like Get
zels and Jackson).

Further, it harmonizes with Torrance1s

1964, 1965) view that creativity is

siL~ply

(1959, 1962,

a different (and perhaps

superior) kind of intellective process.
Cicire1l1's extensive testing of the Anderson threshold hypothesis
did not find, however, that it was supported by the evidence.

This

might have been expected, considering HollingNorth's investigations of
so many years before (Hollingworth and Cobb, 1928).

She had compared

groups of gifted children with high (146) and very high (165) mean IQ's,
and found significantly higher achievement in all different content
areas among the group with extremely high IQtso
the Anderson hypothesis is reported by Cicirelli.
·lished work by Pielstick
Anderson prediction.

Further refutation of
He cites an unpub

(1963), woo found an actual reversal of the

According to the Pielstick results, "The correla

tion between creativity and achievement decreased as IQ increased
(Cicirelli,

1965, po 304)."

Of what significance are the combined :results of Hollingworth,
Cicire11i, and Pielstick?

Although they neither

ccnfil~

nor deny the .

yalidity of the ceiling effect in creativity-intelligence interaction,
they may indicate a direction we might take in searching for the factor
respolfSible for the ceiling/)

They present us with a question:

if

achievement increases throughout all levels of intelligence, but is not
continuously enhanced--and may even be negatively affected-by high
levels of creativity, why should the highly intelligent child behave

creat;lvaly.?

Certainly crestiva behaviors would not gain him a larger
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portion of the reinforcement accruing to ac..l1ievement, and they might.
even lose that reinforcement for him.

Perhaps, then, there is some

social variable which is suppressing increases in creativity with in
creases in intelligence at a ver.r high level.
II. THE SUPPRESSOR-VARIABLE VIEW'

Observations by Getze1s and Jackson (1962) and Torrancs (1962)
support the idea that a social variable suppresses creativity among the
highly intelligent.

They found that, all other things being equal,

teachers prefer high-IQ students with low creativity to less bright
students with high creativity--even if their achievemerrt levels are
equal.

Further, Hollingworth asserted that mentally gifted subjects

with IQ t s over 150 have significantly more adjustment difficulties than
subjects within the 130-150 range (Hollingworth and Cobb, 1928;

and

Hollingworth, Terman, and Oden, 1940). Apparently, at the 150-IQ level,
the well-documented social advantages of high intelligence are supers.eded
by some less familiar disadvantages.
The Getzels and Jackson, Torrance, and Hollingworth observations

all hint at social pressures a cting upon the highly intelligent to dis- .
courage or stifle their creativity.

It seems to be the result of some

thing more than chance that the ceiling level in creativity increases

among the highly intelligent finds such a close analogy in the ceiling
level of optimal social adjustmento

It is impossible to avoid the sug

gestion that mounting social and interpersonal difficulties, expecta
tions, and pressures might singly or collectively constitute a suppres
sor variable which inh:l..bits increased creativity among the highly intel

ligent .
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A hypothetical system based upon the suppressor-variable concept

'Would be well able to account for the ceiling effect in the creativity-
intelligence interaction.

Increases in intelligence could produc& in

creases in creative potential, but at the same time precipitate slowly
accelerating incremen'tis in the effects of certain socio-environmental
variables having a tendency to decrease creativity.

At some level,

these socio-environmental factors, labeled together under usuppresso;r'

variable", would produce effects equal to those of the increased' crea
tivity potential.

From that IQ level upward, there would be no net pos

itive correlation between :intelligence and creativity. A ceiling would

have been reached. MOdifications of this hypothesis can account for the
low positive correlations between intelligence and creativity, as well.
What are the options open to us if we do not accept the suppres
sor-variable hypothesis? Vfe can choose among a number of closely related
points of view which are currently in vogue:
1.

Creativity and intelligence are essentially independent fac

tors of intellective ability (Guilford, 1967; Wallach and Kogan, 1965a,

1965b; Ga1anter$ 1967; no specific ceiling referred to).
2.

Creativity and intelligence are slightly correlated, but mainly

~ndependent,

factors of intellective ability (Torrance, 1962, 1965;

Getzels and Jackson, 1962; all placed here by virtue of their findings;

no ceiling referred to).

3. Creativity and intelligence are correlated over their

lrn~er

ranges, and uncorrelated above a specifiable or variable ceiling (Bar
ron, 1968, 1969, and others).
The first and second viewpoints are derived essentially from
Guilford's

(1967) model, and assert that intelligence as it has tradi
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tionally been vievved is convergent, conforming and reproductive in na

ture--while creativity is essentially the opposite:

divergent, construc

tive, and non-conforming. 2 Both viErwpoint,s, then, po:int to what Torrance
(1962) called the "antithetical" quality of creativity and intelligence.
The qualification that slight correlations may be found is added by

those investigators who happened not to obtain insignificant correlations
in their research.

Both of these positions have two difficulties in

CODl

mono
First" if the two ttability factorslt are so vitally opposite in

nature" how can it be that they occasionally coincide in a single in
dividual? Wallach and Kogan (1965a, 1965B) and Getzels and Jackson
(1962) did find groups of children high in both creativity and intelli

genoe, and the undeniable reality of men like Einstein must in some way
be dealt with.

Further, the correlations obtained by Getzels and Jackson

between intelligence and the creativity-test battery were greater than
those obtained among the creativity tests themsel'V"9so

Although intelli

gence did not account for most of the variance in the creativity tests,

it was, nonetheless, the most constant indicator of creativity in a wide
variety of test contexts o

How, then, can we say that the two variables

are independent?
Second, although Getze1s and Jackson emphasize heavily the differ
ential environmental phenomena in the homes of creative and noncreative

2Convergent thought is understood to be a process in which one
single, correct response can be derived from the information given,
while divergent thought is a process where the information presented is
elaborated or extended in any number of possible and satisfactory direc
'tions.
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ch'3dren, and discuss at length the creativity-stifling aspects of our
culture fI they seem not to recognize the 1mplica.t10ns of these environ
mental variables.

It shQuld be clear that creativity may be largely

env-lroTJDlentally determined, from this data.

Yet the authors, in suoh

theoretical positions as ,they take, treat ?reat1vity always as simply

a different aspect of intellectual. ability..

wa.llach and Kogan seem to

avoid implications of their data, as well--findi.ngs of important. per

sonality

dist~~ctions

between oreative and nonoreative groups, for

example.
Although the third position avoids many of these diffioulties lrJ
introducing the ceiling concept, it has one major problema
provide an

exp~D!t1~

it does not

for the ceiling phenomenon. All of the positions

mentioned would no doubt l'.ave to a.dopt soma kind of ceillng-ef'fect qualc.a

if1ca.tiona t yet the others a.re no more a,ble to explain 1t.
And this is "&he grsa.t failing of a.ll of the work tha.t has been
done 1n the area of creatl vity research"

There Mve been rallY attempts

at describing the in'c,eract1on of oreativity a.nd intelligence in terms

of more or lass stat.1st1c.a.l concepts (independence. ceilings, etc.) 0
But there has l)een

:0.0.

systemat10 theory

phenomena. once they have been described,.

pr~posed

to a.ccount for. the

We' have been told that ere-

s.tiv1ty a.nd intelligence reaot in a certain way..

But we 11.1.va never

been told, in more than hints and ltnplica.tlollS-9 why i-it is that this

j,G

their manner of interaction 0
III.

OBJECTIVES

In this paper, .'t.heu r 'tie have two prim.a.ry pu.rposesa

first, to

develop a. theoretical szn:rtem. which can to some extent !~.ep}f.1Mt the cIa ta.
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resulting from the interaction of creativity and intelligence, and, to

use that system to construct predictions of the relationship of crea
tivity and intelligence to other variables; and, second,

~o

arrive at a

hypothesis for the creativity-intelligence interaction which is in bet
ter logical and evidential harmony with the entire body of the litera
ture than ara any descriptive systems at present.
It is proposed that the data already III existence, if brought into

a consistent and logical synthesis, ''Would provide considerable support
. for and delineation of a nevi theory of creativity and intelligence and

fulfill the primary objectives we have stated. At very least, an attempt
at such a synthesis would sharpen the focus of experimental efforts,

which are at present scattered in many different directions-showing a

strong tendency to be redundant in exploring certain fields which would
provide little new information even if deCisively defined, while being

strangely luCking in other areas which seem to be of critical signifi
cance.
The suppressor-variable hypothesis we have suggested wjJ~ be the
tentative foundational structure of the new theory of creativity-:intelli
gence interaction.

We shall use it as a guide--for a fresh organizing

principle for existing data--and hope that it reveals nuances in the evi
dence which have not as yet. been appreciated.
organizational principle itself, the

We also ax:}:€ct

suppressor-vari~ble

tha-t; t.ha

hypothesis,

will lead us to suspect stru.cture where none rr.ay be visj.ble-.lc,hat

~e

can

be led to look at important data which may not as yet have been consid....
ered relevant to the creat.ivity-intelligence investigation.
We intend to follow the following general pattern in organizing

our effo rts:
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1. We shall define intelligence, in order to provide ourselvas
with some valid basis for accepting intellectual measures as signifi

cant to

our study,

and in order to point out, in. the ver:" nature of

intelligence, factors whioh support or contradict, our hypothesis.
2.

We shall define creativity, in order to p;'ovide ourselves with

the tools for comparing its processes to those of intelligence; and we
shall examine whether or not it can be treated as, a global behavior
pattern, or must be seen as
responses.

a,

colleotion of environmentally determined

Throughout this section, our concern will be to show whether

or not there is any characteristio intrinsic to creativity which would
make it incompatible with intelligence.
). We shall compare erea.t1vi ty a.nd intelJJ.igenoo at a. cognit1va
level. a.ttempting to show that they have a. common basis in assoc1a

t10nal processes--but also searching for the variables which differen
tiate between creativity and intelligence in an individual.

4. We shall discuss arousal or excitation, exploring the poss1
bU1ty tha.t increased arousal levels among the highly intelligent might
e1ther facil1 tate or 1nh1bit creati vity a.mong them.

5.

We shall present evidence on inhibition, demonstrating.the

olose coordination of excltator.y and inhibitory processes in all higher
eognitl va opera.tiona f and a.t tempting to disoover if iuna.te ca.pac!ties

for inhibition and/or delay of gratification can be responsible for

the suppressor v.ariable.
6" We shall invest1gate the 11tara.ture on anxiety, 1ntelligence,
and creativity, still in a search for variables which might be respon

sible for the

suppressor-Y~riable effect~-which

between creativity.and intelligence.

might disoriminate
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'7 e We shall discuss "styles" of perception and cogn1tion. the

more or less stable patterns of

1nfo~ation

intake we might expect among

the highly intel11gent, and the possib1lity that these might interfere

with creative processes.
8. We shall look at specific environmental effects ca.pa.ble of
mediating a.

s~ppressor-varia.ble

effect--those sooial or cultural stim

uli with a high proba.bill ty of o·ccur.r:ence among the highly intelligent

which might tend to inhibit creativity.

90 tIe shall present a concluding statement of the suppressor
v.ariable hypothesis--attempting to

derlv~

as many implications andl

or predictions from it as possible, and to form these implications

and predict10ns into a theory of the creativity-intelligence inter
action.

CHAPTER II

INTELLIGENCE
E. Go Boring once provided us with a definition of intelligence

which has surVived fifty years not so much by its own dubious merits as
by the faults, of its various competitors.

"Int.elligenoe, If he asserted,

!tis what the G.ntelligenc~ tests test (Boring, 1923, p. 35) 1I"t1

This

definition is operational, at least in spirit, but serious students of
the nature of intelligence have never been able to find comPlete satis
faction within its circularity.

Boringts statement may still be the

best we can say about what intelligence is, but, we can at least attempt,
an understanding of the meaning of intelligence from several and various
other points of view--wi th· the hope that we can provide for ourselves an
intuitive and logical basis for Boring's definition.
Matarazzo

(1972) points out that in the process of defining any

theoretical concept, several major steps must be

taken~

First, we must

grasp for the subjective essence, the intuitive and personal meaning of
the concept o

Then mus"t come a stipulative definition, followed by a

low-level operational definition. A thorough research effort at that
point results in concurrent validation, exemplars, or cor:r'elates of the

concept, which lead to a second operational definition of considerably
more predictive power than the first.

This process continually repeats

itself, and new ev:Ldence in validation or refutation constantly causes

changes or elaborations in the operational definition.

It is only after

much reshaping and confirmation that the definition has a high degree
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of reliability..
Historically, it was for Alfred Binet to posit the first stipula
tive definitions, derived from his

O"Nn,

intuitive grasp of what we all

mean when we speak of intelligence. 'These are some samples of his at

tempted definitions, over a period of eighteen years:
Intelligence, that is to say, reasoning, judgment, me:nor.r,
the power of abstraction (as cited in Matarazzo, 1972, p. 65).

That which is called intelligence, in the strict sense of
the word., consists of "bRO principal things: first, perceiv
ing the erlerior world, and second, recons:i.dering these per·
ceptions as memories, altering them and pondering them (as
cited in Matarazzo, 1972, p. 66).
The tendency to take and maintain a definite direction;
the capacity to make adaptations for the purpose of attain
ing a desired end, and the power of autocriticism (as cited
in Terman, 1916, pe 45).
A subject has the intellectual development of the highest
age at which he passes all the tests. • • (as cited in
Matarazzo, 1972, p. 67).
With this last statement, Binet moved from the reaim of the L'1tu

itive expression to an operational definition.

He suggested in it that

intelligence is indicated by the level of the tests passed.

That is,

intelligence is what intelligenc·e tests test.
All operational definitions have the same advantages and disad
vantages, and this one is no exception.

If other psychologists can

agree that their intuitive definitions are satisfied by the kind of test
Binet proposes to use as the operational criterion, then they can agree
upon the criterion.

For many years, intelligence tests have been used

as if this kind of agreement had already been reached.

In actuality,

hm,ever, there has never been a solid agreement among theorists about

the intuition-level definition of intelligence.

The foundational steps

have baen hastily and badly built, and simply do not support the super
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structure of the operational definition.

In this chapter, we shall in

vestigate three of the areas of division which have prevBnted

consensu~

about the theoretical definition of intelligence in the years since

Binet: the problem of the uni- or multi-factorial nature of intelli
gence, the problem of the hereditary or environmental dominance of in
tellectual development, and the problem of whether or not higher mental
processes ara-qualitatively different from lower ones.
'Io

THE NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL FACTORS

While the intelligence test rose to a high level of popularity, it
remained a matter of disagreement whether or not intelligenee was a uni

tary "thingtt to be measured, at all$

If intelligence is not a unitary

phenomenon, we might certainly ask ourselves what it is that the intel
ligence test measures, and question the validity of its measurement.
Guilford (1967) .argued that intelligence was not unitary at all,
and that it should be considered only in terms of i..'I1dividual and inde
pendent factors.

He had broken away from the Spearman group, who were

oonvinced of the existence of at least a general factor of intelligence.
The general factor was assumed to appear in every intelligence test,
although each test would be affected by its tapping of different spe··
cific ability factors (Spearman, 1904).

Guilford disagreed.

The proof that there is no general factor of intelligence must
begin, Guilford (1967) suggests, with the indisputable variability of
abilities we find within individuals.

Even retardates can have signif

icant musical ability, and subjects can show unusual competence at re
membering colors only to be deficient at sentence memor,y.
port for placing

e~phasis

Another sup

on the factorial nature of intelligence is the

21
evidence that during childhood growth and during m.ental decline of old
age, various aspects of intellectual functioning increase or decrease
differentially.

Guilford also alludes to the lack of perfect, unitary

correlations among intelligence tests.

No one, of course, has ever been

able to argue successfully that intell:i.genca has no factor character at
all-that there could not be some aspects of intellectual ability more
easily manifested in one test than in another.

Guilford, however,. pIa cas

a heavy emphasis upon the factorial nature of intelligence, to the ex
clusion of any general factor.
The ~ery basis of Guilford's Structure-of-tha-Intellect (81) model

is his factor analysis of data from many administrations of ability-test
batteries. When analyzing data according to the content of the tests
involved (verbal,

figl~al,

etc.) he seamed to find factors in the data

corresponding to these content areas.

On the other hand, factors also

seamed to appear when the analysis was based on the kind of cognitive
operation performed on the test, or the kind of product
answering process.

a~hieved

in the

Guilford thus had three different dimensions thxough

which he could successfully factor-analyze intellectual processes--three
continua along which to arrange specific abilities.

He could not resist

the temptation to put his three continua into a three-dimensional form
(a cube) alleged to represent the total human cognitive structure, and

to call each of the 120 cube cells an intelligence tlfactor. n

The des

criptive definition of each cell-factor was an arbitrar".! result of which
three of the dimensional factors intersected in that cell.

The cells

were thus assumed to be the elemental factors of the intellectual pro
cesses.

¥Any of these specific factors (about eighty-two) had been or

have been discovered and accounted for by Guilford, but only t1'1enty...three
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are olaimed by other investigators (Cronbach, 1970). Some are merely
assumed to exist as actual factors

b~cause

the cube modal predicts them,

and others have been found to be dual instead of unitary in nature as
they had been assumed to be.

Twenty-four factors correspond roughly

to ttcreativity, tt and thirty to interpersonal or social response pat
terns-two ability areas which have classically been excluded altogether
from the intelligence question.
Guilford's SI system is arbitrary, unwieldy, and overwhelmingly
complex.

But that should not be the basis of its out-of-hand rejection,

if the model is really an

acc~rate

picture of human cognitive structure.

There are, however, soma valid reasons for caution in regard to the
model, not the least of which is that the system is based on t.he valid
ity of the factor-analysis technique.
Cronbach (1970) comments::

"Guilford's factor analyses ara de

signed to fit the dpta to his hypothesis; they do not tell whether his
complicated scheme is necessary (p. 339). n In point of fact, suggests
Cronbach, factor analyses may conceal the true nature of the problem:
Guilford's is a fine-grain analysis, and fine-grain analyses
are not necessarily useful. The photoengraving process of the
newspaper breaks a photograph down into minute gray and bla ok
dots; when we look close enough to see that detail, we lose all
sense of what the picture is about (Cronbach, 1970, p. 341).

I

!

-

l~tarazzo

(1972) is perhaps even less

kind~

implying that results

on the order of those Guilford obtained with intelligence-test data have
been duplicated with random, fictitious data, USing his methods.
Matarazzo argues further that even if the factors Guilford

de~lved

from

his data were "real, n they would not necessarily correspond to the title
he attached to them.
to

lo~d

Thera is no way of ascertaining that a test known

very heavily on a single £-.actor is actually testing any certain

23
ability.

We can only assume that any ability is represented by our fac-·

t,or loading because it has a sort of face validity in- respect to that

faotor.

So, with Guilford's system, we may well- have come fU11 c1rcle

to the origil"...al problem:

how do we know that what we test. is whtlt we

think we are testing?

or

course, in spite of all objections to Guilford's approach,

there can be no denial tha-t there is a j;act.ori.al character to inteUi

genea" as evan Binet was ·well

aware~

"'hat wa call our mind, our :tntellect, is a group in internal
event.s "Very n1.l111erOUS and very l.raried, and o " • The unity of'
ou.r psychical beginning sho"Jld not be a ought elsewhere than it,
the al'Tangement 9 the s:yntbesis--:i.n a word, the coordination of
all t.hose incidents (as cited in Matarazzo" ~972$ p. 66).

Binet, although aD"owing for tho existence of factor trends in the

phenomenon called illt.elligance, placed enlph.asis ur.>On
- -the. .inte!"action. of
t.hose trenCs,9 ratheL" than their independence.
the factor

problem~

and decide that

1'99

We can take a point of

Vi9'N

t.A)

solva

outside ·the organism,

ara interested in tJle total relative efficiency of the

indivldual;. as compared to his peers.

in factor packages.

This is one way

An individual's abilities may coma

But even if they do" the great difficulty of con...

st.ructing tests which tap one factor and only one" demonstrates that
flu_man beings seldom use one factor at a

tj..L'U.9 e

HU1lBn intera ction with

the enviro:nment is much nlora complex than that.
reasonable, -chen, that a test

'¥1ith

It does not seem un

s everal ~J ell-chosen subtests could

be quite an accru"ate reflection of an individual's total relative ef

ficiency and adaptability within his environment.

As Wechsler (1958)

writes,
Illt.elligence, operationally defined, is the aggregate or
global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to

think rationally and to deal effectively with his en~on
mant. It is aggregate or global because it is composed of
elements or abilities which, thottgn not entirely indepen
dent, are qualitatively differentiable. By measurement of
these abilities, we ultimately evaluate intelligence. But
intelligence is not identical with the mere sum of these
abilities, however inclusive••• The ultimate products of
intelligent behavior are a function not only of the number
of abilities or their quality, but also of the way in which
they are combined, that is, their configuration (p. 6).
In support for his position, Wechsler points out that anJ70ne with
a clear excess of one particular ability

i~

in terms of his total relative efficiency.
test should generally be able to avoid

not really much better off',
The standard intelligence

h~rsensitivity

to such exees

ses, and remain an adequate indication of' the inm vidual's overall prob
ability of successful environmental dealings.
Is intelligence not, then, a "thing"? We have argued for the gen
eral validity of the intelJ.igence test $ even should intelligence prove .
not to be a unified entity, but

rathe~

an interaction of factors.

But

must we accept Guilford's argument that it is pnf.Y factors and nothing

more, however interactional?
Evidence produced by Alexander (1935) indicates that the answer
to that question is verI' complex.

He found that intelligence test re

sults could be largely explained by the presence of a common factor, but
not entirely so.

There were also evidences of several broad, fairly

independent factors

(verbal~

practical, and so on), but these were def

initely correlated with each ot!1ero

Presumably, this intercorrelation

accounts for the substantial intercorrelations among intelligence tests.
In addition to the broad factors, some of the variance in Aloxander's
data could only be acco1.U1ted for by introducing some kind of non-intol
lective, perhaps motivational, variables.

Both Spearman- and Guilford
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type premises were in part supported, although the general factor idea
came out a l i tUe better than we might have expected.

It

seems

that

when we administer an IQ test, we are measuring some enti-t;y, plus some

entities (factors) and their interaction, plus soma personality or mo
tivational variables.
Although we have attempted to find a workable synthesis of the
unitary and multiple factor theories, it is just possible that l'Vhen we

discuss whether or not intelligence is a unitary entity we are
the point entirely.

missL~g

Perhaps our treatment of the second major area of

controversy in intelligence theory will

Sh~R

what exactly can be used

among the evidences we have already examined.
U.

THE BASES OF nJTELLIGENCE:

HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT

This second kind of fragmentation faced by intelligence theor

ists is the source of

mo~t

research over many years.

of the controversy engendered by intelligence
No matter what our position on the question

of factors, it is inevitable that we ask ourselves what is the original
source of intelligent bohavior.

At some level that source must be

physiological in nature, and if this is true, then physical heredity
becomes an inescapable concern.

It is of great significance in our

understanding of intelligence to be able to separate its hereditary and
environmental aspects.
Agai.n, we are dealing with a problem having two-:t;'old implications.

If' there is a question about the hereditary/environmental composition
of intelligence, then there is a question about the very natura of
intelligence-about its theoretical or stipulative definition"

who believe that intelligence is

bas~d

Those

in hereditary, biological phen
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omena must necessarily have a different intuitive understanding of it
than, have those who believe it to be the result of environment and
learning.

But then, if there iss question about theoretical defini

tion, there is also a question about the operational definition which
should result from theory.
The past fifty years have seen a fierce and open war, where cor

relation coefficients have been thrown swiftly back and forth between
those who believe that IQ tests test environmental effects upon the
individual and those who believe that they test hereditary effec-ts.
These two factions have perhaps made one significant

error~

They have

both concentrated their efforts on proving or refuting the operational
definition of intelligence (the IQ)" without ever having come to agree

ment on a theoretical definition.

Perhaps it was at the first step that

they should have begun.
In fact, it has been suggested that many of the difficulties psy
chologists have been having with the concept of intelligence stem from
the fa ct that they are talking a bout two very different kinds of in

telligence:

the innate, and the learned (Hebb. 1949).

Those who have

made clear this distinction at the level· of the theoretical definiti?n,
have had, it seams to this writer, much better success in accounting fbr
the

~ata

and moving on logically to the operational level.

Piaget (1967, 1969) has not really been involved in the mainstream
of the intelligence investigation, except as it played a part in his
understanding of early cognitive development.
most helpful to others,

hc~vever,

had no need to fit his ideas of

His ideas

ha-~

proved

in spite of the fact that he himself
inteJ~gence

into existing theories,

nor to move on to operational criteria :which in any way differentiate
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individuals according to intelligence.
In bri&f, the Pia getian system seas the necnate as an organism

capable of exercising "hereditarily determined sensory and motor co
ordinations that correspond to instinctual needs (1967, p. 9)."

These

are the rudimentary sensori-motor schemata or cognitive structures,
which enable the infant to assimilate sensory information.

But a s the

child performs these basically rigid behaviors, generalizing them to
stinnlli for vihich they were not originally responses and modifying them
through the coordinating effect of repetition and the shaping of envir
omental contingencies, he is doing something more than assimilating.
He is accomodating his

own system to his environment, elaborating and

building upon the rudimentary schemata.
These elementary schemata are then differentiated into new
motor systems (habits) and new perceptual organizations. The
point of departure for this differentiation is arways a re
flex cycle. This cycle does not, hcw~ever, merely repeat it
self. It incorporates new elements and together with them
constitutes broader organized totalities by means of progressive
differentiation (1967, pp. 10-11).

For Piaget, Jrintelligence" is manifest in any behavior which is
instrumental in achieving a pre-established goal.

Thus, it is only

the mental structure and activity which result from the interaction of
the child's environment and hereditary schemata that can be called in
telligence.

The hereditar.y capacities themselves are not intelligence,

but presumably they have significant influence on the intelligence which

does

l~su1t.

Here, our interest in Piaget reaches its limit, for he

has no particular interest in understanding individual differences.
This idea that intelligence is s' product of the differentiation
of innate potential through interaction with the environment is partly
adop~ed by Cattell's

(1963) theory of abilities. Cattell differs from
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Piaget in that he labels both potential and ma·nifest abilities tlintel
ligence. tt

gence is

But he does distinguish between them.
a~ost

His "fluid" intelli

literaD.y a reservoir of innate, neurological, and phys

iological capacity which is basic

to all intellective behavior, but is

dominant in those behaviors not specifically learned--that is, not hav

ing the nature of a skill.

nCrystallizedll intelligence, on the other

hand, is intellective behavior in which a skill has been learned in
specific response to a stimulus situation.

C~~tallized

abilities do

have some relation to the individual's original fluid intelligence, but

they are more importantly affected by environmental and/or cultural in
fluences.

Furthermore, it is Cattell's contention that fluid intelli

gence can and does continue to affect behavior throughout the life of
the individual.

The traditional intelligence test is, therefore, a

mixture of fluid and cr.ystallized abilities, and Cattell feels it un
suited for the task of defining intelligence.

He argues that tests can

.be constructed which will tap each kind of intelligence:

a Uculture

free" test for fluid ability, and many tests specifically responsive to
various crystallized abilities (factors).
Cattellts system, if accepted, would account quite well for exist
ing data, making allowance for factorial as w.ell as general characteris

tics inherent in intelligence, and at the same time coming to some kind
of terms with the heredity/environment problem.

There are, however,

several difficulties in accepting his conclusionso
First, certain very specific abilities do seem to have very little
relation to over-all reasoning ability or intellectual efficiency (for
example, rapid color-naming; see Cronbach, 1970--or foreign language
achievement; see Guilford, 1967).

There is no difficulty here since

)

,
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these phenomena are in harmony with Cattell's de-emphasis of fluid in
telligence a s a detenninant of the crystallized abilities.

But many

specific abilities are strongly related to more general intelligence
measures, and that is the

so~rce

of the difficulty.

It would seem

that Cattell does not give enough weight to the possibility that spec
ific abilities may be quite dependent upon the general fluid abilityo
In this respect, a modified version of the Cattell 'theory, like the hier

archical model proposed by Cponbaoh (1970) and synthesized from the s;ys
tems of cattell, Vernon, and others, would be more acceptable.

A second objection to the Cattell system is that it is somfflvhat
difficult to accept his assertion that a test can be

tl~Y

culture-free

-that is, that a test can be a pure and direct measure of fluid abil
ity.

It is difficult to conceive of any situation in which absolutely

no social learning or concept learning would have effect--even more
difficult when one considers that a test of fluid intelligence would
have to be without associations 'to previously learned-about stimuli for
all, or almost all, of the people tested.

As Piaget (1969) considers

learning, every stimulus-assimilation process is modified or elaborated
in some way by experience.

Acquired strategies for dealing with the

environment are most likely to be interwoven in a highly complex way ·
and drawn into even very novel situations by their interrelationships.
In sum, it is difficult to accept the contention that bare, fluid in

telligence is any where exposed for us to see and test it.
Hebb (1949) seems to provide an anower to these particular prob
lems with a few significant differences in the structure of his theo
retical systemo

He differentiates

tt~telligence

!,tt

which is one's in

nate,. physiological capacity for inte;Uigent behavior, and ttintelli
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gence

~,If

which is "the functioning of a brain in which development has

gone on, determining an average level of performance or comprehension
(p. 294)."

In all persons except the neonate, development has occurred,

and any overt manifestation of intellective behavior must necessarily

be classified as

intelligence~.

responsible for i:ptelligence

~,

Even in the neonate, the variables
while not contaminated by experience,

are most probably inaccessible to observation.

Such things as ease

and strength of neuronal associations, potential number of associations,
neural metabolism, reticular activity, vascular efficiency, and neuroncount, which miCht well be the independent variables represented con
ceptually as intelligence

!, have no

know~

relation to infant behavior.

Thus, they are of litt.le value as measures at this time, and intelligence

A remains out of our reach.
Intelligence

£ is the interaction of the individual's potential

for thought and reason with his learning and environment.
gree of intelligence
high

intelligence~.

! is

a necessary, but not sufficient, precursor of

Intelligence

or poverty of stimulation.

A high da

~

can be externally limited by disease

But in most casas, human beings have very

similar stimulation levels during development, and nriJrimal brain damage
(see Hayes, 1962, for supporting arguments).

And because of the high

probability that individuals have similar learning opportunities in the
most basic and essential aspects, intelligence

~

should be in approxi

mate proportion to intelligence! in almost all indi'\riduals, and provida
a valid indicator for it.
It has not been realized that if the effects of earlyexperi
ence are more or less generalized and pernanent one can concede
a major effect of experience on the IQ and still leave the IQ
its constancy and validity as an index of future perforruance
(Hebb, 1949, p. 295).
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It is important to IX'int out the phrase "if the effects of early

experience are more or less generalized." We cannot necessarily ex
pect individuals of radically different cultures to per-lorm a t the same
level of efficiency on a test designed by one of their cultures.

Never

theless, within any culture it is possible to find an individual's in

tellectual efficiencY relative to his peers.

That does not mean that

any test will be free of cultural bias, or that any manifest ability is
untouched by environmental influence--but it. does mean that an individ

ual can be validly tested by his own culture, and perhaps in his own
cultural idiom by someone from another culture.
In order to get the best possible prediction of an individual's

probability of success in a future environment, one should tap the be

haviors most directly reflective of intelligence!.

That means that

an intelligence test should avoid areas where there is a high probabil
ity of overlearned responses (which represen't grossly unequal learning
opportunities) and certain ot.her abilities which correlate badly with
general mental efficiency--much for the same reasons Cattell wished to
avoid them.

In the present framework, hO'Never, we are attempting only

to get the most accurate indication possible of intelligence!:
not purport ever to achieve direct measures of intelligence

we do

A.!.

The Hebbian system allows us to c'onsider essentially all manifest
intelligence as learned behaviors and thus is able to handle those the
orists who continually emphasize its cultural nature.

Attempts at cal

culating the number of IQ points attributable to environment are really
quite beside the point, since it is very likely that all our manifest
intelligence (IQ points) is learned.
in criticizing this kind of activity.

Judd (1928) is no doubt justified
He also points out that much of
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"hat individuals are able to learn is the result of their capacity for
symbolization and language.
tures to

acc~~u1ate

of individuals.

ciples during

Language and symbols are a means for cul

learning and to pass it on to the next generation

Without them, we should have to rediscover basic prin

e~ch

intel~Lgent

generation, and would appear much less

than iVe now do in the tests designed for our ci.vilizationo

Toll this

sense, many IQ points in any individual could be attributed to the Arabs,
who gave us a number system, or to other previous cultures, whose learn....
ing was efficiently passed on to us through the medium of interp3rsonal
communication.
Hayes (1962) makes the same point, arguing that thought is possi
ble without la ngua ge, but such thought is unlikely to be highly produc
tive.

Language enables men. to process and manipulate, store, and use

information they have not individually acquired through axperience, but
have had accumulated and given to them by present and previous

cultures~

"The efficiency and flexibility of language appear to be essential for
anything approaching even the simplest of recent, human cultures • • •
(p.

327)." Most of any individualts adult knowledge, then, is cultur

~lly

determined and transmitted, some of it is gained through personal

experience, and !ll of it is learned.
Intelligence is a concept .invented to account for differences
between individuals within a century, within a culture.

Although we

may wish for sophistication in our understanding of it (and can reach

some sophistication through consideration of

c~ltural·variables),

remains a concept tied to the problem of individual differences
a culture.

it

withL~

It is most productive as an abstract representation or label

for differential efficiency at learning certain behaviors among individ
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uals with roughly the same learning opportunities.

In Fisher's (1969)

proposed definition (at an intuitive level), "Intelligence refers to the
effectiveness, relative to age peers, of the individual's approaches to

situations in which competence is highly regarded by the culture

(p. 669).
It should be pointed out that this intuitive definition could
quite easily rely upon the intelligence test as its operational cri
terion.

This time, however, in accepting the intelligence test as the

operational criterion of intelligence, we have included consideration
for the fact that it is a cultural construction, which will test an

individual's ability to respond to cultural demands.

The cultural demands of an intelligence test are more intellectual
than behavioral, and more molecular than molar.
these molecular measures do tap abilities which

meet cultural demands at a more molar level.

Interestingly enough,
all~v

the individual to

This is demonstrated by

healthy correlations between IQ Bcores and measures of scholastic

achievement (Terman, 1925; Hollingworth and Cobb, 1928; Cicirelli,

1965; and Feldhausen and Klausmeier, 1962), popularity (Jacobs and
Cunningham, 1969), responsibility and morality (Jaggers, 1934; Unger,

1964), persistence

(ltlles,

1954;

Terman,

1925), and delay of gratifica

tion (Melikian, 1959; Mischel and Metzner, 1962).

There is, for all of its appeal, something missing from a defin
ition like Fischer's::

soma

indic~tion

of the source of the individual's

competence, and, therefore, any implication about whether he is judged

intelligent because he happens to

~e

good at the skills his society

demands at the moment, or because he is able to ascertain demands and
meet them in a variety of possible ways.

It is our a rgument that the
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intelligent person is not necessarily inna-tely be-liter at what intelli

gence tests test than he is at any number of other tasks.
developed these skills, it is because he is not

o~lymore

If he has
effective at

reading cultural preferences, but also because he is better able to
chamal his behavior in efficient ways on a variety of tasks. We do

not accept the suggestion that intelligence as it is culturally de£ined,
does not reflect intelligence

!,

or renects only an arbitrarily se

lected aspect of ito
III.

MID-COURSE SUMMARY

We have nmv discussed two controversial areas which have been

instrumental in preventing a theoretical concensus upon which an oper
ational definition for intelligence could be based.
the unitary-

controversy.

VGrs1lS

We have examined

multiple-factor controversy, and the nature/nurture

For the purposes of this paper, a sunnnary at this point,

before we embark upon the third area of controversy, will provide clar
ification of our position.

further suggestionso

It will provide us the tools for handling

We shall try to synthesize the points of each

theory which are salient to our hypothesis, and we shall rely heavily

upon Hebb.
Intelligence can be described as a biologically based potential .
(derived from inheritance or prenatal, environment) for efficient, com
petent interaction with the environment--an interaction which produces

learning.

It is this learning which is the sum. total of manifest in

telligence, and which is tapped by an intelligence test.

Manifest in

telligence has a largely general-factor character because of the depen
dence of many different specific abilities upon the same biological
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variables (intelligence

!),

but any individual may have varying degrees

of ability on dlfferent tasks (either because of learning or physiology).

In fact, a few tasks (musical ability, language-leaJming ability, and
so forth) may be little related to the basic or general intelligence,

but may rather be a ttributed to Borne other specific physical variable.
Further, we argue that although intelligence tests measure only
intelligence~,

the nearly universal opportunity for essential levels

of stimulation and learning within a culture provides that manifest in
telligence will be a satisfactorily valid indicator of innate intellec·..
tual potential.

This

theor.~Gical

definition of intelligence, synthesized

f~)m

various conceptual viewpoints, could form the basis for accepting the

intelligence test as an operational criterion, if it were widely agreed

upon.

It asserts that although the test is not free of cultural in

fluence, it is a valid indicator for individual effectiveness relative

to peers wi thin the cultur'e and provides a good reflection of intaJJi
ganca!.

That is all the support one needs for use of the intelligence

test as an operational criterion--except that until many theorists can
agree upon this matter, proper refinement of our definition is impos
sible.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES

Higher mental processes aroe the t..lU..rd tra di-tiional area of contro
versy in intelligence

theo~r

come roughly a consensus).

(although the controversy,has recently be

The problem here is the distinction between

"silnpletr learning, and processes of a very abstract, complex nature.
They appear, from an eXtra-cognitive viewpoint, to be quite different

36
processes, and it has long been a matter of interest whether ore not they
relied upon the same mechanisms--especially since individual differences
in capacity for the more abstract operations might be the source of dif

ferences in intelligence.
The classical point of view was that higher mental processes in

volved neurological mechanisms

qua~itatively

different fram lower ones.

It was assumed that basic processes were mediated by simple association
al events, or habits, while the higher processes must have some obscure
(and probably iniiate) st.ructural requirements without which their func
tioning was not possible.

It was these complex cognitive or neurologi

cal structures which were thought to be the basis of il1telligence and of

individual differences in intelligence.
Hebb

(1949)

and others (Thorndike, Bregman, Cobb, & Woodyard,

1926; Hayes, 1962), placed themselves in strong disagreement with the
traditional explanation.

They all argued that all human, or even ani

mal, thought processes can be explained in terms of simple associational
structures.

There are many supportive evidences for this position.

After thorough comparison of human to animal subjects, Hebb was forced
to conclude that Uthere is no evidence to support the idea that learning
~

general is faster in higher species--even at matt~ity (Hebb, 1949,

p.

ns)."

This equality in the ability to learn among species suggests

that there is a simple, universal character to all learning--perhaps
even a basic universal element, like the association.

Hayes (1962)

reviews many other evidences in support of this conclusion.
From the v/idely held conviction that higher mental processes are
not qualitatively different from others, we deduce that these

high~level

functions must be made possible through the .sheer number of associational

Ltr
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elements or the complexity of their simple inter-associations.

Thorn-

dike, e~ al. (1926) add:
In their deeper nature the higher forms of intelleotual oper
ation are identical with mera association or connection fo~
ing, depending upon the same sort of p~~101ogical connections
but requiring many more of the:~ (P. 415).
A further evidence for the suggestion that the elements of all
thought are associational in nature is also indirect"

It is found in

the construction of computer simulations of mental processes.
Shaw, and Simon (1958), in a simulat.ion of human problem

Newell,

solving~

dis

tinguish the elements necessarJ for a system capable of solving prob

l13ms.

There must be symbolized information (memories or associations).t

primitive information processes (pres~bly, the various fixed methods
by which new associations can be formed), and programs (definite set
of ruJ_es for use of primitive associational processes).
Hayes (1962) points out that "only a few kinds
operations

of logic units or

are needed in the most powerful computers (p. 322).," so

that higher mental processes need not be different (and more difficult)
kinds of operations, but simply recombinations of Eil.emental ones.

He

also likens human lIinJlBte intellectual capaci tylt to a computer's memory
banks, and human "manifest intelligence U to its program (or education)
of operation (p. 322).

It is apparently possible to construct a'

COIn

puter capable of' fantastically complex tasks using simple elements, ~f
an associationsl nature, and this gives credence to the argument that
the same kind of structures and operations may occur in human beings.

No matter what the

campley~ty

or storage capacity of a computer,

its £'unctions are based upon simple associational elements and their
interaction.

As a result, in the simple storage of a bit of novel infor

''-Ci

,

<
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mation computers would not be expected to differ significantly in the

speed or efficiency of storage. However, there nD_ght be significant
differences bet?Joen computers in the total number of elements whioh could

be stored, and in J('ha efficiency of their recombination and their re
(:,all in relation to new, r e1evant problerns.

An analogous dichotomy

can be observed in human memory processes.
Rot.e memory pel"fonnance (that is, the recall of simple informa tion
with no meaning outside itself, like nonsense syllables) fails to dis
tinguish br~ght from dull subjects (Ct'onbach, 1970).

This may simply

reflect the universal level of difficulty in the formation of simple
aS50ciatipns with little or no reference to other knowledge.

Rote mem

ory probably reflects the simplest kind of learning, and it is therefore

no surprise that most individu.als find it equally difficult.
other memory processes are a somewhat different matter.

Some

indivi.duals seem to be significantly more efficient than others at non
:rote memory (learning and 'recall of meaningful infonr..ation), and this

variable efficiency is constantly fotmd to be correlated tQ intelli
gence-te~rt;

scores (Matarazzo, 1972; Pollert, 1969).

The source of indiv

idual differences in non-rote memory is difficult to ascertain.

Thorn

dike, at a1 (1926) related higher intellectual functions to the l'l3llllb!'}:

of associations.

Presumably,

non-r~.')"te

memory does depend upm a high

number of associations for its functioIl..i.ng.

Perhaps the possible num

ber of associations is 1imi ted by an i!'lherited potential for inter-neur
onal c.onnections.

On 'l:,he other hand, the mediator of better memory cap

acity may be some efficient manner of associational inter-connecti.on
which makes informational elstlents more available for recall.

Highly

intelligent subjects seem. to have a tendency toward holistic organiza

,drn',»
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tion of perceptions, and this kh1d of organization is known to be conduo
ive to memorization in anyone (Gardner, Jackson, & Messick, 1958; Beck,
1968; Saugstad, 1952).
capacity for

reca~

All that is known for certain is that individual

of associations is a critical factor in intelligence,

and basic to all human problem solving (Guilford, 1967)--the exact means

of efficienoy in recall, whether number

o~

kind of associational connec

tion, is in need of determination.
In addition to the mechanics of association, there may be other

factors whioh are crucial in memory processes.

There is some evidence,

for example, that certain mptivationpl factors may mediate individual
differences in memory and intelligence.

Hayes.(1962) argues, in fact,

that the only heritable illfluence on the potential amount and complexity
of learning is motivational.

Motivational variables are known to enhance

memorization (for examPle, Weiner, 1966). We shall treat this area of
interest at a later time.
Memory, of course, does not represent the only kind of associa

tional process.

These processes are involved in the development of per

ceptual systems, slr;mbolization, discrimination, and

generalizatio~.

Although a detailed theory of the associative nature of intelligence j.s
not developed here, it should be emphasized that all of the mechanisms
postulated for differentiation among

~dividuals

along a continuum of

intellectual efficiency are reducible- (at least in theory) to very sim
ple,

bio~ognitiye

elements on the order of the elemental association.

According to most theorists, there does not appear to be any need for
more complex mechanisms than these to be invoked in any explanation of

intelligent bahavior--although the interaction of these machinisms will
no doubt- prove to be of great complexity

It
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It is hypothesized that some innate ~~ysiological effici~cies at

interrelationship9 organization, and/or categoriza'~ion 0,.:£ simple asso
ciationa1 eleme~ts are the basis of intelligence--with the possible in
clusion of some important innate motivational or arousal variables.

Hebb has constantly stressed the equipotentiality of such associationsl
structures, and we wish to stress it again in a slightly novel appli

cation.
It would not seem likely that the basic processes of higher in
tellectual activity, having such an elemental nature, would be strongly
predisposed in very specific directions.

For if all human thought is

reducible to simple elements, those elements are obviously capable of
recombining in many different Vlays.

This is testified

to by the inter

individual variety of cognitive styles, and the intra individual flexi
bility of behavior in human beings.

It has been argued that higher men

tal processes are simply an elaboration of simple ones through learning
and experience.

Although almost all individuals are ablta to interact

properly with their environment to the extent that they develop basic
abilities for memorization, generalization,

discr.L~nation,

and so on,

the direction in which their more highly developed cognitive activities
tend to differentiate may be determined. to a Significant. extent by the
particular environment of the individual. .

Because the

higr~y

intelligent person ver.y likely has innately

superior processes of associative recombination and coordination, it
seems likely that he would tend to be more efficient than the average
at almost any intellectual activity demanded of him.

It has been shown

that highly intelligent subjects have fairly consistent, across-the
board. superiority in the culturally approved sub-tests of traditional
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intelligence tests.

We are merely arguing that were our cuJ.ture differ

ent, these same individuals would also be different-that their co.gni
tive processes are not only more efficient, but that
greater potential

fOl~

th~y

also have a

adapting to and meeting the demands of their en

vironment.

V.

FINAL SmJlh.1ARY

This ends our attempt at constructing a theoretical system upon

which to base an operational definition of human intelligence.

We now

have several justifications for accepting the intelligence test as our
operational criterion, as long as the sample population is specified
and certain other qualifications are borne in mind:

1.

Tested behavior is learned behavior, but it is reflective o£

an innate potential (intelligence
2.

!).

Tested behavior is culturally influenced, but significant

nonetheless in determining the cognitive efficiency of jndividuals rel
ative to their peers.

3.

Tested behavior is beha'\1ior selected by the culture as impor

tant wi thin that culture, but highly intell:i.gent people should have the
same relative r:otential capability at most other, unselected tasks as·

they demonstrate on the intelligence test, if the tasks are of a cogni
tive nature.

This potential maYt however, be undeveloped.

Because of these justifications, we should be able to deal with

intelligence-test data as a valid manifestation of the collection of
phenomena ws mean when we speak of intelligence (intelligence

!).

We

shall devote no further efforts either to justification or to qualifi
cation of our definitions of

inte~ig~nce.

.... M· ...

t~

--

,

0

Those we have already recog
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nized will from this point on be assumed.
It is important, however, that more than justifications and quali
fications be retained from this chapter. we have also tried to get at
the essential

nat~~e

of intellectual processes.

Every understanding

which it is possible to glean from what we have discussed about the
workings of intelligence will be needed,

~f

we are to deal with the

interaction of intelligence with other variables within the individual.

We now move on to our second major area of concern:

creativity.

CHAPTER III

CREATIVITY
According to the step-by-step method of definition we have been
following in this paper (Matarazzo, 1972), we should tr,y to estabJish
for ourselves a generally acceptable, intuitive defirlition for creativ
On the face of it, this task would seem. a great deal more diffi

ity.

cult for creativity than for intelligence.

The h:i.ghly subjective nature

of typical working definitions of creativity is darno;nstrate.d, by the 1'01

lowing anecdote:

(At) a leading Midwestern University••
an old, experi
enced teacher and scholar said that he tried to encourage
originality in his students. In a graduate course, he told
the class that the t~r.m paper would be graded in terms of
the amount of originality shown. One school teacher in the
class was especially concerned about getting a high n~rk in
the course. She took verbatim notes, continuously and as
siduously, of what the learned professor said in classc Her
term paper, the story goes, was essentially a str:L.'1ging to
gether of her transcribed lecture notes, in which the Pl~
fessor 1 s pet ideas were given a prominent place. It is re
ported that the professor read the term papers himself.
When the- sC-.~ool teacher's paper' ¥las returned, the profes
sorts mark was an A, with the added comment, "This is one
of the most original papers I have ever readu (Guilford,
1950, p. 448).
G

Originality has long been one of the most widely agreed upon syno
nyms for creativity, and obviously it can have validity
own.

probla~

of its

Fortunately, most creativity researchers are able to be more con

sistent and empirical than are college lecturers and high school teach
ers.

But it has proved difficult, even for them, to decide upon ori

tena by which to define creatiVity.

Here are some of their efforts.

II

•

44
I.

ATTEMPTS AT AN INTUITIVE-LEVEL DEFINITION

From philosophers, thinkers, and creative artists has been culled

a general pattern of

agraeme~t

In part,

about the nature of creativity.

creativity is perceived to be an awareness of new, hidden relation

ships--an awareness made possible only by past discipline and learning
which are reapplied to a present situation (Koestler, 1970).

For

Poincar~, creation

does not consist in making new combinations wi-th mathemati
cal enti't,ies :..llready knO'vm. Anyone could do that, but the
combinations so made Ylould be infinite in number and most of

them absolutely without L~terest. To create consists pre
cisely in not making useless combinations and in making those
which are only a small minority. Invention is discernment,
choice (PoincarA, 1952, p. 35)1
Stephen Spender (1952) stresses concentration, and memory

~hich

is task directed-that is, a memory for sights and sounds and smalls
which could have possibilities as future elements for

creat~on.

He

alsQ calls upon "inspiration, n a nebulous word which might be translated
as the sudden appearance of a good (selected and useful), novel idea.
Einstein alludes to "combinatory play [which] seems to be the essential
feature· in productive thoughtlt and adds that this play is ttaiIUed to be
analogous to certain logical connections one is searching for (Einstein,

1952" po 43).n
C~ati vity,

then, according to some of those most

~enerally

rec

ognized as being unquestionably in possession of it, is the remembrance
of past learning or experience, recombined (playfully?), and selected
for usefulness, often with concerted a ttention toward a predetermined
goal.
,Frank Barron

(1952, 1958, 1959, 1968, 1969) was one of

~he

first

4,
psychologists to concentrate his efforts on outlining a definition of
creativity, in
tions.

t~rms

as precise as possible, and exploring its implica

His intuitive-level definition is a composite, derived from

sources like the ones we have just touched upon.

it suggests thai orig

inality is the ~ine .qu~ n0Il: of creativity (Barron, 1969).

O'thers

(Brogden and Sprecher, 1964; Taylor and Holland, 1964; Getzels and
Jackson, 1962) have concurred.
criterion of creativity.

Originality is well established as a

It is a very useful concept, because it can

quite easily be operationally

d~fined:

originality is merely the un

usual, as nspecified statistically in terms of incidence of occurrence
(Barron, 1969, p. 25). n
But most investigators also agree with Barron that originality,
in itself, is not enough to provide clear identification of creativity.
An original response Itmust correspond to some extent to, or be adaptive
to, reality (Barron, 1969, p. 25).1f
cr~ativity--it

Thus, mere eccentricity is not

must have soma selective process performed upon it; it

must have some value to justify itself, much as suggested by Poincar~

(1952; see also Brogden and Sprecher, 1964).
This evaluation of originality as to its usefulness and adaptive
ness is the main area of controversy in creativity research.

Original

ity is easily accepted as an operational criterion of creativity.

But

it is much. more difficult to define and measure the ways in which orig
inality should be useful or selected.

The difficulty is two-fold:

it

is hard to determine what criteria individuals should impose on them
selves, and therefore what behavioral correlates should accompany origi
nality in the creative person; and it is difficult to judge the level of
creativit.y represented by any individual on a task which we wish to make

an operational criterion of creativity.
The questions about the selective aspects of creativity have not
by any means been resolved.

Mainly in this area have arisen disagree

ments among theorists about the theoretical or intuitive-level defin:t
tion of creativity--and disagreement is certainly plentiful.

From each

theoretical faction in the controversy has come a different test of
creativity, and as a result many different tests have been adopted as
operational criteria for creativity.
Because of this hopeless

sp~inteting"

we shall tentatively ac

oept all of the creativity tests as operational criteria of creati'vit.y,
and shall later present some justification for such a leap of faitho
Accordingly, ignoring the chaos at both the intuitive and operational
levels of definition, we shall move on to the third level.
II.

VALIDATIONS, CORRELATIONS, AND THE UNITARY CONCEPr

Vlhen he had a rough personal definition of the object of

~~s

terest, Binet put together a test, and went out to sse if it 'Would

as an operational criterion.

in
WOrd:

In validating the test, he compared i t,5

results with pooled judgments of teachers about the "intelligence" of
his subjects

0

Having met with considerable success in that kind of com

parison, he at least tentatively accepted his own operational definition.

This kind of process is the third step in the task of definition
suggested by Matarazzo (1972), which he calls a step of validation, cor

relation, and the discover.r of exemplars.

It is not unique to intelli

gence research, but has also gone on in the fiold of creati.vity investi
gation.
Two, methods have been used wit.h particular frequency to deal with

validating eriteria for creativity (Torrance, 1964).

The first method

is identical to one used by Binet.

A test is chosen as the possible op

"erational criterion of creativity.

It is administered, and bigh- and

low-scoring groups are selected on the basis of its resultse Then,
these groups are exami:'led to see whether or not there are any behaviors
they emit which can be identified as creative (besides those me8sured
directly by the test), and which also distinguish the high and
from each other.

lo1.~

groups

The second method is to choose some behaviors as cri

teria for creativity, to construct groups on the basis of these ucrea
tive" behaviors, and then to see if there is any other test or tests
which will differentiate between these groups.
Many tests have been found to differentiate acceptably between

groups in one of these ways.

But when these many tests of creativity

are compared to each other, we find an alarmingly weak relationship
among them.

Whereas well-accepted tests of intelligence (the Stanford-

Binet, WAIS, Army General Classification Test, Army Alpha, Army Bata,
and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) have correlations on the order of

.7-.8 with each other (Matarazzo, 1972; Wechsler, 1958), creativity tests
(none of which could actually be classif.ied as ''wall acceptadrt ) have
t.

intercorrelations of around .2-.3 (see Getze1s and Jackson, 1962; Barr.on,
~969).

Correlations such as these are high enough in some cases to pro
pose that there is a

relationsh~p bet~een

variables affecting two dif

ferent creativity tests, but they are hardly high enough to indicate
that we are measuring the same entity when we administer the two tests.
Especially in the light of creativity's weak but fairly consistent posi
tiva correlation with intelligence, it seems foolharqy to cling stead
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fastly to the idea of a unitary and gsneralized "creative response ten
dency," independent of intelligence (Wallach and Kogan, 1965a, 1965b).
Can we find analogue to the factor theory of intelligence research
in creativity?

A faotorial aspect to the creativity phenomenon seems

likely, at very least.

Each test of creativity has a correlation so

low with most others, under most conditions studied,. that it must be
tapping fairly independent variables.

It is possible that creativity

is so ttfactoradtt as to be nearly situation specific--or perhaps task
specific, with high sensitivity

t~

situational stimuli.

There has, however, been little discussion of a factor theory of
creativity.

Perhaps this is because from the very outset there has been

less assumption that creativity is a single, innate, unitary tIling.
Very few have suggested that one is "born" wlth creativity, in the

sense that one might be born with intelligence.

The~e

has been no no

ticeable tendency (perhaps because of the Sisyphian nature of such a

position) to suggest that anyone measure of creativity can define it.
Although there is always the stated or u..l1stated assumption that crea

tivity is a phenomenon unitary enough to be used to distinguish those
who have it from those who do not, at least in relative terms, the em
phasiS has always been upon broad-based and varied assessment in such a
task (Torrance, 1962)--as if there ware not one creativity, but many.
Actually, if creativity tests all showed .2-.3 correlations with
each other and factored out upon multivariate analysis into several semi
independent factors, we should have a clear basis for theorization, al
though it would be different from theories constructed up to now.

But

there are other data which constructively complicate the issue.
Some

creati\~ty

measures, although rare in number, ShOVi quite good

1'"'=

'l

«g
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correlations with each other.

Barron' 5 Independence of Judgment Test

correlated 07 with teacher ratings of creativity, Mednickts Remote As
sociations Test (RAT) correlated

~7

with ratings of creative writing,

and biographical information has several times shown relationships of

.30-.55 with

othel'l creativity meaSUl"es (all referred to in Taylor and

Holland, 1964).
Some of these atypically strong relationships are fairly easily
understood.

The RAT, for example, is a measure of t,he subject's abilj.ty

to solva a three-part verbal relatidnship problem, 'where the answers
are words not in common usage.

a person has free access to

It stands very much to reason that if

tu~common

words for usa in problem

solv~ng,

he has a much better chance of being a good creative writer.

But the example of the intercorralation of the Independence of
Judgment Test with teacher ratings, even. making
reliability of

~he

allc~ances

for the un

ratings, is not merely the result of a relationship

between variations of a single task.

Presumably, creativity, as seen

by the teacher, and independence of judgment have no logical relationship

to each othar--unle$s it is through their corr:mon
tty.

J.~elat,i.on

to creati'v

Here, then, is evidence of some kind of generalization of creative·

responses, either from one task t.o another, or from one level of behav.ior
(cognitive independence) to another (overtly behavioral, rated creativ

ity).
Another kind of compljcation in deciding whether or not

creati'~ty

rnaBsures are independent or tap a global phenomenon is. found in the work
of Wallach and Kogan (1965a, 1965b).

Although half-conrinced at the cut

set that the mpst consistent variable measured by creativity tests was

intelli.gence, they decided to alter typical testing condit.ions and to

50
look for some situational variable which might be able to save the uni
tarx-phenomenon concept of creativity--an idea too attractive to be eas
ily abandoned..

They reasoned that a typical tttest" situation, with its

constrictions and tensions and pressures, could not possibly allow sub
jeets to show their full creative

~apaeity,

since creativity is closely

related to plaY"experimentation, and spontaneity.
ministered their tests in a "creative" situation.

Therefore, they ad
Subjects were not

placed in large groups, there were no time limits, and the academic
trappings which are usually found in a test situation were removed to
the fullest possible extent.

With great efforts and precautions, con

ditions were made to resemble a IIgame lt situation.

Teachers and princi

p'als ware not involved, the word "test ll was not mentioned, and young
ladies administered the tests.
The resUlts of these manipulations

'Vi ere

rather surprising, even

wh.en due account :1.s taken .(or their limited generality.

among the creativity measures was

.4.

Correlations

This is unusually high, consider

ing the number of tests involved {five}--even though four of the tests
deal with word usage, and three of these are extremely similar in natura.
One of the tests, however, is a visual test, and although the authors
do not mention its specific reliability in relation to the other tests,

we shall assume that some generalization was evident across tasks.

It

is also very likely that the change in test conditions, rather than pro
viding a truer measure of creativity and thus higher correlations between

tests,. presented a- wide variety
of play !reues" and in that way increased
.
the generalization of creative responses.

The rest of tha Wallach and Kogan results do not bear directly
upon the question of creativity as a 1J1litary phenomenon, but they do
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suggest caution interpreting the high correlations
creativity measures.

obtaine~

among the

Curiously enough, the high correlations were not

the result of an across-the-board increase in the creative output of
all the creative subjects--although this might have been expected to be
the case.

The data showed that other variables were interacting with

creativity level in determining the responsiveness of individuals to the
playful atmosphere.

An extraordinarily low correlation was obtained

between intelligence and the creativity measures in this situation
(replicated by

Galanter~

1967).

Under ordinary conditions, we can expect correla tions of

.2-.4

between creativity and intelligence--if the sample has a fairly broad
IQ-score range (Ripple and May, 1962).

Since the magnitude of the cor

relation between creativity and intelligence has been decreased, there
are two possible explanations for the effect of the situational manipu
lations.

Ei.ther the high-IQ children are less creative in this s itua

tion, or the low-IQ chj.ldren are more creative in it than is usually the

case.

It does not seem very likely that any group would be less crea

tive because of a non-test$ untimed, non-authoritarian atmosphere.

Tnat

leaves the possibility 'chat the low-IQ children were more responsive to
the creative context of the testing than the high-IQ groupo
suggestions might be extended:

Why?

Three

(a) high-IQ children were better able to

interpret the situation as j.t actually was, a testing procedure, and
were less free to respond unusually creatively than were the less obser
vant children, (b) high-IQ children were less able to chang~ their be
havior patterns in !'esponse to a quick change of cues, having a more
internalized

comple~

of test responses, and (c), originality was the

only criterion used to determine the creativity level of the test

it

fS

j

lfWb

gt;

1"e8
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ponses; it is to be expected that originality would be. much easier for
lees-bright children to produce than would adequate. selective processeso
. Tn the area of selection, bigh-IQ children would have their clearest ad..·

vantage in responding creatively, and this would not be represented at
all in the data.

Although there is not enough information available to answer the
questions raised by the results of this study, they do provide an indi

cation that when we ara studying interrelationships among creativity mea
sures, it is unsafe to ignore other variables which might be distorting
the results.

In this case, the modif.ying variable was intelligence, and

intelligence has often been inadequately' treated in the research of crea
tivity.

Fortunately, Wallach and Kogan did not simply match for intel

ligence, and thus lose information about its effects, but rather divided
their sample into a two-by-two matrix to deal with differential levels
of both creativity and intelligence. Without such procedures, it will
be impossible to make logical sense of the creat,ivity f:L-eld.

Answers

we may get to the question of the unitary quality of creativity would
have the possibility of being based on unsound presuppositions.
We have seen, then, some e vidence that cI'eativity is a global phen

omenon, but we do not know for certain how reliable the evidence may be.
T~ere

remain, however, other kinds of evidence of the global quality of

creativity.

These data are the correlations between creativity tests and

tests of personality traits or patterns.

They are another example of

exemplar or correlate validation, and have been vigoro\lsly accul1lulated,
in spite of the tentative nature of their foundation.

Almost all meas

ures assumed to be assessments of creativity have been thoroughly cor
related with personality traits.

ttl" .

The only compelling aspect of this evi

a$ ,

.,

Hi

dance is the consistency with which certain personality patterns have
been found to correlate with creativity, no matter which creativity mea
sure is used.
Every human being who is not profoundly retal':ded is capable of
creative behavior, just as he is capable of intelligent behavior.
some individuals" if not more

orea~ively

But

capable than others, are at

least more frequently found behaving creatively.

There seem to be cer

tain cognitive and personality characteristics which have a higher·..than

average probability of occurrence in these people--whether beca,JSo these
characteristics are conducive to creativity, or because they are

coder~n

dent variables with it.
Cocharacteristics of a cognitive type are good memory, cognition,
evaluation, convergent productions, and especially cLi..vc'1rgent productions,
to follow Guilford's general system (1967).

More specifically, Taylor

and Holland (1964) express the covariables as original:Lty" redefinition,
-adaptive and spontaneous flexibility, associational, expressional, and
ideational fluency, elaboration, and evaluation (see also Barron, 1968,

1969) •
Cocharacte~istics

traits include:

bearing a closer resemblance to personality

flindependence,

self-suffici~ncy,

tolel'ance of smbigu

ity, 'fem:inine· interests, and professional self-confidence (Taylor,

1964, p& 180).tt Creative people have also been suggested to display an
abundance of fantasies, play, humor, problem- and pattern-awareness,
autonomy, judgmental independence$ stability, dominance, self-assertion,
pr~ference

for complexity, self-acceptance, adventurousness, curiosity,

and self-control (Taylor and Holland, ~964; also Bal~n,
Day, 1968).

1952, 1958;

110st of the personality "traits" correlating with our creativity
construqt are difficult to measure with any accuracy, and are not known
to be stable or generalized over situations, even if they could be
accurately ascertained (Mischel, 1971, pp. 147-150).

Therefore, they

are themselves in urgent need of clear operatioral definition and have
difficulty in supporting the weight of some additional undefined con
struct.

Nevertheless, they do form part of a clear and logical pattern,

which is consistent over many tests for differentiating creativity
according to "personality" variables.

It is necessary to deduce as much

from this kind of evidence as it is possible to deduce.

Even their

unreliability and situation specificity can be used as a sort of infor
mation--for when, in spite of such unreliability and specificity, lfe care
upon such clear patterns, they are very likely to indicate something,
although it may not be what we expect.
Although the personality-test correlations with creativity measures
are evidence of a global, unitary pattern of creativity, they, too, are
insufficient proof that such a pattern reflects the actual case.
We have come near to the limit of the useflllness of correlational

data in creativity research.

It is clear that they have given us sig

nals about fruitfUl areas of search, but they can never answer in a
final way the question of the molarity of creativity.

Nor can they be

situationally specific enough to explain why creativity comes about.
Nor can they be cognitive enough in approach to explain what processes
are at -che basis of creative respond.ing
other tools.

8

For these questions, we need

III..

CREATIVITY TRAINING A1TD THE

UN'IT1~RY

CONCEPI'

Experiments in the ,training of creativity offer an excellent

source of information about whether or not creativity is a global phen
o.menon.

If

'ViS

can discover enVirOTh11sntal manipulations which

resuJ~t

in

creativity, we shall be in a position to make valuable guesses about hm!

it is that creative behaviors come about in nonexperimental situations.
Fux'tihermore, through training studies it is easiest to ascertain how ex
'tensiV'el:;:- creative behaviors are interl'¥:JJ.ated-.. . that is, -whether specific
ones

al~e

generalj,zed to other tasks or situations, whether other respon

ses result spontaneously 1X om the acquisitj.on of one creative response,
j

wht::rtiher very specific beha1fiors generalize to It.ore molar behaviors, and

so

OZ1 f1

If these kinds of getleralizations do occur, they will be substan

tial e\ridence for the global, l.Ulitary character of' creativity.

Uni'ort,una-t.ely, the complexity of these problems as. well as the
different possible levels 'of generality, the huge variety of possible
discrimina ti va stimuli, and so on, demands that a rigorous and system
atic body" of research be compiled which deals with each possible combin
ation of various t.ypes of variables.

And this quantity and quality of

research have not yet been achieved.

The studies 'which a 1"a presented

here are an example of t·ha i..'1adequa cies of the present status of the

c

re~

search--not so much by their i.neli,vidual weaknesses as by their collec

tive ones.

They indicate, nevertheless 1 some critical points of inter

est and significance, to wl'l..ich we shall call attention,.
Maltzrnan and his a ssccia tea, for E'.xa!~lple, (1,~I tzman" 1967; Ualtz

man, Simon, Rasking, and Licht, 1967) have made many closely related
studies in the training of orig:i.nal verbal responses.

Their method,
i
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for the most part, has been to demand several different sets of respon
ses to the same set of stimulus words--a procedure designed to encour
age the practice of creative responses without introducing any reinforce·...

ment into the training.

For their consistency and concentration of

study, they are to be commended, although this writer is of the opinion
that no claar reflections of reality will be obtained from situations in
which contingencies are the variables held constant.

Appropriately

enough, in the light of our reservations about this approach, it has met
,'lith ve'r,J' mixed success ..
For example, Simon, Lotsof and Wycoff (1966), using the Hatzman
technique on fourth, firth, and sixth graders, reported that their sub
jects emitted no more original responses to a new list after one day of
training, although they did show results after three days of training.
The authors point out that college-age subjects do shmv learning effects
after only one day.
McDonald and Martin (1967), with a slightly different isechnl.que,
used verbal reinforcements to shape original associations.

The.y were

successful, although there was a differential ease of training, depend-'
ing upon whether subjects were high or low in creativity at the
the training was initiated.

However, when

t~e

~ima

subjects were administered

the RAT, a test of crea"tivity which ?epends upon the use of novel word
associations, E£ transfer (generalization) was observed~

(1966) also had difficulty
ity training.
co~related

Simon, at a1.

in obtaining generalization of word-original

They found some transfer to measures of personality traits

with creativity, but only in older subjects, and only after

fairly extensive training.
From these two studies we infer that ,training, when concentrated
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on ver,y molecular tasks, does not transfer verywell--even to other
tasks at the same, molecular level and of a closely similar type.

Al

though Simon, et ale (1966) obtained some transfer tendencies to more
molar behaviors (personality trait tests), thairTesults can be held
somewhat in doubt" given the McD::mald and Martin (1967) failure to ob
tain generalj.zat1on

acros~

much more closely related tasks" and the

tentative nature of personality assessment.

Levy's (1968) training procedure included both the specific rein
forcement of certain responses and a more molar method of creativity
training, based on modeling and role identification.

He also tried to

measure the effects of this multidirectional technique upon both molec
ular and molar behaviors.

The best combination of training

m~thods

for

both molar and molecular task performance was a composite of reinforce
ment for specific original responses, modeling of specific responses, a

general "rele" model, and praise to the model in the presence of the
child--and this combination did have significant results.
Results strikingly similar to these were found by Brown (1965) in
his study with adult subjects.
worked bast.

To

s~~rize

Again, the composite training method

his method in slightly more operant terms

than those used by Brown, creativity and conformity were introduced to

the subjects in the form of animal sy.mbols--which were used to

ev~luate,

reinforce, or punish behaviors as they were emitted by students in the
classroom.

At the same time, strong. emphasis was placed by the teacher

on challenging clich6s, supporting new ideas, and so on.

The training

procedures were quite significantly effective.
In both of these studies using composite training teclmiques, one

critical limitation stands out clearly:

although subjects were well

,8
capable after training of emitting creative responses of both a specific
and a general nature, they did not manifest any significant change until

- given some extra cue that the kinds of responses learned or learned
about during training were now appropriate in a different situation.

In both studies, subjects demonstrated significantly increased creativ
ity only after the:r had been asked to take the posttraining
their models would take them.

l.t.est~s

as

Presumably, this suggestion brought -the

rewards observed by the subject-to be accorded to the model into the
subject's contingency expectations.
To clarif.y this phenomenon, Brown (1965), whose study included
animal-symbol models of both creativa and conforming behavior patterns,
asked some of his subjects to take the posttraining tests as would their
conformist animal model.

Surprisingly enough, Brown found that under

these request conditions, subjects could appear significantly mora oon
forming on the tests--their behavior actually did closely approximate
the conforming animal model t s • Although they had constantly he ard

ent ..,

icism of this modal, and praise of his polar opposite, subjects had equal
co~~and

them.

of and replicative powers for the behavior patterns of both of

This presentation of cues to the subject for which behaviors are

expected is labeled "triggering" by Brown.
~odeling

Evidently, in the process

Df

and reinforcement, subjects "learned" all of the new responses,

performed none of them spontaneously, but. per.fonned either kind well when
"triggered1l to do so.
In another striking set of findings, Renner (1970) demonstrated
generalization of creativity training at a molar level to completely
dissimilar global tasks.

College-age subjects were presented with lec

tures on the novelty and complexity of art accompanied by slides of
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modern paintings.

From pretest to posttest subjects showed, as might

have been expected, significant increases in tolerance for novelty and
complexity in visual stimuli.

More significantly, experimental subjects

also shmted more tolerance for novelty and complexity in'musical stim
uli.

Finally, and most significantly of all, experimental subjects per

formed mot'e creatively than controls on a test of verbal divergent
thinking (a Guilford creativity test).
These results are doubly impressive becanse, to all appearances,
learning and transfer of global, creative behaviors was accomplished
without need of a triggering stimulus.

Of course, it

j_s

very possible

that the constant emphasis on art throughout the treatment and testing
procedures provided a very subtle discriminative stinru:l:-us for narty"
responses.

What is important is that even if a stimulus was present to

trigger the creative responses, it was not an outright and explicit
command.

People can evidently be taught to act creatively in appro

.priate situations; they need not always release creative behaviors a
package at a time, on cue, like vending machines.
There is indication in this study that the only discriminative
stimulus accutely necessary to the subject is some manifestation of a
ncreative" atmosphere, in which creative responses appear likely to be

reinforced.

This was what Wallach and Kogan

achieve, but they were probably
tures and so on.

les~

(~965a, 196~o)

attempted to

successful than slides and art lec

Artistic training WBy in itself be more effective in

generalizing creative behaviors, because of the fact that the complex of
behavior patterns (or role) it represents is very familiar to us.

Our

familiarity might be the result of direct artistic training or of con
sistently modeled behaviors

(artist-acquai~tances,

or media representa
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tion of-the artistic life style), but it can be easily assumed that we
know how to behave ttartisticallyn in the proper setting" whether or not
we have ever performed any specific behaviors before.
\Vbat pattern are we to make of these few examples of creativity
training projects?

Clearly t hey do not sample widely or deeply enough

to tell us much for certain (and this is not a weakness limited to our
sample).

But we have seen enough to hint at several general principles.

First, it has been often demonstrated that in any particular sit
uation a tendency toward creative or original or uncommon responses

~

be learned, and so also can a tendency toward common responses (Brown,
1965; McDonald and Martin, 1967).

The ease of this learning is depen

dent, however, on several variables.
For example, in a procedure shaping an uncommon response tendency
through reinforcement, learning was stronger in older subjects (Simon,
et al., 1966).

However, when an uncommon response tendency is enhanced

by a change in discriminative stimuli (setting), lower-IQ subjects seem
more responsive (Wallach and Kogan, 1965a, 1965b; Allen and LeVine,

1968). Mental processes can be assumed to be more efficient in both
older and brighter subjects, but these groups show opposite tendencies
in the studies presented.

It is possible that the acquisition of new

behaviors is easier for individuals with better cognitive development
and differentiation, but that those behaviors already acquired are more
strongly internalized and durable in the more highly intelligent.

How

ever, other interactions make such a simple explanation unlikely.

In

telligence and pretreatment

creati\~ty

levels are known to interact sig

nificantly, although it is not known why this is the case
Kogan, 1965a).

(~"allach

and
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The second major

~neralization

to be derived from the studies wa

have reviewed is that the molecular/molar nature of the creative behav

. iora trained has a strong effect on the effectiveness of the training.
Specific training of very specific creative behaviors, like novel word
a~sociation,

seems not to generalize suocessfully to any other behaviors,

whether they are global or specific--even when -chey are strongly simi
lar to the learned originality task (Simon, et a1., 1966; McDonald and
Martin, 1967).

If this were all we knew about creativity,

Tie

should have

to surmise that each minutely specific creative behavior must be indi
vidually learned, and is strongly resistant to generalization.
However, the picture is entirely different when we consider train
ing procedures comprised of both molar and molecular elements.

If a

training process includes reinforcement of specific tasks of original
ity as well as modeling of many creative behaviors and/or a presentation
of creativity rules to follow, the learning of specific, original res
ponses is readily learned e ' Under these same training conditions, learn
ing may generalize to other, more general behaviors, if discriminative
stimuli are present to encourage transfer. With an appropriate stimulus
situation, learned creativity at a completely global-behavioral level
can transfer to other equally general behaviors.
~ost

In summary, it seems

efficient, in terms of ready,learning of both specific and general

ized creative tendencies, to

inco~porate

into the training many differ

ent shaping and modeling and cue-presentation techniques.

Until our

culture has progressed to the point where almost all a,ctivities can be
acceptably considered fair territory for creativity, it may also be im
portant to involve in the

trainL~g

situational stimuli which are clear

cues that Ucreativity is spoken here" U such as nru.sic and art.
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IV.

SUMMARY & A RETURN 'ro DEFINITIONS

Is creativity global in

nature~

The answer seems to be that it

can generalize. if enhanced by broad-spectrum training and if presented
I t is our guess the.t area. ti v

with appropriate discrimina.ti ve stimuli.

ity tends naturally to generalize but 1s extremely sensitive to discrim
ina.tiva stimuli.

Broad spectrum training pro\"1des the.t more stimuli

m

herent 1n a novel situation will be functional as cues for creative behavior-and cues which are verbalized. or represented as symbols, will

make generalization even easier.

It is this reliance upon discrimin

at1ve stimuli for the generzlleat10n of previously learned e creative
responses whioh gives them the

appea~nce

and the pattern of task

specific or 81tuation-specifio bemvior, even though they may always

be well within the subjeot's capabilities.
It probably happens that those individuals reinforced and not

,punished by their enVironment for a certain creative behavior pattern
are also usually reinforced for other creative behaviors, but not !!l
others. The demands of the environment would sha.pe different profiles'
for each 1nd1vidual, but on the whole,

environments would tend to be

accepting of a. certain degree of original!ty for each class of behavior 0

We suggest

tha~any

behavior, if novel or deviant or original to

ta1n degre~, would be unacceptable

to a

~

oer

culture-ld.th some qualifica

tions (deviant art is more acoeptable than deviant theology).

When we put a. subject in a. laboratory, a.nd train him to :respo;ui
originally or creatively in one particular way, we are probably not

causing a revolutionary change in his general pa. ttern of expeota.tiona
about his environment's reward or toleration of originality.

Thus, it
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should prove to be no surprise that his specifically trained original
If, however, we use a

behavior does not transfer:- to other situations.

compos1 te a.pproach in his training, and. especially if we train not only

specific behaviors but also whole behavior patterns (both cognitive and
social), and if we provide cues that the training situation can be com

pared or generalized to a new 81tua.tlon, we may a.ctually change his

reward expectation for a whole oomplex oforiginal
shall see genera.lizatlon,

bahavlor-~nd

we

Our subject will have learned to expect his

environment to accept and reinforce a higher level of originality than
was h1s previous expeotation.
It may prove helpful to look to this concept of the acceptable
"level of orlg1na.11ty" for a. solution to the problem of definj.ng Qre

a i!brlty.

Ra.ther than seeking to fInd creativi ty D

think of creat1vi ty as a. continuum, a.long

~oh

the entity D we can

a.lmost a.ny behavior

could be placed. Any single response oould thus be evaluated in terms
of its degree of creativity.

Since creativity has been roughly agreed

to be represented by originality plus quality or utility. a. crea.tive
response could be evaluated etatistica.lly for 1ts frequency of occur
rence and then by consensus as to 1 ts value..

By the same token,

a.

creative individual could be distinguished by the rate of statistically
mre but subjectively useful and valuable behaviors he has emitted.
This kind of approach could not only. standardize and objectifY differ

entiatlon of area. tiva indIviduals" but it would also help us get -:8.t

(or by) the problem of what creativity is and whether or not it is
global.

Aooepting the hypothetl~l and atlpulative definition of indi
vidual crea.tivlty a.s the rate of statistically uncommon but judged-to

!

•
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be-valuable responses, of an.y sort, we can now return to the problem of

the opera.tlona.l. definition of crea.t1vity with a better perspectiva for
solving it.

Oreativity is the measured degree of originality and usefulness
in any set of responses, relative to peers, for any kind of behavior

exam1ned. Any oreativity test-, then, can be used a.s a.n operational
criterion for creativity at that task--as long as
is taken into a.ocount.

~sponse

originality

}'leasurea of fluency a.nd the ratio of original

responses to the total number emitted are other ways to approach cre
ativity assessment. and eaoh MS its merits!
aceepted~

these will be marginally

We shall thus accept most measures nominated as tests of

creativity, but only in regard to the particular behav:tors they require.
And we shall not expect tha.t these IIlE'Asures and. the responses they

l:"aP

resent will be strongly related to allY other response tendenoy, espe

c1a.1ly in an experimental setting.

CHAPTER

rv

AN ASSOCIATIONISTIC APPROACH
TO CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE
We have tentatively defined creativity as the production of sta
tisticaJ~y

uneommon, but valuable responses.

Ttds definition is prac

ticable in the examination and evaluation of overt behavior, but it is
of little use in investigating how it is that creative responses come
about.

By this

we mean both the socio-envil'orunental "how" of creative

behavior (that is" its external causes), and th,e cogn:ttive "how" (that
is, its internal causes).

This chapter will deal with the cognitive

processes of which creative behaviors are the products" and suggest
possible explanations for the way in which they hava their effect.

It

will also compare creativity, at a cognitive level" with intelligence

--in an effort to show whether the two variables have any intrinsic
antagonism, or, to the contrary, any essential
I.

cOgP~tion.

NOVEL ASSOCIATIONS AND SELECTION

For our purposes, Donald Campbell (1960) provides the best model'
of the fundamental' nature of creative thought processes.
a model of creative thought, however.

It is not only

It is also a sketchy conceptual

ization of all higher thought processes.
Campbell conceives of intelligent behavior as a manifestation of
an organism1s freedom from direct stimulus control--the introduction of

mediating processes between t he ,environment and the organism. With
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increasing complexity, species become increasingly better able to deal
with and receive information from their environments without direct
physical interaction (see also Hebb, 1949; Piaget, 1967; Gibson, 1970;
and Diamond, Balvin, and Diamond, 1963, for corroborating views).

But the development of complex systems for indirect manipulation
of the environment depends strongly upon the influence of that environ
mente

An organism at the primitive level

e~its

random locomotion, re

ceives direct sensory input, and has its random behaviors ttselected tt by
that input--usua'lly,in a very simple, approach/avoid manner.

This is

what Campbell calls "blind variation and selective retention. II V{hen an
organism is capable of somewhat less direct methods of sensory input,
it has merely acquired a means of representing to itself a sensori-motor
exploration of its environment.

It has a way of obtaining information

without direct manipulation. With each increase in a species I neuro
logical complexity and each process

o~

environmental selection, the

species becomes more adept at internal, representational manipulation
of its environment.

At the highest levels of development, we call this

ttL"'ltelligent behavior u (see also Hayes, 1962).

Campbell elaborates:

At this level there is a substitute exploration of a sub
stitute representation of the environment, the "solu-'c,ionn
being selected from the multifarious exploratory thought
trial~ according to a criterion which is in itself substi
tuting for an e.."Cternal state of affairs. Insofar as the three
substitutions are accurate, the solutions when put into overt
locomotion are adaptive, leading to intelligent behavior which
lacks overt blind floundering and is thus a knowledge process
(p. 384).
Innate intelligence (that is, inteD.igence A,)

an~

learning inter

act in this process, and have their effect on the quality of the pro
duct.

Individu~ls

may differ Ifin the accuracy and detail of t.heir rep

resentations of the external world (Campbell, po 391). n Presumably,
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with greater intelligence a greater intake of sensory information can be
acoomplished, and with less distortion and better retention than might
occur in a less efficient 5,Ystem.
r~tiplies

At the same time,

learni~g

experience

the amount of stored information, which, among other things,

enables the organism 1 s internal representation of the environment to be
garnished with greater detail and accuracy.

Learning also increases

the number and range of responses possible to the organism.

Most import

antly, the informational elements acquired in learning are essential
building blocks for random recombination--the recombination which is
half of· the creative process.
When various random associations are made, they are subject to
many selection criteria.

This is fortunate, for the number of useful

solutions is probably just an infinitesimal minority of the total pos
sible associations (as Poincar~, 1952, observed).

The primary selective

criterion is, of courss, that an associative combination be an appropri
ate lIfit" to the enviromnent--that is, that it be realistie, to use the
term in a slightly unusual and literal sense.

But other criteria also

operate on combinations--criteria derived from experience in problem
solving, rule verbalization, and so on•. Some individuals should be bet
ter at maintaining simultaneously more such selection criteria, thus in
creasing their "likelihood of achieving a serendipitous advance (Camp
bell, p. 391)."

Logically, highly intelligent people should be better

able to accomplish such a

f~at.

What Campbell describes,

j.n

short, is really a matter of happy

variations, or associations, arising partly by accident, partly because
of the cognitive furniture of their host.

Certain of these associations

or combinations are chosen as solutions because they meet the criteria
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of the problem-solving situation, or because they meet the criteria of an
artistic product.
This .point of view is not incompatible with more extra-cognitive
approaches.

Barron or Taylor might see Campbell's creativity as a pro

cess of producing original or creative
which is enhanced by

j.nte~ligence

and

prod~cts

(novel associations)

sen~itivity

to the environment

(accurate representation of reality as stored information), by learning
(which provides a large number and variety of elements available fGr
association, producing large possible numbers of useful associations),
and by

flexibil.it.~

(a

lac..~

of selection criteria which might inhibit the

appearance of useful novel associations)o

If creative products are

overtly evident in any individual, it is very likely that these varia
bles are in effect.
Caropbellts model is of course quite consonant with simple associa
tion theory, as it has been described in relation to intelligence. We
-have argued that human thought processes can be reduced to a

fevl

basic

operations, of which the most basic is (or is something very like) the
association.
tailor~ade

The associative model of thought and intelligence seems
for Campbell's theory of,creativity.

In fact, if all human thought processe$ are based upon simple ele
ments and operations, and if creativity can be reduced to analogous or
identical elements and operations, what distinguishes creativity from
intelligence?

If we speak of intelligence, we must start 'with neurolo

gical efficiency and innate potential, but we end up by evaluating an
individual's efficiency and adaptability relative to his peers.

Effici

encr.y and adaptability are obviously the result of rich potential for
random recombinations and effective selection criteria.

Is creativity,
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can it be, distinct from these processes?
For Campbell, creativity is not something in a diffarent cate
gorl from other kinds of thought-it is simply another high-level pro

cess of variations and selection at an eXtreme point on the creative
ness continuum.
a

To be more specific, a creative association is simply

random association which has a lower chance of statistical occurrence

in the general population than other associations, but which at the
same time survives adequate selection criteria.
Since "intelligent" associations and their .resul taut behaviors
are b.Y nature adaptive and realistic, the only distinction that remains
The factors condueive to

to creative products is their originality.

the process of random variation and selective retention are, among
others, retention and usability of past encountered solutions, and good
representation of the environment, with detail and accuracy.
Anyone of these fac,tors is basic to intellective processes
welJ.

8S

Increases in an.y one of them should cause, or enable, increases

in both intelligence and creativity to occur.

In point of fact, it is difficult to understand why intelligence
and creativity do not precisely coincide.

Barron (1957) points out one

aspect of this paradox:

If one defines originality as the adaptive and unusual, and
if one defines intel11gence simply as the ability to solve prob
lems, then at the upper levels of problem-solving ability the
manifestation of intelligence will be also a manifestation of
originality. That is to say, the very difficult problem which
is rarely solved requires by definition a solution which is
original (p. 735).
If it is true that diifieul t problems a re solved only with the
help of creativity, then it is doubly true that creativity is only pos
sl.bIe with the facilitation of intelligence.

Zaragueta (1953) suggests
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that intelligence is creative elaboration, and creativity is the ex
pression of that elaboration.

This suggestion fits quite well with

. the evidence ,ve have presented to this point.
biological efficiency of an

~ndividual

Each improvement in the

would result in better cogni

tive systems of retention or recombination or selection.
iority would be overtly manifest as

intelligence~.

This super

But since the

variables enhancing intelligence

~

would be those very variables en

hancing creativity, intelligence

~

would be creativity--creative ela

boration, expressed.

1~y

is this not exactly the case? Why are in

telligent behaviors not equivalent to creative behaviors? The paradox
of their inequality is the essential stone in the theoretical founda
tion of this paper and it is important that we now examine ,the exper
i.t'1lental 1iterature for some clue to its solution.

We must search for

some factor which differentially influences intelligence and creativ
ity, or soma indication that the assumptions we have made about their
bases are incorrect.
II.

MEMORY AND SETS

As we saw while attempting a definition of intelligence, most
theorists and test constructors agree that

memo~J

is a primar,r factor·

in intelligence, vitally important in ever.y intellective operation.
Guilford (1967) saw it as fundamental to all problem solving and even
to creative processes.

Many investigators have found relationships be

tween memory and creativity.

Therefore, memory seems .to wind itself

through both creativity and intelligence, and should be examined as a
possible source of their differentiation.
In a study with rats, Bruner, Mandler, 0' DO'vvd and Wallach (1964)

,

'
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found that only those subjects which had been overtrained in a maze
task showed the ability to transfer or generalize their learning to a
second task which was the exact opposite of the first.

Although the

transfer was affected by motivational factors, no transfer occurred
un4er any motivational state Unless the subjects had first overlearned
the task.

Apparently, the animals had to have the associative elements

they needed to manipulate firmly fixed in their memories before a novel,
or "creative," solution could be arrived at.
One examination of the relationships between intelligence, cre

ativity, and memory was carried out by Pollert,(1969)o

He hypothesized

that memory was importanc to creativity J and his results supported this
hypotheSiS, with one predictable exception:

two rote memory tasks

showed no relation to non-verbal creativity and only a very small rela
tion to verbal creativity and intelligence.

Rote memory is known to b9

quite independent of intelligence tests (Cronbach, 1910).

If it is

also independent of creativity, our hypothesis about the common origin
ation of intelligence and creativity can only be supported.
P~llert

also found that all o'cher measures of memory (that is,

meaningful memory, like memory for verbal details, objects, number, and
color)
least

w~re
on~

significantly correlated both to intelligence and to at

of the measures of creativity.

Pollert's conclusion was that

"most di'(ergent thinking involves the manipulation of information re
trieved from mstrJ:>ry or storage in addition to external stimuli (po

155). tI

Supporting evidence of the facilitating effect of memor,y upon cre
ativity is to be found in the work of Kerr and McGehee (1964), who ob
tained correlations'of .16,

.53,

and .30 between creative temperament

profiles and several different memory tes ts. (the la,st two correlations
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are significant).

These results are especially interesting because

they seem to relate memory, wlti.C:.l:l. could only exert its creativity

facilitating mediation at a cognitive level, to a global manifestation
of creative behaviors.
intellectual, as 1-isll as

Thus, creativity does seem to be dependent
socio-e~n"'irofl.men-t/al,

u!~n

variables.

Of course, it is reasonable and logical that a good memory should
increase one's potential for creativity.

Campbell's model of creative

thought provides a significant role for the storage and availability of
elements for recombination--without these elements, creativit.y is not
difficult:

it j.s impossible.

McKellar (1957), even while taking a more

phenomenological approach to creativity, is strong in his emphasis upon
the importance of stored perceptions, or trmemol'1.es. n As he puts it,
trno imagination can occur that is not composed of elements derived from
percep~ual

actual

experience {p. 23)."

The anecdotal evidence for the importance of memories

or past ex

perience in creative processes is almost limitless (Ghiselin, 19,2),
and it is supported by empirical evidence and reasoned argument.

But

is there not also reason to suspect that memor,y could be an obstacle to
. creativity?

If associational elements are too easily accessible, might

they not conflict, block each other, or result in the

d~nination

of old

solutions in new and inappropriate contexts? Can variation be limited
by retention, and memory be a handicap in creative problem solving?
Saugstad (1952) att.empted to unravel the problem with
ment on incidental memory and problem solving.

all

experi

He distinguished between

a holistic, Gestalt-type memory and an Itincidental tr memory--a memory of
isolated, concrete items.
ening.

His results were more puzzling than enlight

Task-related memory had no rGlation to problam-solving ability
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(the Pearson r was +.001).

Incidental memor,y, on the other hand,

showed negative correlations with problem solving and with school
grades.

These correlations were only significant for boys, andwithin

the boys, incidental memory seamed more of a handicap among language
majors than among physics and mathematics majors.
Although the entire meanipg, of these results is not claar, they

do provide an indication that some kinds of

memor~

(not necessarily

those correlated with intelligenoe or achievement) can interfere with
problem solving of a creative nature.

But

since there was a significant

sex difference in the effects, it is impossible to avoid motivational
considerations.
There are other studies which indicate that the problem is not

as simple as we should like it to be.
~er,

The overlearning study of

at alc (1964) reconciled previous studies by indicating both

that overlearning (or good memory and usage of information?) was a
help to flexibility in problem solving, and that it was a hindrance.
The reconciliation was accomPlished only by consideration of motiva
tional variables.
Conceivably, problem solving could represent either creative or
intelligent behavior, or both.
i~g

It is therefore possible that in hav- .

some negative effect on problem solving, a

rr~mor,y

variable is dif

ferentiating be'tween creative and intelligent cognitive behavior.

The·

most likely possibility is that such a variable covaries with what

W.9

know as intelligence, while it inhibits creativity_

Whatever the na

ture of the memory variable, it could provide some answer for the prob
lem of the apparent semi-independence of creativity and intelligence.
But uI? to this point we have been discussing Itmemorytl in a very sj.mplis
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tic manner, and we do not have the conceptual tools for handling it dif
ferently.

Memory is not a simple association.

At very best (that is,

in the simplest possible case) it is a multiple association, and it is
probably merely an aspect of complex cognitive systems from which it
can ,be only arbitrarily isolated.

Until we have some idea of what

those systems might be, it will be hard to tmderstand whether memory,

as a tlaet" which inhibits or enl'...ances future solutions, effects the
differentiation between creativity and intelligence.

Therefore we must

embark on an elaboration of our understanding of cognition.

III.

HIF1Ul~CHIES

OF NOVEL ASSOCIATIONS

We have described a general associational system for dealing with
creativity and intelligence, follcw/ing the recombination-and-selection
model of Campbell (1960).

Campbell's model, however, never reaches

specj.ficity when dealing with cognitive constructs, and we should like

to develop a more precise understanding of them.

One particular aspect

of the recombination model serves as a critical point in another hypo
thetical system.

This system is Mednick's (1962), in which a more dir-'

ectly cognitive approach is taken.

The critical point in common with

both systems is illustrated by this perceptive introspection of Poincare

(1952):
Among chosen combinations the most fertile will often be
those formed of elements drawn from domains which are far
apart# Not that I mean as sufficing for invention the bring
ing tOGether of objects as disparate as possible; most com
binati '.Ins so formed would be entirely sterile. But certain
amon£: "ism, very rare, are the most fruitful of all (p. 36).
The ('l'iginality of which creativity is composed oan be defined as

an assocj.ative combination of statistical raritytl

But it is the reasons
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such rare combinations occur (when they do occur) that hold particular
fascination for Mednick.

He believes an associat,ion to be rare because

it associates two very unlikely

fiel~

(see also, Bronowski., 19.58).

novel recombination is born not of two novel elements, but of Uvo

A

1101'

dinarytr elements which have a very 1mv probability of co-occurrence.

Together they are, to use Mednick's terrninology, a "remote association. It
.A remote association can be defjned according to a norm popula

tion, or within an individual.

If an association has a probability of

.0002 of occurrence among a random sample of lJilltmvn, Ohio residents
in response to the word "rock,1I it can be described as original.

If

it is an appropriate or useful association, it might also be described

as creative.

Unless the individual producing the response is highly

deviant from and incompatible with his social milieu, that response

will have a fairly low probability of occurrence within him as an indi
vidual, as well.

l't will probably not be the first response he emits:

it is a remote associatione

The reason it occurred in his mind, and

not in someone elsels, is that his remote associations are somehow more
accessible than others'.

The probability of occurrence, within an indivj.dual, of a partic
ular association depends upon its remoteness •. For Mednick, "remoteness"
is directly proportional to the number of other associations arising in
response to a stimulus before this particular association occurs.

If

each association possible for a certain stimulus were arranged along a

continuum, with the least likely responses at the outer edge and the
most likely ones at the inner edge, we should have a picture of our
subject's "associative hierarchyn for that particular stimulus.

If we

had plotted each response after one thousand stim,llus presentations,
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we might have half of a normal-shaped curve of probability along the
This curve would tell us the probability of any response

continuum.

for our subj act to this stimulus.

But proba bility, in this case, is

really equi valont to the degree of dominance of a response.
be

It should

readily seen that two individuals could have exactly the same words

in their response hierarcp..ies tc? a

different overt response

pattel~

ce~ain

stimulus, but have very

because of the different profiles of

dominance or probability theywoald show for the events in their hier
archies.

In any individual whose associative hierarchy is ttsteep,U there
are a few well-used responses to a certain s t,imulus which dominate all

others.

The remote associations rarely get the opportunity to come

into play, and typical responses could not be called creative.

In a

Uflatff hierarchy, on the other hand, the high-probability responses
are less dominant, remota associations have almost as high a pxobabil
ity of occurrence as ordinary ones, and creative behavior frequently
occurs.
Mednick argues that individuals could have steep but deviant
hierarchies, and he includes these peoPle within his definition of cre
ati vi ty.

Their inclusion is an artifact of our definition of origj.n-"

ality as a low statistical probability of occurrence within a popula
tion sample.

of assessment.

It is a useful definition, because of its clarity and ease

But as we have seen, selective criteria and usefulness

in creativity are also important.

M1d

there is still another signif

icant characteristic of creativity which is not included in measures of
originality.
, Usually, those capable of responding ttoriginallyll have such a

17
. capacity because of a wide-ranging variety of possible responses (that
is, a flat associative hierarchy)~

It is because of this that they are

able to be. flexible; in another situation, with different stimuli, the
individual will be capable of yet another original and appropriate be
havi·or.

On the other hand, the parsoIl with a steep but deviant hier

archy is capable of only a few dominant responses-he has no approp
riate behaviors in many stimulus situatioIlS, and 1vill be rigid) not
flexible.

If he is fortunate, his devtant dominant responses will be

. appropriate and culturally a cceptable~ or even desirable, and he will
be called "creative" (by Mednick, and perhaps by his culture)-althQugh
his creative life may be short-lived, since he is capable only of re
peating his first successes (this is recognized by Mednick).

If he is

less fortunate, his de'nant behaviors will be inappropriate or unac
ceptable to his culture, and he will be labeled "neurotic. 11

But this

"neurotic" behavior is no more inflexible or tL'"1adaptable than that of
. the rigid Ucreative. It
Thus, it seems careless to leave unqualified our dependence upon
statistical rarity, even with the qualification of usefulness.

Crea

tivity is desirable not only be.cause it introduces novel events into
a culture, but also because it provides flexibility for the
within the culture.

indivi~uals

If we lose sight of it,s real evolutionary value,

we shall be the victims of our mvn definition.

Therefore, flexibility

must be :lntrinsic in our understanding of creativity (Guilford, 1967)

r;

Mednick finds considerable support, however, for his contention
that creative responses are the product of a flat associative hierarchYe
For instance, Bousfield, Sedgewick, and Cohen
number of associations made by a subject

t~

(1954) found that the total

stimulus words was strongly
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and inversely related to the rate of associations.

Since the creative

subject's responses to any stimulus should have roughly equal dominance,
Mednick had concluded that i1the high creatj.ve subject (flat hierarchy)
would respond relatively slowly and steadily and emit many responses
while the low creative subject would respond at a higher rate but emit
fewer responses (Mednick, 1962, p. 223)."
case.

And such appears to be the

This position is more supported than refuted by widespread find

ings of higher verbal a nd/or ideational fluency among creativas (Barron,

1968, 1969; and others).
If we

a~it

that associations do have a continuum of probability

in response to a certain stimulus, and that this continuum, in a very
abstract sense, has certain properties which differ from individual to
individual, then we have merely described a very simple associational
process, taking place on an elemental level.
that these ver,y

fun~amental

What leads us to

~elieve

phenomena have any analogue in overt cre

ative behavior?
In a study of his own, (reported in Mednick, 1962), Mednick found
that groups of research scientists rated high or low in creativity
could be very easily discriminated by the relative frequency of stereo
typical responses they gave to stimulus words.

The

Im~-creativity

group

responded more stereotypically on eighty percent of the words.
Mednick's Remote Associations Test (the RAT, which has already
been described in this paper) has also found substantial validation.
Mednick reports that RAT scores correlate significantly (!

=+ 07) "with

rated creativity of students in a design course, a nonverbal task sit
uation--this result, in spite of the strongly verbal nature of the RAT.
The test also correlated +031 with the Originality Scale of IPAR, and
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-.31 with the Crutchfield tonformity Score. High

RltT

scorers proved

to be significantly more "liberal u on questions of sexual morality and
women's rights, and scored higher on the scales of the Strong Voca
tional Interest Blank which are mos·t strongly correlated to other meaBures of creativity and which are also relatively uncommon interests in
the normal population (for example, artist, psychologist, physician,
mathematician, 'and author-j ournalist ) •
Many criticisms have been leveled at Mednic..'k;:ts RAT as a craativ
ity measure.

Some are more telling than otherso

Arguments about

whether or not the RA.T is a measure of convergent or elivergent thinlti.ng
(Taft and Rossiter, 1966) are aimed at a straw mane
RAT is a test of convergent thinking in the true
"convergent. tt

Quite clearly, the

ser~e

of the word,

Three s·t,imulus words are given, and one "right" word is

given in response.

However, convergent processes have been accepted

and agreed upon (Taylor and Holland, 1964) as part of the total crea
tive process, and proof that the RAT is a convergent test is not proof
that it is not a measure of creativity.
Arguments that the RAT is an originality test (Hood" 1969) are
perhaps equally beside the point.

r~

originality is not creativity

(and it is not), then it is at ver.y least a major and vital
~te.

"

prerequis~

Without original responses upon which the selective criteria can

operate, no creativity'is possible.

At any rate,

some~sk-appropriate

selection of the original responses is also required in the RAT.

Per

haps Hood (1969) is objec'i:iing in part to the very spec,ific nature of'

the RAT when he accuses it of neasuring originality instead of creativ
ity; no global behavior is measured by-it, nothing even
lire gross behaviors is e1ici ted.

c~ose

to real

Orl' the contrary, what wa see in the

8'0
RAT is something just about as close to the original neurological as
sociation or ttingramU as we can FOssibly obtain from measures of overt
behavior.

But in a very real sense, the elemental quality of the RAT is
what makes it a valuable measure.

Here it :Ls possible (not proven, but

p.:>ssible) that we have a measure of the ,rsry basic processes which en-,

able more molar creative behavior to occur.

If, as we believe, the

element.s of creativity and inteLligence are identical, then the R.4.T

should measure intelligence as well.

Its detractors have argued that

-c,his is exactly -rlhat the RAT does measure, and that that factor should

be eliminated from ito

But if the natures of creativity and intelli-,

genca are intimately related to elementary associationsl processes, lv-e
cannot have a test of one at that
Thu~!, it

l~nrel

without tapping the other.

should not prove surprising that the RAT correlates .62 with'

the otis 1Q" and .66 with the full-scale (verbal and quantitative) Scho..·

lastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of undergraduates (Gamble and Kellner,
1969).

Schlicht"

at ale (1968) argued tha·t since the R..A.T is a verbal

test, a non-verbal intelligence test would shmv no relatiolwhip to ito
..t\.lt,hough

they found that the correlation was lower than usual when crea

tivitywas compared with the Cattell

Culture~Fair

test of intelligence,

it was still significant (+.36 for males and +.30 for males and females).
The Mednick measure of the

avail~bility

of remote associations

thus 999ms to be tapping a mental process closely related to intelli

gence, and essential to creativity.
same

ti~a

levels..,

some divergence

be~neen

But it seems to indicate at the

the· two phenomena at the lowest of

And so far, we have no information ·to help us to understand

how that can beo

!!

81
The clue lies in the independent variables vlhich Mednick hypothe
sizes facilitate remote association.

He suggests that remote 'associa

tions are the immediate results of a flat associative hierarchy, an
abundance of associative elements, serendipity, the ability to select
the creative combination, and cognitive mediation bet\veen and among as
sociations. We have already

di~cussed

can facilita'te novel associations.

how a flat associative h:terarchy

It frees the mind from the chmins

tion of common responses and gives a higher probability of occurrence
to more origina1 responses.
associations (the

n~~ber

Some of the other fa cilitators of remote

of associative elements, serendipity, and the

ability to select the creative combination) are all strongly similar

to those Campbell suggested, and provide obvious and logical benefits
for the appearance of remote associations.
It is the idea of cognitive mediation which is our stepping-stone
tm1ard a more complex conceptualization of creative thought.

Media

tion provides a way of looking at the elicitation of novel responses as
something more complex and more believable -fjhan a simple S-R chain.
There must be some way for associational hierarchies to affect each
other--othenvise, only the dominant associations would ever be elicited,
aven in creative people, and especially on a first trial (as in "insight"
learning).
Mediation is a process in which "the requisite associative ele
ments may be evoked in contigui ~y through the mediation of connnon ele
ments (Mednick, 1962, p. 222)."
AJ.~hough

he almost laboriously avoids any differentiation of' this

associational process into levels, or

vel~ical

hierarchies (in associa

tive hierarchies" elements are presumed to be peers" horizontally

I( t ) ¥. $
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arranged), vertical differentiation is exactly the path down whj.ch
Mednick's mediation idea leads •.
If remote associates appear to be more accessible in a

~ertain

person, a claim that he has a "flat associative hierarchyU is no ex
planation of his behavior.

Why does he have a flat hierarchy?

And

what does the term mean, aside from its applicability in describing
behavioral data?
tions.

Mediation provides one of the answers to these

~ues

Simply stated, an individual with a flat hierarchy must have

many interconnections between hierarchies--many elements common to more
than one hierarchy which can call the others into play.

This prO""vides

a means for relatively unexpected associations to be made; remote asso
ciative elements can be made available through mediation.
If this argument is sound, there should be some relationship be
t'ween facility at cognitive mediation and facility at providing remote
associations.

Higgins and Dolby (1967) attempted to test the existence

of the relationship between mediation and remote-association abilities.
The authors devised a learning task in which pairs of words (half

~f

them related to each other by a common, but unstated mediator; half of
them nonmediated, but not unrelated) ware learned.

In spite of some

methodological problems which tended to act against them (like the

su~

ject's awareness of the mediation sequence), the results were signifi
cant.

With the learning of the nonmediated pairs held constant, RAT

scores correlated significantly and negatively (-.312) with errors made
in mediated-pairs learning.

Although this study has limitations and

needs very much to be substantiated by additional and perhaps more so
phisticated evidence, it does provide some very interesting support to
the idea that the process of mediation 'of simple concepts or symbols

, ;>

,,2
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(like:words) is significantly related

to

th~ flexible and creative na

ture Qf associational processes.
In their attempts to train uncommon word associations, Simon, at
al. (1966), based their work, as we have seen, upon that of Maltzman

(1967). One incidental effect they discovered was that uncommon stimu
lus words were most frequently !ollowed by uncommon response words,
while the opposite trend resulted from common stimulus-words presenta
tion. ' They could
argum~nt

L~terpret

this result as supportive of Maltzmanls

that "common" and "uncommon" represent two separate associa

tional classes, and that since associations are stronger within any
class, common stimuli result in common responses while uncommon stim

ulus result in uncommon responses.

It seems to this writer,

hm~ever,

most fnefficient for so many (an unspecifiably large number) associa
tive

~lements

to be stored and interconnected in classes according to

their functional and logical relationships, but at the same time farm
'8

class (that is, have direct connection) with every other element of

their ,comparative leval of commonness or rarity.
opera~ion,

Some kind of search

at a higher level of cognitive organization, capable of sen-'

sitivity to the commonness dimension, is far easter to envision than this
duplidation of elements in many separate classes.

Even if each element

needed to have a kind of chemical code or tag (perhaps dependent on
rate of usage), the complexities of such a system of high-level search
ing

a~e

far less overpaNering than those of MBltzmanls hypothetical

systenl.
The idea that cognitive processes differentiate vertically into
levelS of operation is inevitable.

As Neisser (1967) comments, without

allowing for some kind of executive process, !twe must think of every
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thought and every response as just the momenta-ry resultant of an inter
acting system• • • (p. 293)n--a system whose elements are at a single
level and whose organization is determined only by associational "habittt
strength.
Of course vertical differentiation really serves both vertical and

horizontal mediation.

It is difficult to imagine many levels of control

without interaction of the levels, and when there is interaction of
levels, there are alternate pathways to different parts of the same
level--that is, horizontal mediation.

It is in theories of such media

tion that we may find the reasons for differential dominance of common
or uncommon associations.

DI: the

other hand, assuming there are levels of command in human

cognitive systems, the associational processes must be basic to all
th~se

levels and to all of their interaction.

It must be basic to

higher thought processes; it must be basic to creativity.

The renote

associations !nodel does predict and find creativity at the global level
as a result of flat associative hierarchies.

Therefore, even when we

move to a more complex view of cognition, we may find that principles
applying to simple remote associations also apply to more general cog
nitive .systems.

But it is as we begin to sp9ak of' the interaction of

various associative hierarchies at various levels that we suspect the
major differentiation between creativity and intelligence will be dis
covered.
IV.

HIGH-LEVEL HIERARCHIES

Schroder has hypothesized a "conceptual systems t.heorylt (out
lined in Schroder, Driver, and Streufer, 1967) which is an attempt to
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describe the individual's interaction with his environment as a func
tion of his information-processing abilities and his cognitive struc
Karlins (1967) has su.mtnarized the SChroder theory in this way:

ture.

Over a given range of stimuli, information-processing ability
varies among individuals and is measured in terms of its inte
grative complexity. Higher integrative complexity refers to a
greater number of perceptual categories for recei"'Jing informa
t~on about the world, and more conceptual or combinator.y rules
fop organizing such units of information. Structural complex
ity is described as varying along a continuum that represents
gradation in integrative complexity (p. 264).
From this \riewpoint, Schroder and his colleagues generate several
specific predictions, wh.ich Karlins outlines and

dra1'lS

into comparison

with predictions generated by Mednick.
Because of their greater integrative complexity, some subjects
will be able to make a broader range of intercategory combinations-
more "remote n classes of information will be able to be brought to
gether.

These same subjects, whom we might call the "Schrodern crea

tive subjects" should have, bonds between different categories which
are of more even strength than those of less integratively complex sub
jects.

It is 81"gu.ed that more statistical \IDcertainty is generated by

wide as opposed to narrow but in-depth sampling of information cate
gories, and that integratively complex subjects would be more able to
handle such uncertainty--that is, to tolerate it.

Of course, uncer

tainty might not be generated in one's exploration of one's own infor
mation categories in memory because their content would not be unfam
iliar.

But if the subject were to sample inforrnation from an exte mal

source (such as the resources of a computer) this uncertainty aspect
would come into significance--and in any case, wide search patterns
might be expected of the SChroder creative subject for other reasons

i'~

86
Karlins does not mention.

The similarity of the Schroder and. Hednick systems is quite strik
ing.

Each predicts a sorl of hierarchy basic to cognitive structure.

Each predicts that among creative individuals, such hierarchies of as
sociation will be flat, and large numbers of associations will be more
likely to occur.

The significant difference between the two hierarchies suggested

by the two theorists is the level of abstraction or generality of the
members of those hierarchies.

The elements of the Mednick hierarchy

are simple word (or idea) responses; the elements of Schroder's are
idea classes or categories which could themselves conceivably be hier

archies (for example, nrelig:ton,n or usickness tt ).
It appears, then, that Schroder's system is the outside of a
Chinese-puzzle nesting of hierarchies within hierarchies, with the

same principles of causality operating to produce creativity and orig
inality at each level. At least we know that the prj.nc1ples Schroder
assumes are believed to be the same at a very nmch lower level (Med
nick r s).

V/hat levels may lie between Mednick and Schroder, or within

them or beyond them, and what

~

rules may be" is not indicated.

It might be expected, or rather it might even be hoped, that
measures of Mednick's creativity and Schroder's creativity would show
a strong relationship.

The results of research efforts to the pre

sent, however (Karlins, 1967;

l~rlins,

Lee, and Schroder, 1967) have

not been easily subjected to synthesis.

Part of the difficulty of comparison rests
test used by Schroder and Karlins to discrimll1ate

j-n

evaluation of the

be~veen

and low in Ifintegrative complex:i.tyit (Schroder creativity).

groups high
The Para
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graph Completion Inventory (PCl)

r~s

no obvious, direct relationship to

the Schroder theory, and is so open-ended that scoring of :tt may be a
largely subjective matter.
A study was w.ade, however, to validate the use of the Schroder

PCI in separating creative from noncreative subjects (reviewed
lins, 1961, and in Karlins, et a1., 1967)a

Karlins made one further

assumption before preceding with the validation:
corded use of the resources

~f

in Kar

that a subject's re

a computer in a complex problem-solving

task would be closely analogous to the unrecordable uses he makes of
his own cognitive information resources.

We have already mentioned

one qualification that assumption should include, but it does seen
reasonable that some relationship would exist be-tvisen the ways in which
one uses one r s own memory "banks" and those of a computer.
The results of the experiment were that the Schroder PCl did dis
criminate between flat-hierarchy creative sources (as determined by the
fact that many of the computer's categories were tapped, and questions
were more broadly distributed among them) and steep-hierarchy noncre
stive subjects.

The RJI.T scores of the same subjects did not discriminate

signifi CBn'c,ly, although correlations were in the predicted direction.
Abilities tapped by the RAT and the

pcr

'were mutually enhancing; the

highest number of categories searched and the highest breadth-of-search
scores were found among subjects in the group high on both the RAT and
the PCT.
Although we may not agree with Karlins i assertion that no higher
order integratory mechanisms are necessary for remote association, his
general explanation for the weak relationship between the tests could
be

~enta ti vely

accepted.

He argues that Mednick's ass ocia tional theory

~
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may apply only to the lowest levels of a creativity scale, and uthat

both conceptually simple and complex individuals may be associatively
creative, but that only structurally complex individuals are integrative
complex [1hat is, Schroder-creativtl) (p. 267).1t His position does not
provide an explanation for. the possible existence of subjects high on
the PCl and low on the RAT, although there

~y

be other, unrelated var

iables accounting for them.
In substance,

'VIe

have already argued that the RAT should be a

measure of fundamental potential for creativity--that it only begins
to discriminate between creativity and intellieence, and that some fur
ther kind of complexity is the probable source of their distinction.
This argument is supported by the finding that the number of categor
ies searched in the computer-use task is significantly and positively
related to Guilford's Uses For Things creativity test, but unrelated

to the 1Vonderlic

IQ

(Karlins et al., 1967, p. 166).

At one of the most

open-ended, global tasks which might be imagined (ltbuild a hospital and
use the computer to get information for itu), the style of association
formation seems not to be significantly rela ted to int.elligence.

Some

where between the first box and the last box in our Chinese puzzle (or
in what. we can see of it), lie some answers for our questions about the
creativity-intelligence distinction.
V.

We shall try to look between.

COGNITIVE DIFFERENTIATION

We can now quite safely assume that bo"lih crea"liivity and intelli
gence have their foundation in simple associational processes.

But we

also know that in some way, intelligence and creativity become differ
entiated from each other--othervvise, it would not be possible for var

I"~

'If!"III"!l!!;,,.,,

89

iablos to have

effect~

on one and not the other.

It is our task, then, to try to outline possible processes of cog
nitive differentiation between creativity and intelligence. We shall
follow, in a rather theoretical path; the differentia tory process from
the associational stage to its end product in executive-type cognitive
operations.

We shall elivide our efforts into two sections roughly

equivalent to low-level, primary differentiation and high-level, sec
ondary differentiation.

We see these levels as more or less analogous

to two structures hypothesized by Schroder to be necessary for cogni
tive complexity:
Perceptual

perceptual categories., and combinatory rules.

Categori~!

Although the brain probably has approximately fixed kinds and
numbers of neural interconnections and limits to growth and differen
tiation placed upon it by metabolism and blood supply (Hebb,1949; Riro
land, 1960), and possibly a few innate

structu~a1

pathways or a·rudi

mentar'J organization (Hebb, 1949; Piaget, 1969; 1tLDner, J.970), its var
ious activity areas are quite probably within themselves undifferen
tiated and equipotential (Hebb, 1949; Diamond at al., 1963; Bennett,
Diamond, Krech, and Rosenweig, 1964; Milner, 1970).

It is the task of

learning and experience to provide differentiation--and to provide a
differentiation which corresponds to some extent with an external re
slity.

The process of perceptual learning must be thought of as
establishing a control of association-area activity by sensory
events (p. 123) ••• We can then regard the stage of pr~~ry
learning as the period of eS'wblishing a first environnrental
control over the association areas, and so indirectly, over
behavior {Habb, i949, p. 12~).
Hebb's theoretical system traces the development of higher cogni

}.

~-j.;~~
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tive processes from tho first elemental neural associations.
ral events corresponding to

senso~

When neu

stimulation are simultaneous, they

become related to each other.
It is proposed that a repeated (simultaneous) stimulation
of specific receptors will lead slowly to the formation of
an 1tassemblytt of association-area cells which can act briefly
as a closed system after stimulation has ceased; this pro~
lQngs the time during which the structural changes of learn
ing can occur and constitutes the simplest instance of a
rSpre-sentative process (image or idea) (Hebb, p. 60).
Of course, as Diamond, at al. (1963) point out, the process of
neural differentiation cannot be simply the ,result of intercellular
faoilitor,y associations.

In order for the organism to be capable of

intricate and environmentally appropriate behavior, it must learn to
discrfminate among stimuli.
iva

n~t

Discrimination is learning to be respons

only to what a stimulus is, but also to what it is not.

Our

sensitivity to a unique element of a stimulus must elicit some inhibi
tion of our response to previous and similar stimuli if we are to be
able

~o

respond to the neW stimulus differentially.

assoc~ations

nature.

Therefore, neural

must have an inhibitory as well as a mutually excitatory

This kind of inhibitor,y process makes discrimination possible.

Inhibition is also the process which enables generalization to
occur, .and generalization is extremely important in the development o£
~ognitive

processes.

In most cases, generalization is taken to be a state of being. in

sensiilive to distinctioflS
Tempone, 1965).

~etween st.:tmuli

But this need not be the case.

(ss reported in Gardner, Holzman,

KleL~,

jects were asked to categorize objects.
who

g~neralized

(Deese and Hulse, 1967;
In a study by Gardner

Linton and Spence, 1959), sub
It became apparent

tr~t

subjects

more broadly were not simply less aware of distinctions

.. v'tI·...

k

t

,f

~
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than were the other subjects.

On the contrary,

• • • some broad-range S5 noticed many subtle differences
in objects in the Sorting Test. The essential difference be
tween the S5 at the opposite poles seemed to be in the degree
to Which they were impelled to act upon or ignore an rr~araness
of differences (p. 39).
~

:un

any philosophical or linguistic usage of the word Itgeneraliza

tion" 1t is understood that one ignores an ffivareness of distinctions
for the purpose of making use of similarities along a certain continuu.lTl.
Indeed" if any population of elements is to be available for recombina
tion

a~ong

learned.

more than one continuum, their distinctions must first be
Then, according to the purpose of the moment, any number of

generalizations can be made, each of which is constructed among the
element,s having the quality selected, for attention--all other qualities,
all other distinctions, are ignored.

In the

develo~~ent

of basic perceptual categories, or

ar~

other

cognitive classificatory systems for that matter, the process is the
sarna.

First, there is the generalization of ignorance.

SimLlar stimuli

elicit similar responses and facilatory associations are formed.
there i:s discrimination.
sciousl~,

Then,

The organism learns, consciously or uncon

to inhibit old responses to similar stimuli; nmv responses

are made and are contingent upon certain specific aspects of the stim
ulus.

There may be finer and finer discri.mination, in which smaller

and smaller parts of an originally broad-range response pattern
eliminated in the presence of specific cues.

al~

But the organism would

be hopelessly fragmented and specific if it were not "then possible to
generat:e new, "aware" generalizations--generalizations which can be
more 8'nd more inclusive, reaching a high level of abstractiono
These generalizations are expected to, be flexible in nature,

A ",Z. . i ~ ..
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because of heavy overlapping.

They involve temporary inhibition of

respons!es to sti.l'l1uli ha'\ring a certain quality_

One response can thus

be involved in many completely different generalizations.
not

If such were

case, no flexibility would be found in human beings, and so it

th~

must be assumed to be a natural tendency--a tendency of vi:bal signifi
cance tn cognition.
It is no wonder that Harlow is reported (in Diamond, at a1.,
1963) als making the comment that traIl learning and all thinking may be'
regarded as resulting from a single fundamental operation, the inhibi
tion of inappropriate responses or response tendencies (p. 287).n
.Alre capacities for discrimination and generalization related to
intelligence?
Hebb (1949) indicates that one locus of individual differences
in

neu~ological

inato~

acuity.

efficiency is the differences in potential for discrim
There is additional evidence that intelligence is the

result of or a c0variable with efficient discrindnation processes, har/
ever.

Tempone (1965), with a

tec~nique

borrowed from Mednick and

Lehtinen (1957), studied visual discrimination abilities and their re
lationShip to mental age.

Subjects divided into high, average, and low

menta,l......age groups according to the Pinter General Abilities Test were
sign:i:ficantly different in their performance on the discrimination
problem at better than the

.05

level of probability.

Children with

higher intelligence were better at visual discrimination, and made fewer
arrots through over-generalization.
]n a study with mental patients, Desai (1960) correlated scores
from Rqven 1 s Progressive Matrices Test (·Nhich is, according to Matar
azzo, I972, substantially but not overwhelmingly correlated with the

r~
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WAIS) and Epstein's Over-Inclusion Test.
n~~er

telligence test and the

Correlations between the in

of errors due to over-inclusion (-gener

alization) was negative and significant (beyond the .01 level of sig
nificance)e

Desai comments that the sample was higher in average in

telligance than the norm, and had a smaller standard deviation; it is
ver.y pdssible among a normal

po~ilation,

tests would have been even higher.

correlations between the two

High-IQ subjects, then, shrnv a

significant tendency to avoid errors of generalization--to avoid the
kind of generalization which would show a lack of discrimination,
rather than an overriding of discriminations.
~t

found

is of supplementary support that Spotts and Mackler (1967)

a significant positive correlation (E less than .01) between

Otis IQ and field independence on both the Embedded Figures Test and
the Hidden Figures Test.

Highly intelligent subjects may be able to

"discr:itminate" a figure from its field"

And Kerrick (1956) found that

high-IQ subjects used the 'Osgood Semantic Differential Scale more
fully than did low-IQ subjects, relying less on extreme positions and
more evenly on all positions (level of significance for the differ
ence was better than

~

= .01).

Thus, high-IQ subjects show a tendency

to use finer discriminations in evaluation, as in many other kinds of.
tasks.
Furthermore, we know that intelligence is strongly related to
memory processes, and Relson and Cover (1956) discovered that subjects
perform better on memory tasks when items to be memorized are pre
sented in more specific categories.

They suggest that over-general

categories a11m, too much interference and impair memorization.
sugg~st

We

that the facility for memorization found among highly intel

#.

4

.;;)~ & ;
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ligentsubjects may be the result of better discriminations and better
categor,y systems

WOQld

be of little help in the learning of nonsense

syllables or other rote memory tasks, and these would not be expected
to be (and are not found to be) any easier for the more intelligent
subjeot than for his less intelligent peers (Cronbach, 1970).

All of these evidences

indic~te

that high intelligence is, or

brings' with it, a broadly based efficiency at making discriminations.

They also suggest that when intelligent subjects regeneralize (speak
ing now at the level of the formation of the most elementary perceptual
and conceptual categories) their categories are
high lavel of discriminatory potential.

narr~v

and maintain a

For more abstract purposes,

a higher order of generalization, with each of these categories as an
element in the new generalization, is constructed.

It is hypothe

sized that a higher potential number of both facilitory and inhibitory"
associa1tibns in the highly intelligent subj ect make him capable of
mainta~ning

more discriminative and fine-grained categories, and per

haps enable him to construct more levels of Itaware U generalization than
an average person might have over the same total difference in level
of abstraction.
These kinds of processes begin at a layel so basic as to he be
yond our intuitive understanding.

By the time we reach the level of

activity represented in the RAT, for example, many differentiation/
gener~1ization

processes must PAve already gone on.

The subject must

!

at that level be capable of integrating his sensorJ input, his linguis
I
I

t~c tt~ining,

enabl~

than

is

and so on.

In fact, the cognitive structures which

a subject to do well on the RAT are probably at a high&r level
represented by the simple-word it~s of the test~

Mediation,

...
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after

all, is accomplished to a great extent

~J

higher mechanisms; it

is the generalization of the test items into higher categories that
makes oither associations to them accessible.
But Schroder's system is argued to be a
of Medrll.ck' s.

V6r.y

high-level analogy

What, then, is the difference between what has here

been prpposed and Schroder's system of proposals? Very little, exoept
that it is here argued that the total capacity in an individual for
such complexity of differentiation and integration is in actuality his
potential for intelligence (that is, that his complexity capacity is
his

int~lligence

plexit~J

A).

Schroder, on the other hand, believes this com

at its most global and social level of manifestation, to be

creativ?:ty.

He cOIIunencs:

Vfuen personality structure is taken as the anchor for view
ingi behavior, then we are focusing upon creativity--the abil

ity to generate diversity and conflict, to evolve alternate
organizations or integrations of diverse perceptions and de
cisaons (Schroder, et al., 1967, po 11).
Schroder's (and Karlinst) assumption is that higher irrtegrative
complexity is necessary to and sufficient for the "alternate organiza
tions" which are equivalent to creativity.

And of course, we could not

disagree in the assumption that creativity is the ability to generate
ualternate organizations or integrations."
Bruner (1964) provides an exciting argument which is partly sup
portive and partly elaborative of this position.
better" approach.

His is a kind of "one

Creativity is envisioned to be simply a high-level

sort of, generalization (where generalization is what he calls "generic
learninglt).

This higher level of generalization can be called ltgeneric

coding,:n although Bruner admits that the difference beiA"leen generic
learning and generic coding is one of degree or level only.

Generic

44

PiQ 4

«ex; ".. I

96
processes are compared to an

empt~~g

operation, in which the abstrae

tion is a "contentless depiction of the ideal case, empty in the sense
that geometry is empty of particulars (po 307)."

If this is creativ

ity, then creative works of great moment and magnitude are merely prod
uets of generic processes at still a higher level--a reabstracted,
generic t1supercoding. n Comments Bruner:
It seems to me that the principal creative activity over and
beyond the construction of abstracted coding systems is the
combination of different systems into new and more general sys
tems that permit additional prediction. It is perhaps because
of this that, in ~~tehead's picturesque phrase, progress in
the sciences seems to occur on the margins between fields

(p. 308).

This is an attractive Jacob's Ladder, but as a theoretical system

it presents almost as many questions as solutions.
pands entirely upon the

L~dividualts

If creativity de

ability to construct viable gen

eric systems, why is it not directly dependent upon intelligence?
Examine the multitude of ways in which highly intelligent subjects
prove themselves capable of such system construction:

they are superior

at memory tasks, information storage, discernment of similarities, re
call of remote associations, vocabulary, symbol manipulation, arith
metic operations, and general comprehension (Wechsler, 1958; and others).
Any higher
t~inly

syste~ization

of categories and generalizations must cer

depend upon systems like these, as well as a high potential for

fine discrimination; we have consistently seen that the higher systems
are derived from the lower (Karlins, 1967).

It seems impossible that

the causes of the problematic creativity-intelligence <;tivergence can
have any basis in only these kinds of structural potential.

The anSNer

must have something to do with the direction in which such structures
are put to work, or their management by other structures.

That is

,

~
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where we must next search, in hope of finding our suppressor variable.
Sets and Comqinatory Rules
We ara

nO'~

int·.:)rested in higher-level patterns of response ten

dencywhich either direct differentiation

a~

lower levels, or direct

the us's of· differentiated structures, or are themselves the products
of differentiation processes.

First, let us examine sets.
We have already, in another context l discussed sets.
hc·ld

lle'W

But they

relevance at this point in our discussion because they are

phenomena which seem to guide or direct behayior--presu.mably according
t.o principles previously darived fr(")1n learning and experience.
If mere intelligent persons were more readily able to acquire

principles by -which to direct their behaviors (and this is not an un
reasonable suggestion), they might be more susceptible to sets or
negative transfer to nmv situations.

sets than others?

Are they more prone to negative

The research data is a chaos on this question.

One significc:lnt posit:tve correlation between an inteD.ectua1 mea
sure (the Miller Anal()gies frest) and a measure of rigidity which has
questionable validity was obtained by Kapos and Pattu. (1958).

Two j.n

significant positive relationsrJ.ps are reported on the same variables
". by Kapos and Fattu (usi..'1g the Scholasttc Aptitude Test), and Galanter

(1967) .

Two researchers report inSignificant negative correlations between
academic achievement and rigidity (Galanter, 1967; D:lvids, 1956), ~nd
Lester (1966) found a negative correlation between the Otis Quick

Scoring Test and resista~ce to extinction.

These three results are

:<-<::,,~~
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confirmed in part by
fac~J

P~keachts

(1948) finding that the Einstellung ef

which is really a negative set, was negatively correlated with

the Stanford-Binet.
These studies provide proof that if there is any relationship
betr/een manifest rigidity

o~

negative sets and intelligence, it is not

a simple one, and not a strong one, and

positive.

mOl~

probably negative than

The best indication of the real state of things is probably

provided by Duncan (1959) in a review of problem-solving research.

He

concluded that more intelligent subjects are more likely than the aver
age to be good at problem solving and at overcoming negative sets-
while they are at the same time possibly able to benefit more than
their peers from positive sets.

It should be obvious that mere susceptibility to transfer would
not be of any net significance, since negative effects would tend to
cancel out positive effects, and so on.

~bat

does

rr~ke

a significant

difference is how one handles the sets, and Duncan reports that highly
capable subjects seem to get more out of pretest directions, and to be
able to overcome negative sets if necessary.

susceptible nor less.

'rhey are neither more

They simply are able to manipulate their mvn

sets to greater advantage.
It may turn out that what we are examining here are examples of

generic

learp~ng

derived from more concrete learning.

In essence, an

individual may recombine categories evolved from sensory information

to form a higher generalization which can tall him how. to deal with
that information.

For example, Harlow (1949) was able to train his

monkeys to acquire a generic learning set for dealing with their nega
tive, task-to-task set.

This point of view about sets is, of course,

..
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vary much consistent with Brunerts (1964) position.
But Brunerts explanation of creativity as an increasingly ab
stract process of generalization--up and up and up--cannot be sufficient
to explain all cognitive systems.

It is no more sufficient to that

task than a radical associationist view which posits a process going
out and out and out.

It may be

profit~ble

to try another tack alto

gether.

A slightly different way of examining the problem is to use
Neisser's (1967) analogy between sets and schemata, and to look at
them both as combinator,y rules--rules for· searching and recombining
existing categories of information.

~~en

schemata have been developed

for dealing with information, even though they are themselves derived
from it, they act upon it, transforming it (Posner, 1965; lJeisser,
1967) in ways that make it more useftu.

These schemata are

generaliza~

tions for a purpose, and it is conceivable that they might have varying
directional tendencieso

Not all schemata are in the direction of

greater abstraction; they could perhaps be capable of organizing infor
mation toward exactly

OPI~site

ends.

them as endlessly nested upward.

Neither is there any need to see

There may be a completely dif£erent

kind of organization at some cognitive level.
We have already hinted that to explain cognitive processes fully
we must call upon something like an executive computer program, whose
heur:i.stics are lllee operational sets.

Neisser (1967) suggests:

Some programs may even have a hierarchical structure, in
which routines at one level can call those which are tllrn'ler tt

and are themselves called by others which are Uhigher."
However the regression of control is not infinite; there is
a "highest," or executive routine which is not used by any- .
thing else (p. 296).

.... k ..
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Neisser clarifies the fact that human "executivell program must
(presumably) be capable of being der:i.ved from experience and learning,
and must also be capable of self-modification.

It is still, however,

relatively independent of the vicissitudes of everyday learning

axpe~

rience, and it exerts a definite shaping force on all products of the
neural "computer. tt

Conceiva bly, it cOuld direct operations

lV orking

at a higher level of abstraction without itself being at a lower level
of contro1--that is, without itself being used by the more abstract
generalization or operation.
0f course, we have no present proof that such systems exist, but
they seem to be the only logical way out of the "up-and-up-and-upu dil
emma.

Further, there are clues to their existence, and to the possi

bility that they are closely related to the creativity-intelligence
problem.
Riegel, Riegel, and Levine (1966), in basic agreement with the
Mednick and Schroder hierarchical models, set out to discover something
more than the models suggested about hierarchical differentiation.
They tested the hypotheses that:

(a) creative subjects have flat asso

ciative hierarchies, and (b) creative subjects have different patterns
or classes or responses to a sttmuluse

Fourteen tasks were presented

to 'che subjects, and divided for analytical purposes into five cate

gories:

imitative, logical, grammatical, infra-logical (that is, phys

ical), and free associational.
As expected, high-creativity

s~bjects

tion on the free associationsl task.

showed greater differentia

They also showed greater differ

entiation on all of the other tasks, except for grammatical and infra
logical.

In these two categories, low-creativity subjects had greater

:}i.e;;:: t
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differentiation.

Over all categories, highly creative subjects used

significantly more terms of logic and relations in description, while
the non-creative used significantly more terms of functions, parts or
attributes.
for each

Thus, the task categories which were

gro~p

higp~y

differentiated

seemed to represent the kinds of approaches taken by that

group to all tasks.
\Vhat this study appears to demonstrate is that individuals are
not merely highly differentiated, with flat hierarchies, or little dif
ferentiated, with steep hierarchies.

Karlina had stipulated (1967)

that individuals could have different interest or ability areas, in
which they could show opposing patterns of differentiation (flat or
steep).

But what we see here is not merely a difference in hierarchy

slope, or a difference in interest area or ability field.

~fuat

we see

is evidence that differentiation can be invested in the direction of
either the concrete or the abstract--that individuals can have schemata
which direct their'behavior (and their processing of information) in
stylized directions, among whose possibilities are abstraction or con
creteness.
VI

&

CREATIVITY AND SCHEMATA

Is there a creativity schema or schemata? If so, what is its
(their) nature?

The presence of creativity schemata can only be guessed

at, but if they exist something can be predicted about their nature.
First, they will be the perpetrators of the creativity/intelligence
divergence--conbinatoTJT rules which depend upon cognitive potential
(intelligence) for complexity, but do not automatically coexist with
that complexity.

Second, they will be highly placed schemata, respons

It'

i

..
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ibIs for either wide-ranging or specific areas of creative behavior.
Third, they will be capable of directing the highest levels of ab
strac·t processes, as well as facilitating them.
Fourth, they will be schemata

embo~ying

the principle of flexi

bility, capable of generating systems and regenerating them quickly,
and intrinsically tending toward remote association.

~~th,

they will

come into existence through some facilatory environmental effect--some
pattern of reinforcement of past behaviors.

Sixth, in their absence,

other kinds of schem8ta, also capable of abstraction but oriented toward
concrete information processing, concrete sensory inVut, and factual
manipulation, will be developed--these, too, will arise becausB of an
environmental selection process.

Seventh, any

concei~ble

ratio of

creative/noncreative schemata is possible, with the pattern of their
proportional dominance drawn along existing lines and patterns of en
vironmental selection.
We need now to look at some research data which can

provid~

con

firmation or qualification of these postulates.
For example, there is evidence that creative behaviors are learned
best not specifically, but as a class of responses.
creativity-training review, Levy (1998)

obta~ned

As we saw

jn

the

his best training of

creative responses when composite techniques were used, including a role
model, which presumably acted as an organized system of rules for the
benefit of the child.

Furthermore, transfer to novel contexts occurred

only when this model was evoked.

The subjects could incorporate the

model as a schema for temporar.y behavior regulation, although they had
not yet internalized it.

Brown (1965) and Renner (1970) obtained re

sults which also clearly supported the

ide~

that creative responses are

~

i
I
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best learned and transferred as a group, especially if same verbalized
rules or symbolizations are involved.
Additionally, the general tendency of creative individuals to
show predictable patterns of interpersonal, problem-sol'Jing, and pre
ference behaviors indicates the possibility of modes of cognitive or
ganization which are consistent

thr~ugh

several levels of abstraction

and which pivot around the principles of flexibility and originality.
These modes could well be the creativi ty schemata.

And thus evidence

does appear as to their existence, their nruletr-like character, the
breadth of their effect, and their dependence upon flexibility; our
first three postulates have support.
There are other evidences in support of the fourth postulate and
those after it.

While creative people may be equally capable of spon

taneous--or slightly triggered--emission of both common and creative
responses, noncreativ8 people have a great deal more difficulty exhib
.iting creative behaviors.

Riegel, at ale

(1966) found, for instance,

that h:i.gh-creativity subjects used fewer logical responses than lowcreativity subjects on the free association task.

But when asked to

produce logical responses, they were well capable of doing so, and used
many associations frequently used by low-creativity subjects.

We find

a similar phenomenon :in the results of Mednick t s (1962) RAT, where the
first associations emitted by high-creativity subjects may be very com
mon ones, but uncommon responses are quick to follow, and almost equally
available.
McDonald and Martin (1967) found that low-creativity subjects were
exceedingly difficult to train to uncommon 'Word associations, while
highly creative subj ects (whose typical mod,e of response was originality)

~
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were easily shifted to making common responses by means of verbal rein
forcement.

Vlhen readministered the RAT after ttconnnonalityn training,

they showed no decrement in their scores.

Flexibility twice demon

strated.
Duncan

(1959) noted that previous use of an object in a

place manner inhibits unusual use of that object later.
hand, previous unusual use of an object does

~

co~~on

On the other

create a "functional

fixedness, II and subjects who have been .so exposed to originality are
later able to use the object in its

c~stoID8ry

manner.

Creativity was

in a manner of speaking Itinducedlt in these subjects, by exposure to
novel uses (or various uses) of an object.

Presumably, subjects who

come to our attention already creative have internalized some way of
looking at objects and ideas in flexible and various ways--this is
their schema.
We point to a study by Eisenstadt (1966), in which it was found
that on insoluble rebus puzzles, highly creative subjects gave up an
average of 'bNenty-two seconds sooner than the group lou in creativity.
This difference was not due to the low efficiency or interest of the
highly creative, because on the soluble puzzles they achieved as many
solutions as their peers and did so in a shorter time period.
only be suggested, in the light of the other studies

revi~ved

It can
here,

that the highly creative subjects had a capacity for quiek changes of
strategy which enabled them both to arriva at a proper solution more
rapidly" and also to avoid persistance at methods which did not, or
could not, be successful.
All of these experiments hint at the overwhelming importance of
flexibility to the highly creative individual.

He seams to be able
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to move back and forth among strategies with little difficulty.

He

must, as the fourth postulate suggests, have means of rapidly generat
ing and regenerating systems of operation.

And the most likely form

for that sort of capacity is a kind of high-level. schema or executive
program.
It might be argued that creative or noncreative schemata are

simply opposing tendencies of recombination--one toward novelty and

the other toward commonality, or one toward abstraction and the other
toward concreteness.

But the evidence reviewed argues to the contrary

--that creative schemata include both the

cow~on

and the uncommon, the

abstract and the concrete, while schemata directing the less creative
person's behavior are not so multifaceted.

With this suggestion in

mind, it should be a simple matter to decide which kind of cognitive
organization is most desirable and adaptive.
Another principle evident from the data is that creative or non
creative schemata are affected socio-environmentally.

All training

procedures were able to show some effects, although results ware not
as easily achieved as might have been expected.
five through seven find support.

Therefore, postulates

The appearance of even this degree

of responsiveness to reinforcements and modeling treatments

impli~s

that ·the original schemata are constructed in response to environ.m.ental
effects.
17.hat do the data tell us about intelligence and the creativity
schemata?

Let us reexamine the Wallach and Kogan

eA~~iments (1965a~

196'b). Boys were asked to divide a group of fifty objects into cate
gories of their own
belong together."

constru~tion,

accord..i.ng to which ones "seemed to

They were then s sked to express their grouping

: a

;; ,
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rationale, and these rationales were analyzed.

Possible

categori~ing

principles were assumed to be phYSical-clescriptiv-9 (for example, "hard
objects tt ), conceptual-inferential (ufor eatingtt), and relational or
thematic (ngetting ready to go out").
The results of analysis showed that high-creativity subjects, no
matter what their intelligence level, tended to use both inferential
and thamatic categorieso

Boys high in intelligence but low in creativ

ity showed a strong dominance of inferentiat categorization, while
boys low in both used the.matizing

a]~ost

exclusively.

In order to discover whether the highly intelligent boys who were
low in creativity were simply incapable of thematic organization, the
authors administered a test of that particular ability., When they had
no choice (and very possibly, failing any

ass~gned

task vlould be odious

to this group) these boys could thematize as well as their intellec
tual peers who were also creative.
Wallach and Kogan (1965a) conclude:
In sum, creative boys seem able to m~itch rather flexibly
between thematizing and inferential-conceptual bases for
grouping; the high intelligence-low creativity boys seem
rather inflexibly locked in inferential-conceptual categor
izing and strongly avoidant of thematic-relational categor
izi~; finally the low intelligence-low creativity boys tend
to be locked within thematic modes of responding and relatively
incapable of inferential-conceptual behavior (p. 363).

Evidently, the children low in creativity were limited by that
lack, and those low in intelligence were limited as viell--even though
they were creative.

Only the high intelligent children, then, were

fully capable of flexible behavior" but they tended to avoid it strongly

ir'

they were not also creative.

. . ,Me
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VII.

SUMMARY

On the basis of the research we have reviewed, we can make a few

tentative suggestions.

In

~nderstanding

creativity the emphasis, it

would seem, needs to be placed upon the originality of behavior at an
associational level and the flexibility of behavior at the level of
higher cognitive structures. 1'-hile it is ver,y possibly true that the
great products of creative thought are high-level abstractions, this
may not be so much because of the nature of abstractions (for surely
abstraotions can sometimes be uncreative) as because of the nature of
creativity (creativity provides a flexibility of recombination which
is conducive to workable abstractions).

What we find about intelli

gence is that it tends toward abstractness; but unless creativity is
also present, the individual can apply abstractions rigidly.
person would be less likely to come upon

a

Such a

highly creative solution

to abstract problems; he would also show less flexibility at the level
of social

behav~or.

His noncreative schemata, not being

flexi~le

and

inclusive of creative patterns, would limit him in spite of his capaci
ties for abstraction and complication.
Highly intelligent persons, because of the complex character of

their cognitive organizations, undoubtedly have much greater benefit

tQ derive from creative cognitive schemata than most others. Their
larger informational stores, more accurate representations of reality,
and larger potential number of interneural associations (as hypothe

sized) would mean that flexible schemata could lead in them to crea
tive production of considerable significance.
But the style of individual's schemata is very likely due to en

$,

At
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vironmental selection, and the highly intelligent person may not be
ttselected lt for creativity.

Vt'hat has happened?

He must have a complex

cognitive system, or he would not be intelligent; it must be assumed
that the cognitive complexity is channeled into noncreative

dire~tions.

Perhaps the storage and manipulation systems for information handling
are highly differentiated, but "programmed" toward specific, rather
than flexible, ends.

Perhaps abstraction categories are ver.y complex,

but do not have a large overlap, so that rapid and flexible construction
of many different generic systems is not possible--categories could be
highly differentiated, but have a minimum number of interconnections
at a very high level.
'Vhatever its exact mechanisms and derivation, it is easy to see
how such a cognitive state might be environmentally determined.

Gen

eralizations which were task relevant might be rewarded by the environ';'"
mant, and reinforced in a physiological sense.

Connections would thus

be established between categories in terms of specific, task-relevant
characteristics.

Future generalizations would have no interconnec

tions eoccept these to use as mediators-no way to tlcall" for elements
according to some other criterion.

Other generalizations might even

have been environmentally punished, so that specific schematic impedi
ments were set up against non-task-related generalization.

The schem

ata derived from environmental contingenies during childhood might
continue to direct the behavior of the adult.
But training resultj.ng in the severe limitation of generaliza

tions at a high level would be difficult, for overlap is very natural
within the human nauro-cognitive system.

And if the cognitive schemata

we have described are to fill the role of the suppressor variable for
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which

w~

have been searching, some explanation must be found for why

highly intelligent children--who have a natural associative abundance
and coghitive complexity--should be directed by their environments
toward schemata antithetical to their own tendencies.
lem, we still do not have the answers •
...

For this prob

CHAPTER V

. AROUSAL

Ip Chapter II the suggestion was made that what is testable of an
individual's intellectual efficiency--that is, his manifest intelli
gence--is merely a collection of learned behaviors which we suppose to
reflect, his innate, biological, potential intelligence (Hebb's intelli
gence

!).

It was also argued that the basic elements of cognitive pro

cesses are very simple operations, based upon simple associational ele
ments.

Intelligence, then (intelligence

~),

is due to biological limi

tations upon the number of potential associations, the acuity of per
ceptual ttequipment," metabolism, or other unknown variables (Hebb,
1949).
'In this chapter and in the following one, we mean to explore in

telligence and its biological

variables~

and their relation to crea

tivity--in.order to investigate why it is that highly intelligent chil
dren may develop tendencies away from creativity, in spite of their
natural predilection toward it at a cognitive level. We wish to

deter~

mine if there is a physiological phenomenon covarying with intelligence
(or perhaps even responsible for it) which is also intrinsically in op
position to some aspect of creativity.

I.

INTELLIGENCE AS MOTIVATION

Keith Hayes (1962), has written a fascinating and original sum
ma~ ~f

his own theory of intelligence which is of utmost relevance to

III

our present discussion.

He posits t,hat msnifes·t intelligence is com

pletely learned behavior (to which we have already agreed), that poten
tial intelligence is innate, and that the hereditary basis of poten
tial intelligence is in a oluster of tttendencies to engage in a ctivi

ties conducive to learning. • • referred to here as experience-produc
ing drives (EPDt s) (p. 337). ft
With his invention of the term ttEPD," Hayes is referring not to
something exactly equivalent to a "driven in the classical sense, but
rather to innate tendencies very closely sindlar to the curiosity, ex
ploratory, or maniVulatory drives postulated by many researchers (for
example, Hebb, 1949, 1964; Berlyne, 1960, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1965;
Harlow, 1965; Day, 1968).

And Hayes is also arguing that these drives,

and they alone, are responsible for individual differences in learning
and (ultimately) in mardfest intelligence.
Hayes discounts any other strong possibility as the hereditary
carrier of intelligence differences.

He argues that fully established,

inherited, structural differences in individuals' higher mental func
tioning could not possibly mediate intellectual variations, since higher
mental functions are merely elaborations of simple processes of which
every one is capable and the young

h~n

brain is extremely plastic.

All of this seems well substantiated by research, and evident.

But he

also argues that there is no upper limit on memory, inherent biologic
ally, which reEtricts learning potential.
stantiated, and must be tentative, at best.

This claim is less well sub
Obviously, at some physi

cal level in some physical mechanism there is a heritable, structural
difference which causes individual variations in EPDts, if Hayes is
correct.

Although EPD's are -not ttrestrictive,fI they are heritable
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(and they must also be structural) differences.
some potentially

restrict~v~

It· is not clear why

variable could not be physiological and

heritable in some way analogous to EPD's.

Of course, if Hayes is accu

rate in his suggestions about EPD's, there is no need to search for
other mediating variables.
Hayes concludes his hypothetical exposition with the argument
that higher animals and human beings have essentially the same capacity
for learning.

Individual organisms between or within a species vary

in intellectual capability only because of their life span, their cap
acity for language and symbols and the culturally accumulated lmowledge
they transmit, or the strength of their EPD's.

Within species--for

example, among human beings--it is the EPD1s which account for all var
iance in intellectual performance.
~

Thus, EPD's in a ver.y real sense,

intelligence.
In spite of. the difficulties inherent in the construction of a

theory with so few facts to work with and such ambitious goals, Hayes
managed to produce a radical and original point of viEn"l which at the
same time has great merit.

He has made the critical distinctj.on be

tween intelligence as a phenomenon (which is a collection of learned
behaviors) and intelligence as a biological source of heritable
~dual

variation.

indiv~

He has also pointed out the vital importance of mo

tivational variables as discriminators of intelligent individuals.
It has long been realized that highly intelligent people have
significant tendencies toward high motivation. ,But tqe traditional
interpretation of that trend is that motivation states are environ
mentally deterrrdned variables affecting academic achievement and thus

one's performance on an IQ test

(usua~y,

i

f

adversely), and that they
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are significant but only partial determinants of a largely inherited
intellectual potential.

Hayes makes a dramatic change in emphasis,

arguing that rttrue tt or innate intelligence and motivation are intimately

related, if not mutually inclusive.
Hayes' entire hypothetical structure, with its supposition that
people (and even

anima~s)

are equally capable of complex learning and

its restricted focus upon EPD's as the only source of human intellec
tual variation, seems difficult to accept.

Perhaps we can avoid some

difficulties by accepting only part of it.
First, it is agreed that intelligence and motivation (especially
exploratory, curiosity and manipulative types of motivation) are in
trinsically related.

The possibility is also accepted that manifest

intelligence is partially mediated by innate motivational differences,
and thus that intellectual potential is partially equivalent to moti
vational "programming. tI What is not accepted is that EPD's are the
sole source of human intellectual variance, or that there are no innate
differences in information-processing capacities among human beings.

In place of the discarded portions of Hayes' theory, we make cer
tain amendments of our own. We suggest that motivational differences
and differences in intellectual capacity are correlated phenomena, not
an identity.

Although the increased-motivation of the highly intelli

gent certainly enhances their learning and accumulation of knm1ledge,
it is not

th~

only or the primary "cause tt of manifest intelligence.

Mo~over,

we suggest that some kind of motivational state and manifest

intelligence are both dependent variables resulting from the effects
of an as yet unspecified independent variable.

This independent factor

may well be a biological structure (or a group of them) which determines

»"t. ewS

)e
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to a large extent the levels of both motiy,ation and information-process
ing capability_

In fact, the intersect of these two phenomena--the de

tection of the possible location of a factor having these two kinds of
effect--may be the eventual solution of the problem of the plWsical
basis of intelligence.
We shall now attempt

t,o

support these amendments to the Hayes t

theory with facts.
II.

BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCES OF MarIVATION

What evidence is there that motivational differences accompany
differences in intellectual ability? Much of the evidence exists in
anecdotal form.

Eiduson (1962) reports from her study" of forty emi

nent research scientists the consistent pattern of a drive toward
work among them--a drive which seemed to center around a desire to

"fmq ~"things.

In a historical study of eminent men, Cox (1926)

found that even through indirect means of

infol~tion

about them, she

could clearly detect among these men a tendency toward roth broad and
intense intellectual interest.
These data might be argued to depend more upon creativj. ty than
upon intelligence.

But Terman's (1925) Gifted Group is clearly a
~.

group defined by means of intellective performance, and not creativity

(in fact, this is one of the criticisms most ..often leveled at it; see

Burt, 1961).

But analysis of responses on questionnaires, parent and

teacher ratings, and so on, gave strong support to the. idea that these
intellectually gifted subjects had high levels of interest and motiva
tion.

They showed significantly more desire for leadership, devotion

of effort toward future goals, perseverance,

,

I

d"

e g)"

pe~sistence,

and desire

to excel.

They maintained

~Jice

as many collections of things as sub

jects from the oontrol group, and were very clearly superior to less
able children in their desire to know about things (see review in
Miles, 1954).
All of these characterizations can be summarized in two general
attributes:

There has never seemed to be

interest and perseverence.

any question among researchers who have observed large numbers of in
tellectually gifted children that such children were more intellectual
ly curious and persistent than their peers.

One qualification needs to be made here, however.

Highly intel

ligent children have not been found to be universally more curious
about all things (Day, 1968). There may be a di~ectional variable in
volved.

Evidence on this point can be gathered and implied from the

work of Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Wallach and Kogan (1965b), al
though these authors do not address themselves to the point.

In their

.descriptions of gifted children, however, it seems to be evident that
the intelligent children have high motivation and persistence, and a
passion to learn, or at least to achieve by learning.

But it is also

clear that this intensity of motivation can be directed in vastly dif
ferent ways.

High IQ-low creativity

childre~

in these studies seem to

show an intense desire to achieve, and to receive social reinforcement
from other· childl'en or from adults.

Their curiosity, if it may thus be

described, is of a qualified kind, and is perhaps used only in academic
pursuits.

It may, in fact, result in a distorted fixity of intellec

tual goals and concrete patterns of thought (see the case histor,y of

"Jay," Wallach and Kogan, 1965b, p. 62).

1 -
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III.

PHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCES

It is of obvious interest to investigate whether or not there is

a physical basis to the heightened curiosity and motivational inten
sity we have seen related to

~pe~or

tional and correlational e vidence

0

intelligence through obse:rva

There are known to be individual

differences in something widely known as uarousal levels, n and it is
highly possible that this kind of variable

~ou1d

account for the behav

ioral phenomena of which we have mads note.
Elizabeth Duffy (1957) is one of the most prominant exponents of
the ,idea that one's average arousal level is an indicator of individual
differences.

Interes-t,ingly enough, she has made a claar point of the

fact that intensity and direction of arousal are distinctly differentl'
although she has also argued that these two dimensioP$ are sufficient
for classifying all human behavior.

It is, of course, intensity rather

than direction which her research attempts to clarifY, by measuring
such physical phenomena as skin conductance, muscle tension, electro
encephalogram, pulse rate, and respiration.
The most reliable and impressive fj.nding in Duffyrs work is that
individuals seem to have an over-all general arousal level, roughly
indicated by a few physiological indicators, and that the average of
this over-all arousal level is qui t-e cons:i.stent over a time wi thin the

individual.

However, individuals do vary in their arousal levels; in

a stress situation, Gach individual will show himself to be above his
own average, but in an amount roughly proportional to
among his peers in the same stress situations.
different from each other in thsir

aro~sal

.

arousa~

incr,.eases

Individuals may be very

levels under stress or calm,

·'titen

117
and they may

va~J

greatly in their responsiveness to stress, but they

are different from each other in clear patterns of deviation from their
own average arousal levels.
Duffy warns that internal "arousal lt is a concept, a hypothf;ltical
construct, while all of her measures are overt physical responses-
many show responsiYeness to operant conditioning" or may be -controlled
by internal inhibitory processes.

They may not actually correspond to

In

the internal arousal which is really the object of our interest.

spite of this, she argues that they may provide a good indicator of
internal arousal.
problem):

The problem is familiar (it may even be the same

we must estimate a biological potential (intelligence, or

internal arousal) by measurement of purely overt responses.
Whether she has investigated the arousal-intelligence interaction
or not, Duffy does not present any hint about the relationship.

She

reports no administration or scoring of intelligence tests on her sub
jects, although it is almost unthinkable that such tests would not have
been given, given the long (if hesitant) courtship between the concepts
of arousal and intelligence.

However, there is evidence from other

quarters that a relationship between intelligence and physiological
measures of arousal does exist.
In his thorough medical investigations of the original Gifted
Group, Tel~an (1925) obtained evidence that these highly intelligent
children had higher basal metabolic rates (BMR's) than average chil
dren.

The results were not reliable enough to

predic~

IQ ranking

within the Gifted Group, but they did discriminate between the gifted
children and the control group.

Shock and Jones (1939) obtained a

positive correlation of 027 (not significant) between intelligence and

t

t
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'BMR. Hinton (1936) found a much clearer relationship between the
Stanford-Binet and BMR (~

= +.736),

and the Arthur Point-Performance

(intelligence) Scale (~= +.661).
Some less direct evidence is available for supporting the
arousal/intelligence relationship.

We know that intelligent individ

uals learn more efficiently (Harootunian, 1966).

If we ascertain ,-that

conditions enhance learning, there is the possibility that those con
ditions will be the independent variables responsible for better learn
ing in the highly intelligent brain.

Several studies show that chem

ical t electrical and ttmoti va tional n arousal or stimulation of the brain

enhances learning effects (Weiner, 1966; Gaito, 1961; and others).

This

may prove to be the reason that the more intelligent learn more effi
ciently.
From all of these different evidences, it can be surmised that
intelligence j.ncreases very possible correspond

l~ith

increases in body

arollsal or activity levels--or with some heightening of brain activity
which is only imperfectly reflected in measurable physical responses,
What phenomena might be expected to result from such an intel1igence
arousal correspondence?
If only body arousal levels are involved, we might expect only
heightened rates of activity among highly intelligent people, with con
comitant increases in learning because of the greater learning oppor
tunities inhererrc in exposure to many different situations,
arousal level might correspond roughly to Hayes Q EPD's.

Body

But arousal

level seems no-c to be only a matter of gross physical activity, because
high-IQ children are, for example, more able to control their physical
behavior (that is, to be still and so on) in school situat:i.ons
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(Jaggers, 1934).

Even Hayes' EPD's are probably more subtle in their

influence than the simple acttvation of gross body movement.
elude curiosity, manipulation, and exploration.

They in-

Thus, we axte not

speaking simply of gross body activity (and if we were, we should not
be able to find observational confirmation of the hypothesis).

What

we are dealing with is something much more like a need for stimulation

than it is like a need for activity.
Hebb (1964) postulates that individuals have levels of arousal
which are optimum for effective performance in a complex environment.
Presumably, these optimum levels of arousal could vary from individual
to individual--although a quantitative view of such individual differ

ences is well-nigh impossible, considering the absence of any certain
measure of optimum levels.

Duffy may be measuring something ver,y

close to optimum levels when she measures average levels.

But we have

no proof that these two phenomena are interwoven, likely though it may
be.

It is Hebb's contention, supported in spirit and fact by others
(Barlyne, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1965; Leuba, 1965) that each individual
is motivated to maintain his optimum arousal level (except at times
like sleep).

If an individual's arousal level is higher than his

IIoptimumt1 arousal and situational demands require, he will seek to

lower it--to cut himself off from some of his environmental stimulation.
If his arousal level is lower than the optimum, he may seek some en
vironmental stimulation which will raise it.
In support of ris hypothesis, Hebb suggests several typical cases
of varying arousal states WhiCh,Car be placed on his continuum, and
'Which appear to a ffect performance in the predicted Vlays.

For example,
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sleep and coma are levels of arousal too 1m, for adequate functioning.
Performance during states of drowsiness or boredom is also impaired.

Alert, interested states result in the highest performance competence,

especially in complex tasks.

At very high states of arousal, like

fright and anxiety, the adverse effects of deviation from the optinm.rn

again begin to show R and performance is greatly impaired.,
It is possible that instead of having an intrinsically higher
average lavel of arousal, the highly intelligent person has an intrin
sically higher optilrnwm level of arousal than the average.

In that ease,

he might a ctually need more·-than-avera ge stimulation from his env:iron
ment in order to be at the optimum level of arousal.

It is assumed

that being; at the opti.mum level is in some way reinforcing (for related
evidence, sae Glicltman, 1960), and that aspects of the environment
which helped to maintain that level would be actively sought out.

Of

course, we are imrnediately reminded of the pervasive description of the
highly intelligent as strongly curious, persistent, and intense in

interest.

How close is this picture we 'have compiled of the highly

intelligent to a characterization we nught construct of the person who
is attempting to raise his arousal lev61 through extra stimulation?

It is actually very close indeed.

Aeain, the exploratory,

osity, and manipulatory drives seem intrinsically involved.

~urj_-.

Berlyne

(1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1965) and 9thers (Hebb, 1964; Harlow, 1965; for
example) believe these drives to be the result of some need for stimu
lation.

Berlyne (1964a) argues

~hat

explorator.y drives, are satisfied

by stimuli which have the qualities of uncertainty, novelty, complexity,

and relevance, for the subject.

And it is in these directions that the

individual with a higher-than-average optimum level must seek for stim

'.,

~,
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ulation which will heighten arousal.
If people of higher intelligence have higher optimum arousal
levels than the average, theywou1d thus be expected to display a
greater interest in, and persistence of approach tcrnard, activities
with elements of uncertainty, novelty, and complexity.

To a great

extent, these expectations are fulfilled in the accumulated results
of studies of the highly intelligent.

But another population, also of

significant interest to us, satisfies the same expectations to a super
lative degree:

the highly creative.

IV.

CREATIVITY AND NEED FOR sTnruLATION

We have already demonstrated that creative subjects are more

likely than the average to emit novel, or uncommon, responses (Mednick,
1962), and this might suggest that they prefer novel or uncommon stim
uli as well.

We also know that those high in creativity sample infor

mation stores in a wide-ranging way which generates greater statisti
cal uncertainty (Karlins, 1967; Kar1ins, et al., 1967; Schroder, at a1.,
1967), and this hints at greater tolerance for uncertainty among them.
But there are some more direct evidences that high levels of cre
ativity bring with them a preference for novelty, uncertainty, and com
plexity.

Barron (Barron, 1957, 1958, 1968; Barron and Welsh, 1952) has

discovered that one of the most reliable discriminators of creative sub
jects from less creative is a test of stimulus-card preferences.

Fig

ures drawn in ink on cards are categorized by the subjects into "likelt
or tfdon!t liken groups.

It has been demonstrated that creative sub

jects consistently prefer cards which 'are both asymmetrical and complex,
and which tend toward the chaotico

If anything has been clearly shown
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about creative individuals, it is their preference for novelty, complex
ity, and uncertainty.
But, of course, creative people have a very high
above average in intelligence.

chan~e

of being

It could be that the preferences they

display for complexity of stimulus input are merely the results of
their natural need for stimulation.

If this is true, we must explain

why further increases in IQ do not result in greater and greater tol
erance (and/or need) for complex stimulation (that is, creativity).
According to the Hebbian view, the only possible reason for an
individual to avoid complex stimulation is an overheating of the arousal
mechanisms--in other words, an arousal level which is elevated above the
optimum. We do not see an actual avoidance of complex stimulation among
the highly intelligent; they are, as a group, definitely elevated in
motivation, and in curiosity about and exploration of their environ
ments.

But individuals above an IQ-1eve1 of 130 or so do not shov; needs

for complex stimulation significantly different from people who have
IQ1s of 130 but are maximally creative.

we can only assume that the

more intelligent persons have much higher than average optiDnun arousal
levels, that they need more than average stimulation to maintain opti
mum arousal, but that they are receiving stimulation from some other
source which is keeping their

measur~ble

need for stimulation lower

than others with 101ler optimum arousal levels c

This extra stimulation

might be in the form of social pressures falling upon the highly intel
ligent.

Another assumption we might make about this problem is that

the highly intelligent persons who show no more preference for complex

ity than their lower-IQ, high-creativity peers may have been punished
for seeking novel and complex stimulation (and behaving creatively),
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and so avoid it in spite of their higher optimum arousal levels.
If our assumptions, and their logical conclusions, are accurate,
the potential for creativity--for handling and seeking after complex
stimulation, for deriving pleasure from uncertainty and novelty--in
creases constantly over the full range of intelligence.
certain IQ level, only a few

indi~duals

for creative thought and behavior.

But above a

realize their full potential

Most come under the pressures of

the culture around them and are unable to reach the levels of creativ
ity of which they are capable.
V.

THE BIOIJOGICAL MEDIATOR

A review is in order, to determine how ,veIl we have established
our amendments to Hayes' theory.

The individual

variatio~

of optimum,

arousal level have been proved to exist and we have suggested that
they have the possibility of covarying with intelligence.

Arousal is

not, as were Hayes' EPD's, the sole postulated cause of manifest intel
ligence.

Its exact influence upon one's accumulated learning and mani

fest intelligence as a motivator of experience and learning is unknown.'

However, it has been argued here that arousal level has something to do

not only with the amount of searching for

st~mulation

which is initiated

by the subject, but also with his capaCity for processing those stimuli

which reach the cognitive "machinery. n Therefore, whatever independent
variable is responsible for both intelligence and arousal, it ver.y likely
has a potentially limiting, as well as facilitating, function in intel
ligence.

It is thus argued that there could be an independent variable,

with a physiological basis, which is significantly determinant of both

intelligence (as an

infol~tion-pracessing ~apacity)

and heightened
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motivation (as a covariable with intelligence).

Is there evidence that

such a biological mediator does exist?--or evidence of its identity?
In fact, several posstbilities exist for filling this role.

We

have seen that basal metabolic rate could be nominated--or rather the
processes which underlie it (respiration, heartboat, sugar metabolism,
and so on).

It is easy to see how a high metabolic rate could heighten

general arousal and motivation, but its relationship with information
processing is a little less clear.

Conceivably, neural cells

-~uld

receive increased blood and oxygen supply and act in a more efficient
mBnner.

Whatever mechanism is finally discovered to be

~

it will probably include metabolic processes in its effects'.

mechanism,
But

they

are unlikely as a single-factor choice because their correlation with
intelligence is simply not clear and consistent enough.

Hebb (1949)

suggested potential neural synapses as the possible physiological med
iator of intelligence differen?Gs, but this is also difficult to tie to
motivational differences.
It is not likely that this

~riter

can solve all of the problems

arising from our theoretical assumptions.

At this time, there simply

is not enough information available in any of many fields to do so.
But one psychologist has posited an 'interesting nominee for this par
ticular mediation role--a variable capable of affecting both motivation
and information processing--and we should like to present his sugges
tion.
In his book on infantile autism, Bernard Rimland (1960) makes an

astounding suggestion more or less

~

passing:

that individual differ

ences in intelligence are the direct result of differences in the vas
culature of the brain--most especially in the reticular formation of
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the brainstem.

He points out:

Since the human brain consumes one-fourth to one-half of
the total oxygen input of the body, it would not be surpris
ing if through sheer logistics, the efficiency of the cerebral
bascular system imposed an upper limit on the functional ef
fectiveness of the brain itself. Nor would it be surprising
if the diameter and quantity of cerebral blood vessels turned
out to be a heritable correlate of individual differences in
intelligence (p. 130).
Rimland suggests that high-level differentiation of the vascular
system of the reticular formation

l~sults

in its susceptibility to oxy

gen damage and consequently in autism among those known to have a high
probability of reaching extraordinary levels of intelligence.

His

tightly-woven system of support for these hypotheses cannot be consid
ered here in full.

But it is most interesting that Rimland t s arguments

rely only on the likelihood that a widely effective scanning mechanism

like the reticular formation could play a strong role in enhancing or
limiting information processing.

For our purposes, it is equally sig

nificant that the reticul?r formation has long been known to be the
center of both cerebral and bodily arousal (Hebb, 1949, 1964; Lindsley,

1964; Malmo, 1964; Milner, 1970, and others). Furthermore, attention
in itself--the direct product of reticular activity--could well result
in more effective informational receiving and processing.

This little-

understood lO'iver brain organ may be the intersect of the two variables
w.e have considered, and should certainly be in"16stigated earnestly as

a candidate for the 1tseat of intelligence n we have been seeking for so
many years.
VI.

A PARTIAL SYNTHESIS

It is not clear how the concept of "optimum arousal level" (the

idea that one is required to find one's own optimum level by seeking
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or avoiding stimulation) fits together with the idea that arousal level
may be innately decided (by some mechanism like the reticular forma
tion) and at high levels would only determine a capacity for complex
ity, not a need for it.

Perhaps the real case is sommvhere in between.

Unless external variables impinge upon the organism, it is

~er.r

possi

ble that processing information and organizing it and manipulating it
are intrinsically reinforcing as long as they are below certain maxima
of optimal reinforcement effect.

They may be intrinsically reinforcing

in that same way that making a kill is reinforcing to an animal, com

pletely aside from the ~~tter of hunger and food (Glickman and Schiff,

1967). If these assumptions are true, individuals with higher arousal
levels would naturally seek complex stimulation because of their higher
capacity for manipulating it and being reinforced by it.
But environmental phenomena could negate these reinforcing ef
fects by over-stimulating the individual in certain ways or by punish
ing creative behavior of specific sorts.

The highly intelligent per

son would then "need" less stimulation, or would seek to dari va rein

forcement and stimulation from his environment in other ways, and would
not demonstrate his potential for creativity on any test of creativity.

A warning is necessary here. We

canno~

suggest that the highly

intelligent person is normally operating at a high level of arousal
without being aware that this ftblessingtt may be mixed.

An individual

attending strongly to his environment, with a strong desire to process
and integrate the information he receives from it, may well be hyper
sensitive to that information.

Indeed, it was Duffy's suggestion that

those with higher average arousal levels would be intensely responsive

to their environment and susceptible te its effects or its selection.
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A hypersensitivity of this kind could be disastrous in certain
environments, especially in those punishing creative behavior.

It may

be revelatory that subjects classified as high in intelligence and low
in creativity often turn out to be highly sensitive to praise and crit
icism from adults, eager to please, them, and almost insatiable in their
desire to conform, to achieve in acceptable ways, and to be accepted
(Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Wallach and Kogan, 1965b present the evi
dence from which these generalizations are derived).

This complex of

behaviors--which could be labeled ttcompulsivitylt--may be the result of

an aborted creative potential.

Quite possibly, the highly intelligent

have enormous potential not only for creativity, but also for compuls
ivity and conformity.

But we see no reason to assume that heightened

arousal levels inevitably, and by their
inhibitive of creativity.

~~atur~,

are necessarily

CRAPl'ER VI
.INHIBITION

Any system with arousal mechanisms would not long survive with
out some means of inhibiting them.

Paradoxically, it j.s alsO' true that

inoreases in arousal level must be accompanied by increases in poten
tial for inhibition, or chaos will result.

Therefore, if we suggest

that highly intelligent people have higher levels of average or opti
·mum arousal, it seems necessary that we suggest they have more capacity
for inhibition, as well.
It must be remembered that inhibition and excitation are perfectly
harmonious and mutually dependent at an associational level.

In order

for an association of the facilitative type to be made, all that is
necessary (in any simplified model of the real

proc~ss)

is excitation.

But if the organism is to discriminate among stLTflUli, we have seen that

he must inhibit all or part of his old response to the stimuli, and
then attend to some unique aspect of

them~

Generalization involves

the two processes of inhibition and arousal at more or less the ,same
level, and in a perfectly compatible coordination.
In fact, attention itself is possible only because the organism
is not only aroused, but

al~o

is free from responding to other stimuli

in that moment by inhibitive mechanisms.

Part of the .highly intelligent

person's ability to deal with and interpret and store large amounts of
incoming information is probably his ability to screen out its irrele
vant .aspects by inhibitory means.

Or, we might see very competent
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" handling of stimulus input as the superior ability of the cognitive
system to discriminate and categorize--but discrimination and categor
ization are also dependent upon inhibitory processes.
There is, then, no conflict inherent in proposing that intelli
gence covaries with arousal and with inhibitory potential, if we see
inhibition as quite a specific prO?9SS of the negative feedback type
--a process which is quite necessary if heightened arousal is to be
efficiently used.
Diamond, et al. (1963), who "wrote the classic study of inhibi
tion, call to our attention another advantage to heightened levels of
both arousal and inhibition.

They argue:

Nor is it unreasonable to suppose. • • that there is an
essential difference between the kind of alertness which re
sults from a balance of strong tendencies toward both arousal
and quiescence, and that which results from a balance of weak
tendencies. • • One can readily imagine, for example, that
the strong system could be able to maintain its balance in the
face of an overload of stimulation which might overwhelm the
weak system (Pe 363).
What we propose is that at increasingly high levels of intellec
tual potential both an individual's average arousal level and his poten
tial for inhibitor,y associations are greater.

In fact, these together

may account for pis intellectual efficiency, since generalization and
discrimination are not possible without the close interaction of both,
and since intelligence clearly means in part a higher efficiency at
processing large amounts of incoming information.

Higher levels of

both tendencies enable a system to stay in balance despite environmen
tal extremes.

It is completely unnecessa ry to think of bilateral in

creases in the strength of these two tendencies are redundant or use
less.

They may be the only way for increases in mental capacity to
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occur without overheating of any single system.
If our assumptions are correct, we should expect highly intelli

gent people to show an elevated capacity for inhibitions.

And if this

is true, we must ask if inhibitory mechanisms could be ttinhihiting1t

creativity when they are

I.

~ighly

INHIBITION

developed.

M~D

INTELLIGENCE

It is probably the case that inhibition is a great deal mere
specific in nature than is arousal,",

It may be more difficult, than,

to obtain a gross physiological measure of an individual's potential
for inhibitory activity_

That is not necessarily catastrophic.

It

might be easily argued that an individual's ability to learn the inhi
bition of an overt behavior is at least indicative of his cognitive
inhibitory efficiency. Since there is little other kind of evidence
available it is at such studies of overt behavior that we must look-
for we must examine any possible relationship between intelligence and
inhibitory processes.
At least there do turn out to be individual differences in in
bibitor.y ability at quite a molar level of behaviore

The inhibitor,y

association may be just as universally simple to establish as the
facilitory association, but measures of it so far have depended on
behavior considerably mora complex than the induction of rote memory
items.

Because of this, learning of the inhibition of a response prob

ably always involves at least. a narrow subsystem of the inhibitory pro

cesses, and perhaps even a larger piece of them.
standably difficult for research to make

t~e

It has been under

transition from the physio

logical level to the level of gross, overt behavior, but it is a step

131
which must soon be made, if we are ever to understand the phenomena
with which we deal in this paper.
Is there any indication, in the :roughly-measured studies whicn

have been made, that intelligence covaries with inhibitor.1 capacity?
There is much indication of it. First, there are all of the discrim
ination and categorization studies reviewed earlier (Tempons, 1965;
spotts and Mackler, 1967; Kerrick, 1956; Desai, 1960, for example).
They indicate that at the simplest (presently) measurable cognitive
level, highly intelligent subjects are more capable of inhibition.
Then, there is evidence dealing with the inhibition of body move
ments in children.

Massari, Hayweiser, and Meyer (1969) made measures

of children's rates of drawing and walking straight lines under dif
ferent conditions.

In the first condition, the subject is asked to

walk a line and given no further instructions.

Secondly, the subject

is asked to walk or draw a line as slowly as possible.

Last, the sub

ject is asked to walk or draw a line as fast as possible.

The child

ren's scores on each task were correlated with their Stanford-Binet
IQ1s.
Results indicated no significant relationship between a child's
ability to draw or walk a line rapidly and IQ--presumably variables
such as motor development and strength were more responsible for per

formance under that condition than intelligence.
children were better able to fulfill the

But more intelligent

inst~ctj.on

to walk slowly•

.And they also showed slcrtlsr rates of response on the t.est when the
instructions told them merely to avoid making mistakes (correlations
were all significant and ranged from

.43

to .60).

Evidently, the

children of higher intelligence were better able to inhibit their motor
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responses (or "control" them, in the authors' terminology) toward some
purpose.

Furthermore" they 'Were not only be.tter able

to do this when

the purpose was made explicit by request (1twalk slowlytt), but also
when the purpose had to be inferred from the request (walk slowly, so
you "don't make mistakes u ).
Clearly, some facility of

i~ibition

is required for such a task

as dravling a line "as slowly as you can. tr

By

learning, the tendency is to draw the

section of the line irow£di

ately after the first.

ne~~

habit and chained-response

This response must be inhibit.ed if the line

drawing is to proceed at a slow pace.

Thus, the superiority of more

intelligent subjects on such a task is indicative of (if not proof
of) an inherently more effective system of inhibition.
Supporting evidence is provided by Levine, Spivak, Fuschill

°,

and Tavernier (1959), using young mental patients and several measures
of "inhibitionrt (they corresponded to measures of one's conception of
the future, ability to estimate time, ability to overcome a word set,
and motor inhibition).

It was found that all of the inhibition measures

correlated significantly with IQ scores except time estimation, which
approached significance.

However, only a few of these measures of in

hibition correlated significantly among themselves.
The evidence quite strongly suggests that intelligence is the crit
ical variable in an individual's developnent of the ability to inhibit
his responses.

This general potential for inhibition of responses is not

in itself directional, however.
fe~ent

Individuals evidently learn many dif

ways to inhibit their responses, and also have idiosyncratic

discriminative stimuli for

res~nding

by means of inhibition.
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II.

DELAY OF GRATIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE

The delay of gratification research is helpful in supporting
these conclusions.

Studies of the delay of gratification phenomenon

have been done in great number and variety, and some of them have in
cluded IQ correlations in their design.

For the majority of these par

ticular studies, correlations of IQ with delay of gratification have
proved to be significant and positive (for example, 1tischel, 1971;
Mischel and Metzner, 1962; Melikian, 1959).

The exceptions which do

appear tend by their very nature to clarify the relationship
intelligence and the capacity to delay gratification.
toRO

studies.

bet~een

Let us examine

One is typical of the majority in the results j.t obtains,

although its sample population is quite unusual.

The other is atypical

in every way--and an exception which clarifies our rule.

In attempting to investigate whether or not the correlation of
delay of gratification with intelligence is culturally affected,
Melikian (1959) used children of Arab refugees as his subjects.

These

children had all their lives lived in refugee camps, their food and
shelter being supplied and rationed to them by charitable groups.

They

had attended a YMCA school, and were acquainted through the school with
some of the experimenters.
The children were given the GOodenough

Draw-A~Man

intelligence

test, and were told that for their drawings they would be paid--not
according to the quality of their dra-lI'lings, but according to when they
wished to receive their earnings.

The monetary

r~iard

offered for im

mediate payment was half the amount of the reward offered for payment
'bRO

days later.

Results showed that the children choosing delay of
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gratification had IQ scores significantly higher than the other groupls.
In other words, the more intelligent children were better ab1S to con
trol their

~~ediate

desires for the purpose of obtaining larger pay

offs, and this was true in spite of the hand-to-mouth nature of their
existence.
However, in a similar study by Bochner and David (1968) among iso
lated Australian aborigines, the opposite trend was apparent.

In this

sample, children who were the first generation of their tribe to attend
school and who aside from their time in the schoolroom spent their
whole lives ,in the traditional aboriginal manner, were administered the
Porteus Maze test of intelligence and offered a choice between one candy
now and two candies later.

Those who chose

~lediate

gratification

were significantly brighter than those who chose delayed gratification.
What is the meaning of these results?

The aboriginal culture is

one of the very few cultures in the world where there is absolutely no
storing, planting, or growing of food for the future, and no delay of .
any gratification beyond minutes--or hours, at most--except that imposed
by environmental hardships.

Even in a refugee camp, it may be wise to

save food coupons for a later day, or to wait for eating or buying.
for the aborigines, such delays would be extremely maladaptive.

But

Most.

likf;11y, delay behaviors would be punished in children from infancy; at
ver.y least, they would receive no reinforcement for them.

In all other

cultures, some s}:'l..aping and rei,nforcement of delay behaviors would be
certain to occur.
We can make a generalization with these facts in mind.

In almost

all cultures, where delay of gratificatio,ns is of definite value, more
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intelligent children learn better to delay their own gratifications and
to iILhibit their own responses than less intelligent children.
are simply more capable of inhibiting responses.

They

However" in a culture

where delay of gratification is useless, or even harmful, it is'the
intelligent children, again, who best learn those responses which are
adaptive to the environment.

This,does not prove that inhibitory pro

cesses are not highly differentiated in intelligent members of a cul
ture oriented toward immediacy.

On the contrary, lIintelligence tt is

directly dependent upon ability for abstraction, discrimination, and
so on--and these abilities cannot exist without inhibitory activity
at some cognitive level, if our arguments have been

Ylhat we

cOl~ect.

see in the aborigine study is that cognitive inhibition does not

al~ays

mean generalized behavioral inhibition--it merely provides the basic
potential for behavioral control.

We have seen that although a wide range of cognitive and behav
ioral controls are dependent upon the inhibitory processes identified
with intelligence, they are independent of each other and must be spe
cifically selected or shaped by the environment (Levine, et al., 1959) ,,'
In the aborigine, basic inhibitory processes still result in "intelli
gence," but they mayor may not result L"1 bep,avioral controls, depend
ing upon the adaptiveness of those controls.

Motionlessness during

hunting, a'motor inhibition, is adaptive and is performed.

Delay of

gratification, another beha"vioral control, is not adaptive for the abor
igine--and the more intelligent an individual is, the better he is able
tq understand and respond to his environment's contingencies.
Again we have seen evidence that the highly intelligent subject
is more responsive, and more discr:in1irJ.a tingly responsiva" to his envi..P '

('
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ronment--whatever that environment contains.

SuCh responsiveness

requires discrimination and, of necessity, cognitive inhibition.

alwa~~

In by

far the majority of cases, it also requires generalized inhibitions of
responses at a behavioral level.
III.

MORALITY AND INTELLIGENCE

Vlhen an individual inhibits a response which would obtain for
him something reinforcing, and does so for the internalized reinforce

ment inherent in performing acts labeled by his culture as "good, It he
might be said to be engaged in moral behavior.
involves both attention t

0

cultura~ly

MOral behavior, then,

recognized behavioral guidelines,

and the inhibition of an otherwise reinforcing response. We might ex. ·
pect, from this analysis of the composition of moral behavior, that
intelligent individuals would be more easily capable of it than less
intelligent ones.
This proves to be the general case.

In her analysis of one hun

dred mentally gifted children (Cox, 1926) found her subjects signifi
cantly more trustworthy and conscientious than average children.

Ter

man (192,) observed the same phenomena in his Gifted Group (see also
Tallent, 1956).

In a plea for attention to the definite relationship

which exists between intelligence a nd moral behavior, Unger (1964)
suggested that the over three hundred studies showing positive correla
tions between the two variables cannot-be disregarded.
nature of the results

obtaL~ed

Because of the

(correlations were low, but the most

moral children were almost always among the brightest), Unger supports
the hypothesis that "intelligence operates as a requisite precondition
for these tendencies as measured (p. -300). If

Inte~ligence is once again
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posited to be

necesBary~

but not enough.

In fact, some evidence indicates that when intelligent children
do

not behave in "goodtt ways, they may be some of the most difficult

children a teacher might face.

Jaggers (1934) finds a strong relation

ship between good behavior and intelligence, but discovers several
very bright children, near the top of their group in IQ scores, who
'Were Ita constant source of disturbance" in the classroom (p. 258).
It appears that when they are good they are very very good, and when
they are bad they are horrid.
Assuming that intelligence is the precondition--the potential-
for moral behavior, what are the possible reasons this is the case?
First, the intelligent person may s imply be better at distinguishing
"good" from "bad" behavior.
the MBnifest Anxiety Scale

One of the long-standing difficulties of
(~~S)

by Taylor has been the suspicion that

more intelligent subjects are able to select responses on the test which
are more socially acceptable (that is, indicate low
1955; Grice, 1955).

a~xiety)

(Taylor,

In an attempt to discover the truth of this sus

picion, Voas (1956) administered the

1~S

with the instructions to

"choose the 'best' (most socially acceptable) answers (p. 87)."

He

found that there was a significant and negative correlation between
~he P~erican

Council on Education (ACE) intelligence test scores and

MAS scores under these conditions.

Although all subjects revealed less

anxiety when instructed to respond in a socially acceptable way, more
intelligent subjects were better at judging which responses were most
acceptable (that is, least uanxious '1 ).
Some of the highly j.ntelligent person r s moral capacity is thus
his ability to distinguish moral from immoral, acceptable from unaccept
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, able behavior.

This greater ability to distinguish good from bad is

easily seen as a case of making fine discriminations" of course, and

as such is, very much dependent upon cognitive inhibitor,y mechanisms

hypothetically plentiful in the

hig~

intelligent.

The second possible explanation for moral behavior in the highly
intelligent is that they are better able to concentrate on a difficult
moral task, and are less likely to be distracted by other possibla res·
ponees.

Binet was aware of this possibility when he suggested that

among other things intelligence was the "tendency to take and .maintain
a definite direction (as cited in Cronbach, 1970, pe 200).11

Grim and

Kohlberg (1968) imperfectly confirmed Binet's intuitive conviction.

They found a positive relationship between conscientious behaviors and
ability to concentrate.

Attention is an obvious derivative of inhib

itory and arousal processes, and this explanation for moral berwvior
among the intelligent does not require any new or unique explanator.y
mechanisms.
The third possible explana tion is merely the simplified combina

tion of the others:

moral behavior, in the sense we have been discus

sing it, is an elaborate inhibitive process at a behavioral level.

It

requires, primarily, complex inhibitory mechanisms at the cognitive
level and, secondarily, shaping by tho environment.

Because of their

greater capacity for complex inhibition at the cognitive level, highly
intelligent persons have a greater potential for moral behavior, and
will emit i t significantly more often,
t~em

for it.

g

tha:i.r environment rewards

Inldb1tive processes (and so, intelligence) provide the

potential, not the direction for moral behavior.
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IV.

INHIBITION AND CREATIVITY

What is the relation of the intelligent person l s greater inlubi
tory capacity to his potential for creative

thot~ht

and behavior? If

generalized, behavioral-lavel inhibition, in the form of low spontan

eity, "inhibitedness," and constriction, is the necessary product of
cognitive inhibitory processes, than the highly intelligent person has
absolutely no chance of being

higr~y

creative--because spontaneity and

fluency of beha:v:ior are intrinsic to creativity (see Chapt.er III).

We have seen demonstrated, in a variety of ways, that intelligence
and/or cognitive inhibitory processes are prerequisite to behavj.oral
controls of many kinds.

ment

reir~orces

not

But we have also argued that when the environ

UL~bition,

but spontaneity, the intelligent per

sons are those who respond best, -to environmental contingencies and
show l-eest "control. II

In fact, there is nothing antithetical to creativity in inhibitory
processes, at least

L~

certain of the directions they may be utilized.

It, was Diamond, et ale (1963) 'toyho emphasized t,hat a capacity for inhibi

tion of old responses is necessary for flexibility and change to be pos

sible-and that the greater and more complex the inhibitory capacity,

the greater the potential for flexibility and change.

In

other~ords,

intelligence and complex cognitive inhibitory- systems are necessary
for the change and flexibility in the schemata group we know as creativ
ity.

The critical variable--a va.nabla not decided by level of intel
ligence or inhibitory complexity--is

§..~re9t.i~.

The direction ttpraferredtr

by the environment will be most accurately discriminated or perceived,
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and most intensively responded to, by a cognitive system with a com
plex interaction of heightened sensitivity and heightened capacity for
inhibitive controls.

In essence, the highly

greater potential for almost any style of
might choose for him.

int~lligent

beha~or

his

person has a

environ~ent

He can control his behavior extensively toward

moral, culturally conforming, socially reinforcing ends.

Or, he can

establish a complex system of cognitive inhibitions and discrimina
tl.ons which "protect" him against the effects of external social rein....
forcement, and orient him toward spontaneity, originality, and crea
tivity.

Or, he can be shaped by his environment to follow a path any

where in between.
V.

SUGGESTIONS

Vie have argued that the highly intelligent person is more

ttarousedtf--more able to take in large amounts of stinn.Llation.

In

order to function at this lavel of arousal, he must be able to order
incoming stimulation through discrimination and categorization, or
through discrimination and inhibition of irrelevant stimulus aspects.
But this limiting through inhibitory processes introduces a
oant danger.
~

sig~ifi

The individual will have heightened responsivity to

aspects of his stimulus environment.

~

He "Will have chosen, in a

more finely discriminative way than his peers, to respond in a partic

ular direction.
Diamond, et a1. (1963), suggest that there is a developnwntal

process of childhood, during which inhibitions are acquired.

This

process begins in infancy with the inhibition of fear responses, and

continues through childhood, where the individual learns to make

,

..

· abstractions by inhibition of stimuli which are generically irrelevant.
We suggest that the child also learns to which environmental stimuli he
must be responsive, and to which he must inhibit responses.

Presum

ably, this is accomplished through the shaping effect of his social
environment.

If the child is reinforced more for behaving in creative

ways, he will develop j.nhibitions

creative behavior.

~gainst

dependent, compulsi va, non

But he can as easily acquire other patterns of in

hibition (or patterns of selective

sensitivity~

or schemata--for'sll

of these are equivalent).
It is possible that there is a critical period for the develop
ment of the cognitive structures which determirle an individual's sel
ective sensitivity to the environment.

The arousal correlations with

IQ are highest during childhood (Terman, 1925; Hinton, 1936), and it
is perhaps during this time that inhibitive controls and differential
sensitivities are established.

It is not argued here that such cog

·nitive patterns are absolute, fixed, and

irrevocab1e~erely

that the

general style or pattern or schemata of cognition may be fairly 'Well
stabilized at the end of childhood, and will tend. not to change unless
drastic environmental changes are encountered (Hebb, 19u9; Piaget; 1969;
Diamond, et a1., 1963).
The point we wish to re-emphasize is that there is no reason to
believe that inhibitor,y potential, any more than arousal, is intrinsi
cally generativa of compulsivity.

The highly intelligent child will

be more sensitive to selected stimuli, and therefore capable of great
e~tremes

of performance in the direction reinforced

by

the stimulus

to which he is sensitive--whatever that direction may be.

Thus, inhib

itory process could easily enhance his creqtivity in a suitable environ
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ment.
But if, indeed, brighter people are more sensitive to certain
aspects of their environment, and if there is a critical period in the
child's growth whan his schemata of the future are being developed, it
must be obvious that raising a mentally gifted child is a task to

which all possible resources must be brought--in order that he not
respond intensively in an ill-chosen direction.

CHAPTER VII
ANXIEI'Y

Our efforts are directed

tow~rd

discov9I"J of the crucial varia

bles which inhibit creativity among the highly intelligent--and inhib
it it to such an extent that correlations between creativity and in
telligence are not significant at high IQ levels.

Because this is our

purpose, we must not neglect a full examination of arousal and its

related phenomena.

If increases in intelligence are accompanied by

increases in average arousal level, then the arousal phenomenon it
\

self may be in some way responsible for specific effects interfering

with creativity.
There are two areas of concern in our examination of the litera
.ture on anxiety and its relation to intelligence and creativity.
First, anxiety has often been considered a form of arousal--a state of
high motivation.

Duffy (1957) has suggested that heightened arousal

may take the form of anxiety.

It is thus appropriate to investigate

any possible relationships between anxiety and intelligenoe; or anxiety

and creativity. Second, if highly aroused, highly intelligent persons
do shmv leas curiosity or other creative behaviors than less intelli
gent (but highly·oreative)·persons, and the possibility exists that
they are receiving stimulation from their environment which "uses uplt
their stimulation needs or tolerances, we

~ust

investigate the possi

bility. that anxiety-evoking environmental pressures fill the role of

that extraneous stimulation.
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I.

ANXIETY, CREATIV!TY, AND INTELLIGENCE

It is well established that states of high anxiety impair problem
solving ability (for a review, see Cofer and Apley, 1964).
is not an indiscriminately general agent of impairment.
to some extent, selectively.

But anxiety

It impairs,

On the whole it has been found that flex

ibility, divergence and abstraction in thinking are the processes most
adversely affected by anxiety.

Behaviors emitted under conditions of

chronic or acute anxiety tend to be rigid, extreme, and concrete (for
example,

Le~is

and Taylor, 1955; Berg and Collier, 1953).

A study of the effects of anxiety on creative behavior was car
ried out by Krop, Alegre, and Williams (1969).

The control group

watched a film demonstrating the use of the· chalkboard in teaching.
The experimental group (the "stress" group) watched a film showing a
puberty rite Hin which crude surgery is performed with stone knives
on the penises of adolescent boys (p. 895)

&

It

Resll1ts of the study in

dicated that creativity was impaired on two creativity tests (Guilford
Consequences Test, and the

P~T)

by the induction of stress, although

to a significant degree only on the more open-ended Consequences Test. 3
One difficulty with the study is that the stress induced was not in
any visible way relevant to the responses required on the creativity
tests--but this failing could only have decreased the magnitude of the
results and makes the data obtained appear even more strikineo

Another

study (Bruner, et a1. 1964) with animals demonstrated that abstract, or

3frhis reinforces our belief th~t the RAT measures creativity at a
more basic, less environmentally responsive level.
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"creative" response were most interfered with when responses mvolved
were instrumental in reducing drive level, and this indicates that
when a stress is relftlvant to the task at hand creative responses on
the task are even more adversely affected.
Gelfand (1962), in yet a third study, found that when children
viere manipulated in such a way as to believe that they had failed on
a series of tasks, they

confo~nad

or imitated more than those who be

lieved themselves to have succeeded.

Although confornrlty and imita

tion are not direct opposites of creativity, they are very nearly in
compatible with it, and were here seen to be the .effects of the stress
we might assume resulted from recent

failt~eso

Despite the difficulties inherent in dealing with something as
nebulous as ttanxiety, n there do seem to be a large number of studies
approaching the problem from a wide range of viewpoints which result
in one fairly consistent pattern:

anxiety--induced, measured, or as-

sumed--decreases the frequency of responses identifiable as, or com
patible with, creativity.

Thus, if the higher arousal levels we be

lieve to be present among the more intelligent were roughly analogous
to BPAiety--if arousal took that form--we would have a simple aAjplan&
tion for the relatively negligible increases in creativity' correspond
ing to increases in IQ at a high level:

high-IQ persons are anxiety

ridden, and therefore uncreative.
Fortunately, or unfortunately, this statement does not prove to
be as complex as the reality.

There are other data and considerations

whi9h must be woven into the problem;s solution.

First of all, intel

ligence shows no clear, positive relationship to anxietyo

In fact, the

evidence more usually than not shows a negative relationship between
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the two variaoles (for example, Grice, 195,;

Kerl~ck,

1956; Feldhusen

and Klausmeier, 1962; Matarazzo, Ulett, Guze, and Saslm~, 1954; Keller
and Rowley,

196e)~

Various views have been expressed about the reasons bigh-IQ
subjects shovi less anxiety on measures of general, trait anxiety.

The

most obvious assumption is that more intelligent subjects are simply
less prone to anxiety, as the evidence indicates on the face of it.
Suggest Feldhusen and

Klausm~ier

(1962):

Superior mental ability may make it possible for a child to
assess more adequately the real and present danger in any cur
rent threatening object, situation, or person. Thus~ his
fears may be specifj.c and ascertainable ••• (p. 408).
A less obvious interpretation of the anxiety-intelligence re
search was made by Voas (1956),' whom we have already presented.

He

noticed that some of the studies obtaining negative correlations be
tween intelligence and anxiety had used military personnel as subjects.
After finding that intelligence made individuals better able to
choose nonanxiouB responses on the 1ffiS, he hypothesized that in any
situation where the results of testing are of any relevance to the per
sonal lives and future of the subjects (or even where the subjects
might suspect them to be), greater intelligence will act to dampen
the number of "anxious" responses.

Tests administered under what

pear to be less threatening circumstances show

mix~d

results, as op

posed to the custOmBry negative correlations (see Taylor,

review; Mayzner, Sarsen, and Tresselt,

1955,

for

ap~

1955,

for

counterevidence)~

It

is not now possible to make an unqualified general st,atement of the

Ii. The studies cited use the MAS and its equivalen-GB as mea Bures
of anxiety.

"
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relationship between anxiety and intelligence--not from existing data.
II.,

THE ANXIETY CONCEPI'

Ona possible reason the anxiety-intelligence data is in such a
state of disharmony is the questionable validity of the concept 1fanxi
ety.tI Mischel (1971) concludes, in revi6\"1ing several studies" that
self-reports of anxiety and other measures--for example, physiological
readings or counts of avoidance behaviors-are of "low or negligible ll
correlational strength.

Endler and Hunt (1969) devised an inventory in

which they attempted to sample many different kinds of stress situa

tions, many different possible reactions to them, and many possible
evaluations of feeling-states.

The variance for a wide sampling of

students could not be substantially accounted for by stress situation,
response tendencies (actions or feelings) or individual differences,
in themselves.

Only by treating the results as the product of all

these variables did the analysis make sense.

The individual. responds

in the way that he has learned (or been innately determined) to res
pond to a certain stimulus complex.

Mischel and Endler and Hunt agree:

general tests for anxiety are really much less valid than they have
been assumed to be.
Sarason

(1957) is one investigator who sees the need for redefin

ing anriety in terms more specific to 8ituation than have been used up

to now •

Although 1;1e is not as anxious as Endler and Hunt or Mischel to

eliminate measures like the

W~S,

Sarason does make this observation:

• • • people are not anxious ever3 minute of the day and. • •
often we can specify· the conditions which 'Will lead to an in
crease in anxiety in the individual e Perhaps what we need are
not general anxiety scales oriented Uwlards the kind of anxiety
responses (eg., sweating, awareness of an increase in tension,
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etc.) which an individual will admit to but, rather, tests
designed to assess the specific conditions under which anx
i~ty is arousede •• (P. 485).
He chose as his own particular interest "test anxiety, tt and

found that his test anxiety measure was negatively correlated with
IQ" while the general anxiety test he devised was not.
The emphasis on situational and individual variables in anxiety
research is consistent with Gaudry and Spielberger's (1970) suggestion
that the :MAS test measures anxiety occurring ltin situations in which
Q3ubject~

experience failure or some threat to self-esteem (p. 39l).1t

Unfortunately" their situational qualification (lIthreat to self-esteemn )
is of little help in the task of making anxiety measures as operational
and specific as possible.
More specific definition of the particular Itanxietytt being mea
sured would certainly be helpful in understanding thelelationships
among anxiety, creativity and intelligence (if anxiety research is to
be salvaged meaningfully at all).

Further" some consideration must be

given to individually specific as' well as situationally specific fac
tors.

Until these kinds of questions are asked and answered, it will

not be known for sure whether intelligence covaries positively with
anxiety.
w~ether

Even if such a relationship were found, it would not be

clea~

the anxiety was a function of innate arousal level, or of en

vironmental factors impinging on the more intelligent.
We shall have better luck. at reaching a working hypothesis for
the anxiety-intelligence interaction if we investigate. the differential
effect of anxiety upon problem-solving performance with

v~riation

in

intelligence level. What we shall be concerned \'lith is a particular
case ?f situation specification, and the situation specified is the
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setting of a problem-solving task.

Immediately, the

~ctura

bgcomes

more complex.
III.

ANXIETY AND INTELLIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE

Generally speaking, anxiety has been found to have more facili
tating effects on bigh-IQ subjects. than lmv-IQ subjects in problem
solving tasks.

It has been demonstrated that subjects who score high

on the llAS make better scores on simple tasks, while subjects low on
the MAS make better scores on difficult tasks (Spielberger, Goodstein,
and Dahlstrom, 1958). It is assumed that anxiety facilitates the res
ponse most dominant in an individual's hierarchy of possible responses

to a stimulus situation. In difficult tasks, a

do~inant

response would

have a lower probability of being the correct one, and high anxiety wou.ld
decrease efficiency on the ·task. In simple tasks, the dominant responSe
in one's hierarchy is most probably correct, and the task is facili

tated (Duncan, 1959; Cronbach, 1970). Spielberger (1958) argued that
these principles could easily be applied to individual differences in
intelligence and their

~ffect

on problem solving.

Among more intelli-'

gent subjects, problems are relatively easier, and across many tasks
anxiety would always activate dominant responses with a high probabil
ityof being more accurate.

His research, and others', tend to support

his argument that highly intelligent subjects are more often facili

tated by anxiety than

~thers

(Gaudr,y and Spielberger, 1970; Denny, 1966;

Kennedy, Turner, and Lindner, 1962).
Like all good generalizations, this one has some important quali

fications e

First, there is evidence that anxiety is facilitor,y in prob

lem solving whenever subjects are in a state of competence relative to

8

problem-whether by native ability, or by practice (Gaudry

a~d

Spiel

berger, 1970). This qualification is merely an elaboration of :the @en
eralization~

of course, since correct dominant responses could

~0t

reasonably be assumed to be the result only of ability, and neve~ o~
learning.

Second, some research simply does not support the

Spi~l

berger argument" for reasons which are not as yet understood (Keller
and Rowley, 1962; Pervin" 1967).

This research is, however, ver.ymuch

in the minority.

For the present, at least, we must accept the strong possibility
that subjects with higher intelligence are more likely to be fac11i
tated b.1 anxiety in their performance of tasks than are other subjects.
They are batter able to make constructive responses under al1Xiety be
cause the dominant responses activated in them by anxiety have a higher
probability of being accurate and appropriate--evan when anxiety bas
forced their arousal levels above the optimum.

The consequences

of

anxiety in the highly intelligent are thus not necessarily debilitating.
In fact, a distinction can be and has been made between deb.tli
tating and facilitating anxiety.

Instead of tapping "general" ail.;iety,

or attempting to define anxiety situations, the Achievement

Anxie~y

Test (AAT) attempts to differentiate between two kinds of responses
made to anxiety--responses which are detrimental to effective performancs, and responses which facilitate and invigorate it.

I

In demonstra

tion of the idea that anxious responses are really a continuum with
facilitation and debilitation at its poles, several studies have found
intelligence tied to one particular mode of response in anxiety.

Pervin (1967) obtained a correlation of -.46 between the two kinds
of anxious responses (facilitating and debilitating), indicating that

?

t:

t

..\
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where one mode is used, the other tends not to be.

He also found that

intelligence (as measured by the verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test)
correlated +.23 with facilitory responses to anxiety, but -.28 with
debilitating ones (all correlations were significant at the .E.:::: .01 level
or better).

Butterfield (1964) obtained results in the same direction

for all of these variables, but his correlations were even

highe~

(intelligence as measured by the WAIS correlated· + .466 with facilitating

anxiety and -.429 with debilitating anxiety).

suggests that when more

in~elligent

The evidence strongly

subjects do have reportable anxi

ety, it facilitates their solving of problems--that, in fact, they are
more likely than the average to have facilitory anxiety responses, but

less likely than the average to have deb iIitating responses to anxiety.
The ability of those who are more intelligent to :react in facil
itory ways is probably due in part to their learning histoT'lJ.

Anxiety

has always had a better chance of' activating correct responses in them,
Even in anxiety, action has proved to have a high success rate; active
responses are thus emitted rather than responses of salf-criticism,

emotionality, and so on.

Another possibility is that the more highly

developed inhibitory systems of the more intelligent subject enable him
to inhibit mora effectively those responses which he has learned are .

less efficient in handling a problem

~ituation--evenwith

the increases

in arousal due to high anxiety.
We must qualify what we mean by"response facilitation, however.
There has been

110

indication in the ;literature r eview€!d by this wri tar

that responses faei11 tated by anxiety in the highly intelligent subject
are creative ?responses.

On the contrary, there is every reason to be

lieve that anxiety always decreases the flexibility and variability of

response, because it activates dominant response tendencies.

In the

highly intelligent person these activated responses happen to be ac
curate and environmentally adaptive, but they are no less rigid and
no more "remote" in the cognitive hierarchy because of their accuracy
Thus" creativity could easily be impaired by anxiety in the highly
intelligent, in spite of their prowess at, problem solving under ttaruc- .

ious" conditions.
IV.

SEEKING THE SUPPRESSOR VARIABLE

Is there any reason that greater
highly intelligent persons?

a~ety

should occur among

For if there were, t heir anxiety would

easily act as a variable suppressing increases in creativity with
increased intelligence.
As tested by the MAS or any other general measure of anxiety,
there is no visible, stable relationship between
gence.

ar~iety

and intelli

Nor is there any reason to assume that the increased arcusal

levels we have hypothesized to exist in the more intelligent are ex
actly equivalent to anxiety states.

are

It is highly unlikely that they

equivalent--at least not physiologically or necessarily--since

Duffy (1957) has observed that arousal can be manifest in alertness,
stability, and adaptive responses.

If general arousal level--and thus,

intelligerice--were intrinsically identifiable with anxiety, we should
be very surprised not to find clear evidence that anxiety is related
to intelligence.

And even more basically, we should be able to deter

mine that a generalized trait of anxiety actually does exist.

The evi

dence for either of these suggestions is worse than sketchy--it simply
does not withstand scrutiny.

Therefore, it seems safe to assume that
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genaral arousal level is not necessarily manifest as

ar~iety.

If this is the case, the environment (not their own cognjtive
penchants) must be the source of any higher anxiety among those of
higher intelligence.

Their tendency, like that of their peers, is to

use the most available responses under conditions of stress--and to be
relatively rigid in those responses, losing flexibility and creativity.
T~ey

do not, however, lose accuraa,y and competence, because of the

accurate nature of their dominant responses.

This is an exact charac

terization of what could result from anxiety in interaction with high
intelligence.

And it is also exactly compatible with the suppressor

variable hypothesis.
of the chain:

Only one further link is needed for this section

it must be shown that high-IQ persons do have greater

anxiety-engendering pressures exerted upon them by their environment,
consistent with or covarying with their intelligence level.
In establishing groups of high and low anxiety groups, Souei!
(1958.) used an interesting method.

Rather than measuring some response

tendency which could accurately be labeled "anxiety" only for the spe
cific situation tested, he made evaluationS of the social

st~lcture

of

his countr.y (Egypt) and logical hypotheses about which social groups
would have such undesirable positions within the culture that they
would be subject to stressful pressures.
anxiety" groups.

These he labeled the "high

In Egypt, high anxiety groups were hypothesized. to

be Christians (because of their minority), adolescents (as compared to
adults who were not in a transitional age), and so on.

When assessed

on tests of ambiguity tolerance, groups predicted to be nanxious" showed
more rigidity and greater intolerance for ambiguity in their behavior.
Therefore, Soueif's assumption that people under stress can be

ident~fied
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by

examination of their cultural and social situation

fOtL~d

significant

support.
It is our intention to make that kind of socio-cultural search in
regard to individuals of high intelligence, and to arrive at a logical
assessment of the stress they may incur because of their intelligence
level~

Of course, direct measures will be used as much as possible.

In keeping with Soueif's method of looking for anxiety by logi
cally deducing who might have. cause to be anxious, we might assume that
high-IQ children were under stress commensurate with their intelli
gence level because intelligence caused them to be alienated and unpop
ular in the classroom--especially if evidence could be found for such
an assumption.

But, on the contrar.y, a strong trend tcwlard what is

Culturally-defined as psychological "health" and "adjustment" is readily

seen in intellectually gifted subjects of many different samplings
(Terman, 1925; Wechsler, 1958; Matarazzo, 1972; for comment see Tyler,

1965; and Burt, 1961). Not only are the mentally gifted well-adjusted,
as rated by adults, but they have also been found to have more popular
ity among their peers (Terman, 1925; Gallagher, 1958).
There are, however, data qualifying our visions of the highly in

telligent child as the supersocializer of the classroom.
~cceptability

The social .

of a child depends not only upon how intelligent he or she

is, but also upon creativity.

Jacops and Cunningham (1969) found that

children in a questionnaire chose

h~ghly

intelligent, highly creative

peers to work with them on school-related tasks more often than anyone
else.

But these sama children were not preferred for social purposes

--their peers rated them preferable only to children low in both intel
ligence and creativity.

Any

other combination (high in one or the other

..

'
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variable, but not high in both) was more acceptable).

It seems that

if a child who is mentally gifted is to find himself a social niche

among his peers, he may very well have to forego creativity.

And only

'when the child was noticeably brighter than others would this kind of
pressure be exerted.

Thus, it fits the prQfile of our hypothetical

'suppressor variable.
But it is not only for his peers that the gifted child may

-to tailor his behaviors.

n~ed

Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Torrance

(1962) found evidence that teachers prefer high-IQ students to high
creativity ones, even when both have equal leyals of achievement.
Wallach and Kogan (1964b) suggested that children high in both intelli

'gence and creativity may be disruptive in a regularly stru,ctured class
room because of their expressiveness, wit, and spontaneity.

Such chil

It is easy to under

dren are often known by their peers as "naughty."

stand how teachers and parents who do not high1y value spontaneity and
. autonomy might prefer children who did not show 'these qualities.

Crea

tivity may well be udisruptiva lt in many situations.
It is logical to asswne that when both are available for s el~c ...
tion conforming, :restricted achievement

-to creativity.

1\'ill.

be preferred by the culture

Since more intelligent children have shown greater sen

sitivity to social stimuli (Rothenberg,

1970), these cultural prefer

ences may well be sensed by them more intensely, so that they are bette r
able to avoid creativity and the .disapproval accompanying it.
These views are compatible with the position taken by Fellows

(1956), who approaches the problem in a slightly different way. He
maintains that although gifted people may be Uadjusted1t -m.ay even be
very popular-they are not necessarily "happy."

l 1 i".f

t

Y

Recognizing the
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enormous difficulties inherent in a scientific investigation of happi
nes-s, Fellows, nevertheless calls attention to his data--which show
that self-ratings of happiness in college students are negativelyre
lated to scores on an intelligence measure (ACE).

Although tthappiness tt

is little more useful than tranxiety" as an explanation or prediction,
these results do serve to point out the fact that ttadjustmentft is not
necessarily a satisfactory state--that gifted people may achieve adjust
ment by paying a high price.
- . Some investigators suggest that if constricting

p~essures

are

exerted upon the highly intelligent because of their intelligence, it
is only at very high levels of intelligence that this begins to occur.
Gallagher (1958), for example, found what he believed to be a downward
trend in popularity and social acceptability at the 165 IQ level (this
IQ number is probably inflated, because of the high scholastic level of
the school population he sampled).

Apparently, in spite of ability -to

reach social acceptance bys.acrifices in creativity, children may reach
a maxinrum intelligence level, beyond which they are much less acceptable
to their peers.

Gallagher also found what he believed to be a tendency

to sacriftce achievement for greater popularity, among children above

150 IQ who had been placed in a school with rather low norms.

These

subjects were still ver,y popular, in spite of their high intelligence,
and among those much less intelligent, but their achievement quotients
were quite a bit lower than would have been expected.

Burt's (1961)

finding that at higher and higher levels of intelligence, achievement
is in continuous deceleration (confirmed by Wilson, 1926), may have
significance beyond his own awareness.
Gallagher's (1958) finding that children at a very high intelli
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gence level are those who shm' an inability to compensate for their
diffe~ences by

social conformity is not without predecessor.

alent suggestions were made by Leta

Hollin~lorth

Equiv

more than thirty years

ago (Hollingworth, 1940; Hollingworth, Terman, and Oden, 1940).

She

made children of extremely high intelligence levels her special inter

est, believing them to have unique problems
their peers.

in

findL~g

a place among

Her observation is that children of high but not extra

ordinarily high intelligence (130-150 IQ) adapt socially and get along
better personally than any other group.
Within this range, the person comprehends more clearly, but
not too much more clearly, than the majority of his fellow
men, and can thus get himself accepted as a supervisor and
leader of human affairs generally, with accompanying emolu
ments and privileges. His vocabulary, his interests, and his
hopes have, at this point, still enough in common w~th his
contemporaries to enable and warrant cooperation (Holling\'Jorth,
1940, p. 274).
1Yhen one's IQ level is higher than 150, problems begin to appear.
His abilities begin to separate him from,.. rather than endear him to,
his peers.

Says Hollingworth:

"Mutual :rejection begins to appear be

tween the deviate and nearly all his contemporaries (Hollingworth,

1940, p. 274)." She suggests that this
difficulty being tolerant of others.

highly gifted person will have

He may seek the company of elders

and of his own imagination so much of his life that unidentified prob:'
1.ems can arise in

hi~

relationships 'With peers.

Most of all, he may

appear to be completely separated from the normal world in terms of his
thoughts and values--he may lose his
ality.

n cozmnon

sensen and thus his common

Several investigators have found evidence of these hypotheses,

although systematic research is difficult, given the small size and the
large geographical spread of the population (Sheldon, 1959; Gallagher,

sf

1998; witty, 1940).
V.

SUMMARY:

RESTRUCTURING OUR APPROACH ID THE PROBLEM

It appears to be possible that difficulties in socialization and
interpersonal relations might cause pressures to be put upon

child~en

and adults with intelligence levels which are very high (150+ IQ).
Al though we might call this group lIarodous ll because of the pressures

we·have hypothesized, and point to their failure to live up to their
potential in creativity as evidence ,of their anxiety, the label ttanxious U

is not the most efficient label we mdght use for them.
ing that they are under stress or "aw.iety,1t
use of the anxiety literature in
highly intelligent.

un~erstanding

have

been

able to

make

creativity among the

But this label does not help us predict or modify

the phenomenon we observe.
cannot be (or at least
. usefulness.

we

By hypothesiz

h~s

And uamdetyn as a theoretical COT'..struct
not been) specified adequately to be of real

What we really need to know about are the specific pres

sures and manipulations

exer~ed

upon the intelligent person by his

environment in shaping processes.
We have seen that preferences are expressed and shaped in its

members by the culture, and that these are

e~pecially

forceful in their

effect upon the pighly intelligent. We do not need to say, or have the
basis for saying, that the

emotiona~

responses intelligent persons feel

in those conditions are ttanxiety." 'What we can say is thAt the pressure
of their environment evidently
p~ttern

of responses in them.

caus~s

a certain intensity and a certain

They respond with facilitated vigor and

little-diminished a ccura cy.
In 'What directions will they

X

M

re.spond~

They will seek social .rein-

forcements from the best ava:tlable source.
forcement is obviously not among peers.

The best source of rein
They are too likely to be to

,

some extent alienated by differences.

It is most efficient to adhere

rigidly to patterns of behavior known to be accepted and reinforced
by

parents and teachers and others in command:

dent, a model child.

to become a model stu

Of course, this pattern is not

al~aj~

followed

"\iO its limit, in spite of the kinds of social difficulty which every
particularly gifted child must feel.

Some of them do manage to behave

creatively (in accordance with their cognitive tendencies), to culti

Others

vate their autonomy, and to remain spontaneous and flexible.
become rebellious under-achievers.

All of these, presumably, experience the same externally-imposed
It

anxiety• It

But

it must be clear that that fa ct provides us wi th

help in predicting which of the available response modes a child
choose~

We must look to the specific sources of

punis~Jnent

n~)

~":1y

and rein

forcement which enable one child to be creative and force the next to
be compulsive.

We must begin to understand specifically how creative

schemata ara formed in the developing child.
One

~ther

thing should be borne in mind:

the highly intelligent

child is particularly adept at responding to stress,

an.~ety,

and de

mands of negative sorts effectively and efficiently (Kennedy, at al.,

1962). He is particularly adept at reducing his arousal by selective
sensitivity and attention to certain stimuli.

He has such a high rela

tive rate of success that he may get more information by attending to
negative cues and ignoring positive ones--the loss of
ficiency that others would

sh~j

per.forrr~nce

ef

if they concentrated on criticisms and

punishments prevents their being able to attend to theil" environment
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in just this

way (Hurlock, 1925, presents a hypothesis of marginal rele

vance to this suggestion).
such

8

If the highly gifted person grows up in

pattern, wit.h heavy emphasis upon negative cues, it is inevit

able that his unusually high potential for creativity wilJ. be absorbed
by the necessity for rigid, efficient responses to the environment.

In

order to allow him to realize his .full potential, he must be saved from

his own tendency toward efficient environmental sensitivj.ty, and from a
cultural environment which places little value upon creativity.

72

CRAPI'ER VIII

PERCEPrUAL AND COGNITIVE STYLES

We have hypothesized that certain patterns. of physiologically
Q~sed

cognitive capacity and tendencies in cognitive structure (for

example, fine-grained differentiation) are daterodned
lent to intelligence. We have also investigated

by

cel~ain

or equiva
environmental

sensitivities which are argued to exist in the highly intelligent" as
well as some environmental effects which could have influenced than

thl'ough their heightened sensitivity. We now wish to examine the in
teraction of cognitive tendencies with certain environmental

phenomer~

(for example, the causal nature of environmental events) in the devel-"
opment of cognitive

sche~~ta.

Although there may be no physiological necessity for noncreativ6
behavior among the very intelligent, we cannot yet elim:inate the possi
bility that their interaction with the environment results in structures
of behavioral control and selection which prevent or inhibit crea tivi.ty.
That is our concern in this chapter.
I.

PERCEIVED

weus

OF CONTROL

One of the major intellectual achievements of the growing child
is its development of an understanding of the laws of causality.

At

a rudimentary level, the child understands causality as a process with

himself at the center, the Cause of ALl Things (Piaget, 1969).
his parents may appear to be of

over-j.nflat~d

f

1.

Later,

importance in causing
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things to oocur.

Real understanding is achieved when the child is able

to discriminate actual causal agents among those agent.s which are in
any other way associated to a phenomenon.

An analogous process of learning, one not so complex or abstract,
is the development of a system of hierarchies of expectation--based on
previous success or failure at achieving reinforcement through some
instrumental response.

The individual, because of his past history,

nas a certain expectation of reinforcement in almost any situation or
stimulus complex.
situation.

It generalizes to all situations which have similarity to

the specific one.
more or less

This expectation does not only apply to one specific

~n

s~ademic

studies dealing with expectations of success in
situations, Crandall and McGhee (1968) noticed

that. a ch:ild t s past h:istory of academic reinforcement (good grades)

was significantly correlated with the expectations he expressed about
future success on a wide range of tasks.

Even in a perceptual task,

like matching sample angle sizes to a series of model angles, the chi1
<iren showed expectancy levels which were correlat.ed + .32 wl:ch school
.',

grades.

But the more "academic" a task became, the closer

YlaS

the cor

relation bet.ween grades and the expectancy of success on that task

(correlations ranged to a high of +.62).
It is the conclusion of Crandall and McGhee that

i.l~dj.viduals

dev

elop generalized patterns of expectancy, based upon past reinforcement
-and that theRe expectancies, if they are in any way contingent upon

the subject's own behavior, are estimates of the adequacy and competence
of his own respop.se.

They further argue trlat rJ.gh expectancies provide

greater motivation for a task, and a facilitating influence on task-

relevant responses.
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Children of high intelligence would of course be expected to de
velop high expectancy levels in intellectual tasks at quite an early age
;-~barring

some strong environmental influence like unavoidable failures,

or the inability of the child to have any signif:ic:snt effect in obtain
..ing reinforcers by his own actions.

But, in most cases, the intelli

gent child should be more effective than the average child in ewitting
·behaviors instrumental to reinforcements.

He is probably more discrtm

'inating in reading the reinforcement probabilities of his environment-
Imows better what are the sources of reinforcement, and upon what re

sponses the,y are contingent--and

s~ou1d

generally have much higher suc

cess at obtaining them through his own actions.

Consequently, he would

have higher success expectancies.
Thus, it might be predicted that the highly intelligent child
would soon, with the help of his understanding of causality and of
his system of reinforcement

a~pectancies,

develop an internalized repre

sentation of the controls of relevant reinforcers in his environment.
:·It is further' expected that in such an internalized r.epresentation he

would see his own behavior as instrumental to many more significant
-reinforcers than would the average child.

For the bright child, the

perceived locus of control is internal.
It should be emphasized that

w~at

we mean

her~

by perceived trcon

trol" does not necessarily mean onets perceived position in a cultural
-or political power

structur~--although

these kinds of control would cer

tainly enhance the "perceived" control which is our concern.

Rather,

we are discussing the individual's perception of his ability to choose
and emit behaviors which will reap good consequences and avoid most
bad ones in his milieu.
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In the literature devoted to individual differences in perception
of control, the majority of investigators designate a continuum with
the axis tt:l-nternal-external, It any point along which an individual can
select as the "locus" he percej.ves for control in his en\iironrnent.
~ocates,

very much

in effect, the seat of power.
in

He

Those who see themselves as

control of and responsible for the contingencies of their

environment are labeled "internal, If and those who sea themsal ves at the
mercy .of a random, whimsical environment are "external. tI
Once an individual has experienced enough reinforcements and pun

ishments, he can establish and internalize some expectations of rein
forcement and a perception of the general locus of control in his own
surroundings.

His internal representation of the locus of control is

quite stable, and tends to guide his continuing perceptions of the an
vironment--it acts, in other words as a schema for organizing incoming
information and executing appropriate responses.
In example of the ways in which locus of control schemata affect

perception in behavior, we cite the research of Lefcourt (1966).

He

reported that subjects categorized as highly ftexternal" in perceived
locus of control were much more likely than "internals" to raise their
reported expectancies of success after a task failure and to
them after a success.

la~er

If one has already established a world-visw'in

which random events are conceived to be dominant--events with no re
lation to one's own behavior--it is as sensible to raise expectations
after a failure
s~ring

as

it is to Imler them.

To this "external" person, a

of successes may mean a high probability of fai1ure--an end to

a run of luck.

To the "internal" subject, of course, all estiIn3tes

about the future are strongly dependent

-

" eta

15 e ·'ok

upo~

nd"

the results of his behaviors
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in the recent past--he has constructed a schema, a system of informa
tion....p rocessing which makes predictions in that way, and he continues
to make them even when environmental events are really random.

Many studies have established that the more intelligent individ
,wls are, the more likely they are to percaive their locus of control
as internal (Gold, 1968; Bialer, 1961; Crandall, Katovsky and Preston,

1962; Butterfield, 1964). Trus is true over a wide range of subjects,
from college students to retardates, and should not be surprising.

An

intelligent person should be better at perceiving causal relationships
in his environment, at choosing and accomplishing appropriate instru
mental responses, and at realization of the effectiveness of his own
responses.
What is perhaps really surprising is that the correlations between
intelligence and internalized locus of control are not nearer unity.
The relationship is so logical and predictable, and the evidences so
consistent, that as Lefcourt (1966) pOints out, nit might be

argu~

that

locus of control merely represents the phenomenological response to
one's own intelligence (p. 217)0"

In actuality, one's degree of intel

ligence is directly related only to one ' s ability to perceive the locus
of control accurately. Usually, i~telligence is also strongly (but
indirectly) related to one's ability to affect the environment.

But

if, for any reason, an individual with high intelligence is prevented
from exerting control upon the environment which is as effectiva as

that of which he is capable, he will then be able to perceive even his
own lack of control accurately;
Let us examine a few 6ituations in which cultural structures are
sel~ctive

in meting out individual control.

Battle and Rotter (1963)
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found that among both blacks and whites, 10'l"/er-class subjects showed a
more external perception of control than middle-class subjects.

Com

paring races, they found that blacks were generally more external than
whites.

In fact, lower-class Negroes, even those with high IQ's were

more external than low-IQ, middle-class whites.

Further, there seemed

to be a tendency among the lower-class blacks for the brightest among
them to develop the most external perception of control.

They were

perhaps better at accurately estimating their own ineffectuality in a
white culture than were their less-bright peers.'
Thus, . the structure of the individual f s environment determines to
a significant extent his perception of how much control he has over en
vironmental contingencies.

It is relatiyely simple to choose a group

one expects have little control over their own lives and thereby extract
an environmental factor in the individual psychology of controls.

It

is considerably more difficult to predict and verify what specific en
vironmental influences affect indivtduals ' perception of control within
a cultural group.

It is possible that an autocratic parent might "pro

duee an external-control child.

But such a child might perceive subtle

ways of obtaining predictable reinforcements from the parent--through
achievement, flattery, and so_on--and be classifiable as "internal. 1I

.

In a study not strictly part of the locus of control literat'ure,
effects like these were found to be important.

Heilbrun and Waters

(1968) discovered that college students who came from homes with strict

5Graves (1961) supports the contention that repressed groups per
ceive themselves as little able to be in control of their environment,
as has Seeman (1959) from a more sociological point of view.
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"controls" were much more capable than others of the independent behav
iors required for achievement during their first year away at college

--but such capability was present only if their parents were seen as
highly nurturant or rewarding, as well as strict.

It can be guessed

that the availability of rewards encouraged the students, as children,
to seek ways of responding to parental "control" which would bring the
rewards.

Behaviors instrumental to rewards were emitted by the stu

dents, rewards ware received, and for all practical purposes the stu
dents were in "control" of reinforcement contingencies. We must attend
to Skinner's (1972a) warning that the pigeon controls the experimenter
just as surely as the experimenter controls the pigeon.
It is probably because more intelligent persons are more capable

re

of making out indirect as well as direct ways of controlling

the~r

inforcements that they are, as a group, so high in perceived

inte~el

control in spite of environmental variations.

It is also partly be

cause of this capacity that they are probably more susceptible than
others to any systematic patterns of environmental contingency and
may be easily shaped by those patterns.

Unfortunately, behaviors lead·.. ·

ing to social reinforcement may not always be creative behaviors.
fact, another defi.'1ition of creativity might be that it is not

In

o~ly

representative of an internal locus of control, but also an indepen
dence from .those who administer social reinforcements··...an independence
that goes well beyond being able to obtain these reinforcements.
What are the results of a certain internalized perception of con

trol?

First of all, internalized control is expected to enhance one's

desire and ability to achieve.

We have already observed that Crandall

and McGhee (1968) believe internal perception of control facilitates
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achievement (see also Butterfield, 1964; Lefcourt, 1966).

Gold (1968)

reports several small and insignificant or barely significant correla
tions between internal locus of control and need for achievement.

is surprisingly little support for such a logical proposition.

This

But

heed for achievement measures of the McClelland type tend to depend
partly on independence from parents and authority figures--a variable
which may not take into consideration the desire and ability to achieve
independently because of dependence on parental
have just discussed.

~inforcement,

as we

It would be enlightening to see the results of

a nead for achievement measure which was not tappi.11g independence from

authority figures, as compared with locus of control.

Significantly

enough, measures of actual achievement (grades), with intelligence
held constant, results in a high partial correlation betvveen internality
of control and achievement (!
?-Ie

= .891,

in Butterfield, 1964).

Therefoxe,

conclude that whether or not they are truly "independent, It individ

uals high in internal control are generally high achievers.
Another predictable effect of the perceived locus of control var
iable is anxiety.

Butterfield (1964) demonstrated relationships among

measures of the Internal-External Control Scale (I-E), the Frustration
Reaction Inventory, and the Alpert-Haber Facilitating-Debilitating Test
Anxiety Questionnaire.

He found that both intelligence and internal

locus of control were significantly correlated with constructiveness of
responses to frustration (positive correlations), debil:Ltating test anx
iety reactions (negative correlations),6 and facilitating anxiety reac
tions (positive correlations).

6Just under significance for the- I-E ,
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With this data we can sketch in the details of a portrait of the
highly intelligent person.
analyzing

~nd

If he is anxiolls, he also is capable of

manipulating the contingencies of his environment so that

his responses are most often facilitory and goal oriented.

Also with

this bent to successful dealing with the environment, an internally
controlled and highly intelligent person may be more alert to its stim
ulus configuration.
II.

And that is pur next topic of discussion.
PERCEPTUAL LEVELING AND

SH.ARPEND~G

With the conviction that his responses can be instrumental in
causing change within his environment, an individual will probably pay
more attention to his environment, so as to learn what are its eontin
gencies.

Comments Lefcourt (1966):

Vfhen the subject perceives thBt he is able through some modi
cum of personal activity to predict the events occurring in a
given situation, he becomes more accurate in his perception of
changes in that situation (p. 209).
Although it is necessary, simple predictability of events is not
a guarantee that a subject will attend to and be more accurate in ob
serving

en\~ronmental

changes.

Reece (1954) argues that the availa

bility of instrumental responses relevant to a stimulus is critical to
the sharpening of an individual's perceptual processing of that stim
ulus.

He showed that when subjects could avoid shock by quickly rec

ognizing critical stimulus words:

(a) they recognized all stimulus

words more quickly, (b) they did not recognize more quickly words immed
iately preceding stimulus words in

presentation~

and (c) they later

remembered more pairs of words (preceding word plus stimulus word) than
other subjects.

Reece took these last results to mean that people
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generalize their perceptual ·tvigilance tt to all task-relevant stimuli,
, and only to task-relevant stimuli.

They may attend to (and remember)

stimuli associated to the critical class of stimuli by contiguity or
causal relationship, but they will not necessarily nexpend1l their per

ceptual vigilance on these more or less irrelevant stimuli (see Guthrie,

1966, for supporting evidence).

This research points to possible dif

ficulties in finding stable traits among individuals for responses
which evidently have such stimulus-specific characteristics.
Phares (1962) did a kind of photonegative of Reecels

study~

He

established escape-from-shock conditions for his subjects on both
-"chance" and "response-contingent" bases.

Since escape conditions are

'by definition response-contingent stimulation, Phares is rea~ly measur

ing

somethj~g

like subjects' response to manipulated success-rate for

their instrumental behaviors.
ReecG.

~~en

At any rate, his results supported

response-contingent escape is possible, subjects have

shorter recognition thresholds than when escape is based upon chance.
Vigilance is the most adaptive response mode for subjects who
have internal control within a test situation-that, is, for those whose
res~onses

are instrumental in avoiding punishment or obtaining reward.

But for subjects who have external control in the temporal context of
the experiment, another kind of modification of perceptual processes
is possible.

It is known by the various names of leveling, repression,

and defense.

Both Reece (1954) and Phares (1962) found evidence that

subjects who were shocked, but had no way (that is, no precti.ctable way)

of influencing the onset of the shock, recognized stimulus words more
slowly than control subj acts who were not shocked at all.

Clear evidence of the nature of a subject's "choice" of percep
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tual mode--whether vigilant or defensive--is found in a study by Guthrie
.(1966).

He found that para chutists, prior to a critical jump, displayed

significant vigilance to visual cues as cOI!lpared to control subjects;
while hospital patients, prior to abdominal surgery, tended to level

their perceptions of visual stimuli.

Obviously, parachutists have a

great deal more control over their environmental contingencies than do
surgical patients, and for this very reason are more alert to their

s~-

roundings.
There is no need to regard vigilance as adapt,iva while we see

leveling as maladaptive.
environment:

All behavior is produced by adaptation to the

it is' the dominance of an old (previously adaptive), in

flexible response in an inappropriate enviromnent which is maladaptive

--or the use of leveling or defensive

respor~es

response is actually available to the subject.

when an instrumental
As Dulany (1957) sug

gests:

We might guess that one kind of subject had learned to de
fend a gainst threatening stimuli because with his particular
experiences and personal economy that reaction has somehow
been to his advantage. Another has learned perceptual de-.
fense because that reaction has served,him well (p. 333).
Although we question whether any individual does not modify his

mode of perceptton according to the situation (Guthrie, 1966), it is
u~doubtedly true tha t any leveling or sha rpen1ng, as part of one's., own

schemata of perception, is

adapti~a

to environmental events.

, Dulany (1957) set out tc establish this principle ebjperimentally

by training his subjects to respond to stimuli in either a leveling or
sharpeni~g

(vigilant) manner.

His subjects Vlere asked to report wp..ich

of the presented stimuli was clearest or most recognizable.

Then one

stimulus was arbitrarily selected as the critical stimulus for each
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subject•. "Defense" subjects were reinforced (by avoiding shock) for
recognizing best the non-critical stimuli, and punished (by shock) for
"Vigilance tt subjects were rein

recognizing the critical stimUlus.

forced for recognizing the critical stimulus and punished for recog
nizing any other stimulus.

When their responses were compared to their

.

baseline patterns of response,

I

res~ts

showed that the two groups were

I

successfully trained in vigilance o~ defense.
l
Pustell (1957) was also able ~o obtain experiment effects in the
direction of both vigilance and defense, using electric shock.

Unlike

one perceptual mode or another
Dulany, he was not operantly reinfO~cing
I
I

·in each subject.

He was merely clas~ically associating shock to cer

tain stimuli (subjects were told their responses were irrelevant to
.the shock, and this was the case).

to be striking sex differences in
chosen by the subjects.
.vigilant after

training~

\Vbat he found was that there seemed
th~

mode of perceptual response

All of the twelve male subjects were more

But nine of the twelve females were more

defensive.
Pustell suggests that the females were subject to more severe
I

anxiety because of the shock than were males.
,

This is a possibility,

-especially if we consider Pustell's thoroUgh efforts at establishing
the hypothesis that defense is used

~n 8i tuations

,vhere:

(a) anxiety

is intense, (b) escape is difficult <?r impossible, and (c) reality is
unclear or ambiguous..

But Pustell' $ reference '00 escape can be seen

as a locus of control variable.

And:this variable is much more lik61y

to.be the determinant of sex differences than Pustell's suggestion that
females are more frightened of pain.

It is intuitively obvious that

women are cORsistantly trained to perceive their locus of control as
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external-to remain tthelpless" while others manipulate their environ
ments.

It is only to be expected, then, that in a stress situation,

,like the exPeriment involving non-contingent shocks, they might choose
"leveling" responses.

Pustell makes note of the fact that when inter

'viewed, the female subjects reported strong feelings of helplessness
and resignation.

This incidental evidence only supports more strongly

the idea that locus of control and perceptual defense are intrl.nsically

related•.
. Returning to the problem of intelligence, we shall try to relate
intelligence to the variables we nave just discussed.

Intelligence

,appears to fit quite neatly at the center of the puzzle.

Highly intel

ligent people are better able to tolerate and perform under anxiety.
This may be simply because they can handle and inhibit the

unpleasan~

stimulation more effectively, or because they are more internal in per
'ceived control and have higher expectancies that a r.esponse can be found
which will have effect.

If highly intelligent people are more vigilant,

it is thus because they have highly internalized loci of control, ,and
handle "anxiety" better.
As

neatly as everything may fit together around intelligence

as

'an independent variable, there is little evidence demonstrating directly

that intelligence covaries with vigilance.
·internal control.

Intelligence covaries'with

Internal control covaries with vigilance.

Vigilance

is a determinant of a neurotic pattern, the obsessiva-compulsi va pat
'·tern.' Obsessive-compulsives have higher average IQ fS (as will later be
demonstrated) than other neurotics.

There is a smooth chain of

relati6n~'

ship beginning and ending with intelligence in which vigilance is a

central link--and the only link which has not as yet been clearly
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established as dependent upon intelligence to some degree.
It is possible, however, that our measures of perceptual vigi
lance are just not enough like life situations.

Dulany (1957) warns:

The forced-choice procedure simply delimits the range of
competing perceptual responses to a high priority few.
Until the evidence for sensitization and desensitization
is less equivocal, percePtua~vigilance and defense can
legitimately be identified 0 y with shifts in balance among
competing perceptual respons s, in the one case toward a
critical percept, and in the other case against it (p. 337).
The predicted superiority of the very intelligent at attending
"vigilantly" to stimuli may only be predictable if the stimuli 'comprise
a complex input.

It is in that very situation that greater information-

processing skills 'Would become invaluable, and would enable an indiv
idual to avoid negative consequences by attending.

For negative conse

quences can be avoided not only by selecting the proper response, but
also by selecting the proper stimulus to which to

proper

~espond--and

stimulus selection is possible only with broad scanning and fine-grained
inhibitory capacities.
On the other hand, the more intelligent person may prove to be no
more prone to vigilance than anyone else.

Intelligence may determine

the direction of opposing tendencies to vigilance or defense.

This is

not what we might guess the situation to be, but it is not a point cru
cial to our

h~~otheticaJ.

structure.

All of our discussion has made, to one degree or another,

th~

assumption that vigilance and defense are more or less unitar,y ways of

re sponding to one's envi remnent.
accurate.

This as sumption mayor may not be

It is impossible to know until we have solved the problem

of over-simplicity which plagues vigilance-defensa research.

The

studies by Dulany (1957) and Guthrie (1966).ind1cate, however, that

17,
perceptual modes are quite situation specif:i.c in their effects.
Gardner (in Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, and Spence, 1959),
reviewing results of a factor analysis of the large body of data taken
by himself and his colleagues, argues that leveling and sharpening des

cribe a c9ntinuum for a kind of cognitive control which is quite gen
eralized across tasks and situations.

He notes:

, In levelers, successive perceptual impressions were assim
ilated to each other, so that distinctions among them were
blurred. Memories of past impressions were also less avail
able to them, pres~~ably because of the general laci{ of dif
ferentiation of their memory schemata (p. 105).
The opposite trends were found in sharpeners by Gardner.

From

all evidence, it appears that leveling and sharpening (as well as sev

eral other cognitive controls) are fairly stable tendencj.es in informa
tion processing.

Individuals may have quite differential response ten

dencies for different stimulus situations, depending upon 'their learning
history.

They may have general, overall tendencies in one direction or

another, especially in response to a variable with wide-ranging effects
on perceptual accuracy and information-processing, like intelligence.
The evidence for this assumption, however, is not at hand.
Gardner does make note of the fact that cognitive controls hold
a strong resemblance to intellectual processes in many ways.

He sug

gests that both are essential~y structures of control and delay--struc
tures, or the ca pa city to
direction to behavior.

constru~t

structures, .which guide and gi va

What we are really discussing are inhibitory

processes--the mechanisms of direction selection, and the covariables
of intelligence, to translate into terms of this paper.

But if the

relationship between cognitive controls (like vigilance and defense)
and intelligence is so ll1ttmate, why has it been so difficult to
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demonstrate?

Gardner suggests that different factors in intelligence have
~heir

directional influence on different cognitive controls.

. our point of

ViSV/,

From

this is merely another way of proposing that envir

onmental differentiation of' native ability (crystallization of ability,
in Cattell's terms) is in turn responsible for differential directional
tendencies in var:tous cognitive controls

&

This suggestion may be modi

fied to a more satisfactory hypothesis with the help of suggestions by

Dulany.
Espousing a point of view more or less harmotlious with our hypo

thetical structure, Dulany (1957) suggests that vigilance is the dom-'
inant, the preferred way of perceiving threatening stimuli.

If instru

. mental responses are possible in an environment, the superior adaptive
'value of vigilance is clear.
it is most basic.

If it is most adaptive, argues Dulany,

He cites evidence in support of his theory, and con

cludes by asserting that if vigilance is the "natural, It donrlnant re

'sponse of

h~n

beings to

t~reatening

stimuli, then we can assume

~~at

any tendency in any individual toward defense is the cumulative result

of punishments for attending to stimuli and/or lack of reinforcement
for responses to attended stimuli because of their inefficiency or inr
·~ccuracy.

This pattern of spreading inhibition or defense against

stimuli would be expected to some extent in everyone, but to a greater
extent with each decrease in intelligence (if intelligence is the abil
ity to respond efficiently to a variety of

stim~li) •.

Of course, strong correlations between intelligence and percep
tual modes would be prevented by individual differences in punishments
and reinforcers resluting from responses in each of the modes.

Final
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response dispositions might not be highly reflective of intelligence,
especially considering that the {asks or stimulus situations tapped by
testing leveling or sharpening may be unrealistically simple or narrow
in range.
TIl.

SUMMARY

We have seen that intelligence is equivalent to a capacity for

cognitive differentiation, but that it does not determine the goaLs
toward which the schemata made possible by differentiation guide the
mental processes.

By the same token, intelligence may be the critical

factor in enabling an individual to attend to, and be vigilant to,

large amounts of sensory information.

But it also enables him to in

hibit response to stimuli (here, a ttresponse ll might be awareness, for
example).
As the individual develops, if we accept Dulany's (1957) hypo
thesis J he is (in a manner of speaking) in a process of leveling. Wha·t
is leveled depends upon the contingencies
class within the individual's

environ~ent.

attach6~

to each

stL~ulus

Conceivably, the highly

intelligent person could--in an environment where control was almost
entirely external, punishment frequent, and possibilities for escape
vary rare--become an extreme leveler.
are slight.

Of course the chances of that

The probability is much' greater that he will become a vig

ilant perceiver of the environment, since he will very likely be suc
cessful in behaviors resulting from vigilance.

However, that is not

to say that even the very intelligent have across-the-board tendencies
at levelirtg or sharpening.

The ver,y intelligent person could become

a leveler of, for example, socially reinfor,cing and/or punishing stimuli
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while remaining vigilant to most others--he might then be creative.

Or,

he could defend against any spontaneous, Ucreative u :cesponses, while
remaining vigilant to cues calling for compulsive, 3chievement-oriented
responses for which he had received least punishment and most reinforce
ment in the past.
Again, direction is apparently environmentally determined to a
great extent and tendencies in any direction might conceivably be en
hanced by high intelligence.

Although ver.y intelligent people do have

obvious tendencies toward an internal locus of control and vigilance
to environmental

st~nuli,

which are precursors of compulsive behavior

patterns, these tendencies could also enhance creativity and have no
rlecessaril~

responses.

inhibitive character to them, in relation to creative

;
•

j

CHAPTER IX
THE

~rvIRONMENTAL

SPECIFICS

We have attempted to establish the foundations of the argument
that highly intelligent people are more susceptible to the

promp~ings

and selections of their environment--that they are capable of

re~pond-

.ing intensively in almost any direction to its shaping. we have, con
centated and shall continue to concentrate on two major directiohs
!

available to the very bright growj.ng child:

creativity and what we

sometimes refer to as "noncreativity" or compulsivitjT. We have con
tinually emphasized that the environment has its effects in ways which
are situation-specific.

Now, we wish to discuss some particular ways

in which environments are known to affect the directions of a child's
cognitive-style development.
I.

THE VIGILANCE PATTERN

For this purpose, there is no research more helpful than tnat of
Getzels and Jackson (1962).
~usual

Their studies were carried out in a rather

private school in a cultured and well-educated

families near a university.

of

All students in the school were Bccel

era ted at least one year ahead of
graduationo

populatio~

pub]~c

school students by high school

The mean IQ of all subjects involved in

~he

study (includt'l'

ing subjects not in the groups with which we shall be concerned) was

132.

The top students by IQ-score who were not also among the highest

in creativity were chosen as the high-IQ group, and had a mean IQ of
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-150.

The highest scorers on a combination of creativity tests (devised

by Getzels and Jackson) who were not also among the highest in intelli
gence were ,chosen as the high-creativity group, and had a mean IQ. of

127.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the tthigh-creativityn group of
Getzels and Jackson were vary

brig~t

children.

Essentially, the two

groups were the lower and upper halves of a continuum of jntelligence
cut out of the superior range.

The lower half were bright children

reaching their potential for creativity; the upper half were brilliant
children, but the only brilliant children i11 the sample who were low
in creativity--they were not only balm' their own creative potential,
but also below the creative performance level of their less bright
peers.

They were the very kind of individuals who are responsible for

the ceiling effect that we have described in the L~telligence-creativity
interaction, because they are not behaving as creatively as we wight
'predict from the intuitive conviction that creativity should covary with
intelligence.

They are then of critical significance to the suppressor

variable hypothesis.

Hopefully, there should appear some critical dii-'

rarenees in the environments of these subjects and the high-creativity
subjects, which will enable us to see in specific 'wa:y"'S hovl some of them
found their creative potential, while others never knew of theirs ..
First of all, Getzels and Jackson noticed several significant
differences bev,veen the parents of the two groups.

They differed not

only in quantity, but also in the quality of their education.

There

was a trend in the high-IQ group parents toward a higher number of
fathers and mothers with college degrees, but it ,'las not highly signif
icant.

lfuwever, the high-IQ group parents ,had significantly more
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graduate training (especially the mothers) than the other parents.
authors posit that this does not so much

~~dicate

The

a higher level of

cultivation, "but rather a greater degree of "specialization of train

ing, or, if you will, 'professionalization of education' of the IQ
group (p. 63). n As for parental occupation, there was a significant
tendenc.y for fathers of high-IQ subjects to be in academic professions,
consistent with their specialized and professional training.

However,

-

in spite of their high-level 'e;raining, high-IQ mothers were more likely
than high-creativity mothers to be housewives exclusively.
For Getzels and Jackson, this unusual restriction of the bighly
trained mother to her home and children is the first of many indica
tions that the high-IQ group mothers nare in fact likely to be more
vigilant about the 'correct l upbringing of their children than are the
high-creativity mothers (p. 64).1t

For example, high-IQ children have

access in their homes to many more magazines aimed at children than do
high-creativity children. When asked about their own .satisfaction with
the way they have raised their children, high-IQ mothers seemed rather
defensively self-satisfied, while high-creativity mothers did not.

On

the other hand, when asked to comment on the school attended by their
children and on any unusual qualities in the children themselves, highIQ mothers not only made more total observations, but also gave a -higher
percentage of 9ritical comments.

High-IQ mothers expressed much satis

faction with the enrichment program of the school (none of the bigh
creativity mothers had any comment about it), and much dissatisfaction
over the inadequacies they perceived in the school1s control of behavior,
enforcement of rules, and lesson drill. 17hen asked about their prefer
ences for their children's friends, bigh-IQ mothers had many ideas
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about what qualities their children 1 s friends should have, and empha
sized family background, intelligence, manners, and stuqy habits.

High

creativity mothers, on the other hand, tended to emphasize honesty,

high values, and openness as desirable qualities in their children's
friends.
In sunnnary, Getzels and Ja ckson report that on many different
m~asures,

mothers of high IQ-low creativity children show themselves

to be more vigilant, more likely to intervene, more- critical, more aware,
more concerned with

control~

and more concerned with socially-accepted

(superficial?) virtues in regard to their children.

High-creativity

mothers, on the other hand, were less child-centered, less critical,
more tolerant of other adults and of their children, less concerned
about conventional standards, and less concerned about success for their
children.
Domino (1969) presented some evidence corroborative of the
~-

Getzels and Jackson results.

Using groups high and 1~1 in creativity

on three measures (without regard for intelligence), he found that on
a personality test (California Psychological Inventory), scores of'the
mothers of creative subjects formed a significantly different pattern
from those of the mothers of noncreative subjects.

Creative mothers .

were more self-assured, independent,'and flexible; they showed more
tolerance for others, but were less concerned about social probity or
favorable impressions than mothers of non-creative subjects.
How is it that mothers with these particular cha.ra cteristics have
the particular children they have?

It can only be that behind these

maternal personality tttraitstt are certain, specific behaviors which
prov~de

discriminative and reinforcing stlinuli for their children's
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·creativity.

It will never be known how to enhance or to 1.Uldo what they

have aq:eompliehed in shaping their children until

'(iO "l:nde~st,al1d

the

exa ct intera ction bet1"leen their behaviors and their childr'6n 1 s ..

Even

knowing quite clearly a bout one particular kind of behavior in. parents
can be of limited use until we know whether or not there is an inter...
action effect among kinds of beha~ors9 creating re::i.nforcement schedules

or deprivation conditions, and varying results in the child's behav-ior.
SOIne careful studies have been performed which attempt more pre

cise analysis of the parent-child j;ntera ction, but which ala 0 support

the more global conclusions of Getzels and Jackson.

Heilb~un

and Nor

bert (1970) discov61"ed that college students who 'perceived their moth

ers as exerting low control but high nurturance wera significantly more

responsive than others to their Qwn self-reinforcement, and signifioantly
less responsive to the reinforcoment of others.
We are not suggesting that this is the kind of maternal control

and reinforcement l:rattern which will automatically result in creativity,
as such.

But there are Inany behaviors which are conducive to creativity

in anyone, and this mothering pat tern produces several of theme

Above'

all, to be creative one must be autonomous, self-confident, and lacking
in self-deprecation.
reinforcement.

That is, one must,be

c~pable

And Heilbrun and Norbert have

of effective self

sh~Nn

that self-reinforce

ment is most frequently seen among those whose mothers are highly rein
forcing, but low in strict control of their children.

This is the

pi~

ture painted of high-creativity mothers by Getzels and Jackson, but veri
fied from a completely different approacho
There seem to be three other kinds of control-reinforcement pat
terns in mothering, as described by Heilbrup and his associates.

Low
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nurturance subjects sherfled h.i.gh susceptibility to 'external reinforce
ment, whether or not their mothers were very controlling.

But

~dar

conditions of deprivation from maternal reinforcement, only low-control
subjects showed the capacity for independent work involved in academic
achievement (Heilbrun and Waters, 1968).

The low nurturance-high

control subjects, having very probably received many punishments, few
rewards, and little chance to emit autonomous behaviors" were marked
underachievers.

Both of these groups, with their susceptibility to ex

ternal reinforcers, could be guessed to be conformers, of some kind.
Conformity is, of course, in complete disharmony with creativity, as is
dependence upon external, other-initiated rewards.

The subjects of

both groups laCk the necessary behaviors of autonomy and self-reinforce
ment to be highly creative.
Of most concern to us is the last group--those high in both con
trol and nurturance presented by Heilbrun.

The mothers of these sub

jects have been generally described by him as Itoverprotective tt (Heilbrun
and Waters, 1968).

On the test of self-reinforcement effectiveness

(Heilbrun and Norbert, 1970), these subjects showed themselves to be
of intermediate degree of efficiency at self-reinforcement--theywers
neither highly susceptible to external

r~inforcement,

highly responsive to self-reinforcement.

nor were they

Their idiosyncrasy shows up

only in the achievement study (Heilbrun and Waters, 1968).

The high

control-high nurturance group was the very high group in terms of col
lege achievement, even when ability and past achievement were taken into
account. Without regard to ability, it was this combination of high
levels of maternal reinforcement with strict and concerned control of
the child which enabled that child to perform independent behaviors in
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a new environment, resulting in academic achievement.
It is our suggestion that tne subjects

r~gh

in both control and

nurturance are not merely of "intermediate tl ranking in effectiveness
of external versus internal reinforcements. We suggest that they are
selectively susceptible to external reinforcers, and selectively cap
able of internal reinforcement.. They are perhaps the group of Ifdepen
dent independents11 we have previously discussed, who perform indepen
dent behaviors in ord.er to obtain reinforcements from external source
upon which they are in a significant way very dependent.

These sub

jects are presumably very concerned about approval from their elders,
and will perform at optimum levels in order to obtain that approval.
But they cannot be said to be independent as the highly nurtured Iittle

controlled subject is independent, or as a creative subject is

ind~pen-

dent, because their :reinforcements a re still yery much tied to external
referents--tied with long ropes, perhaps, but tied, just the same.
They are not simply conforining; they are conforming to an external
expectation, and they maybe compulsively attempting
ideal.

~o

achieve that

Comment Heilbrun and Waters (1968):

To say that -the boy behave9 independently because he is de
pendent may reflect exactly what the HC-h~ mother effects in
~he son by her behavior.
She is in a position to use control
and nurturant reward to shape those forms of instrumental in
dependence in the son of which she approves, and the son, in
turn, may learn to perform more on his own in these areas be
CBuse of his wish for her approval (p. 920).
We propose that it is this pattern which is most often seen among
the mothers of Getzels and Jackson's high-IQ group.

It is patently ob

vious that these mothers would be, considered high in control.

"Control"

was one of their major concerns in evaluating their children's school.
Their attention and intervention were seen in practically

~

.._..

"'"

~ery

aspect
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'of their children's lives.

Their tendencies of high nurturance are

less obviously demonstrated.

But given the possibility that such nur

turance or reinforcement can be quite selective in nature, the evidence

-is plentiful enough.

Their frequently given permission for the child

:to stay home from school, their care and a ttention at obtaining the best
:advantages for their children

(mag~zines,

books, and so on)--all of

.these and other behaviors are the outline of a Ifvigilant1t (Getzels and
Jackson) or "possessive" (Heilbrun) mother.
And what is the response of the child to "lihese behaviors? Ac
cording to Heilbrun and his aSSOCiates, it is high-level achievement
and selective attention to external reinforcers.

This is confirmed

by evidence that bright students who are also high achievers are dis

tinguishable by the vigilance, the involvement, and the tendency to
reward academic interest found in their parents (McGillivray, 1964;
Morrow and Wilson, 1961).

The analogous group in the Getzels and

·Jackson study, high-IQ, show similar concern for the expectations and
demands of the adult world.

Although both highly creative and highly

'intelligent children shari themselves to be aware of what teachers and
parents value as ideals for success, the self-reported ideals of the
high-creativity group are quite different frqm the adult protocol-
while the high-IQ children report personal ideals which match those
of their elders almost point by point.

These children are making pub

lic announcement of their acceptance of adult standards and expectations
and reinforcements as their own.
It is basic to learning theory that an internalized reinforcement
system, or the ability to reinforce one's self effectively, must be the
result of socialization.

There must be a

~ime

when one is being exter
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p.ally reinforced before one is capable in internalization (Mischel,
1971).

It is highly probable that the difference between high nurtur

ance and low control and high-nurturance and high control is the degree

of internalization of a reinforcement system.
·~rol

If a high degree of con

is continually maintained over the child3 then he has little oppor

tunity to learn self-monitoring and -reinforcement.

By

the time most

pi his behavior patterns and reinforcement-seeking cognitive schemata

are fonned, this child still has had little reinforcement for autono
mous behaviors.

In the low-control child, on the other hand, autonomy

has been reinforced, not punished, and self-reinforcement has been
~earned.

The child is not continually attuned to possible external

reinforcement sources with the strongest possible resemblance to his
parents.

He is capable of creative, independent behaviors.

It is not

surprising, then, that the Getzels and Jackson high-IQ group, among
'Whose mothers this compuls:j.vity-engendering pattern of vigilance was
found, were all the brightest children among a very bright population
who were not also creative.

And that these same children, who did not

find their way to their creative potential, showed a common tendency in
the opposite direction.

•

.. Although very little further research has been done on the environ
mental specifics of creativity among the highly intelligent, there are
groups of

chil~ren

finding themselves under approximately

~he

.uvigilant" conditions as Getzels and Jackson IS bigh-IQ group_

same
It should

be of value to examine the effects of vigilance on other children.
One of the most obviously vigilant parent groups are parents of
first-born children. First-child parents are suggested by Lasko (1954)
to be more anxious and protective about their child, more ready to
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~nterfere

with, criticize, or attempt' to accelerate

trolling and demanding of him.

p~m,

and more con

The child produced under these circum

stances of vigilance was found by Schachter (1959) to be, under the
stress conditions he created, more dependent upon other people as
'.Sources of approval, support, help, and reference (po 82). tt

He also

concluded that they were more easily influenced by,oth-ers in a social
situation than were later-borns.
confirmed this apparent

Becker, Lerner, and Carroll (1964)

confo~ity

to opinions of others for social

purposes, but qualified the generalization with the finding that in
tlinformational" situations, first-borns tended to trust more to thej.r
own opinions than later-borns.

This might be explained by the greater

opportunity of the later-born child to ask for information from his
peers, or by the first-born child's greater experience and confidence
in obtaining information independentlyo

High-IQ

children~ou1d

of course

be expected to have the same confidence in informational tasks (Di Vesta,

1959; Lucito, 1960; Gelfand, 1962). In spite of their independence in
information tasks, first-born children (and high-IQ children) still
exhibit conformity in social situations.
To summarize, in first-borns we see children who have been brought
up in a "vigilant, tt protective, demanding home, and who are as a result
~ore

dependent on the approval of others, especially adults, more likely

to be conformists, and more likely to be high-Achievers.
elements of a pattern of compulsivity.

The very same home pattern is

found for Getzels' and Jackson r 5 high-IQ group, and

same compulsive elements:

They have the

es~entj.al1y

the

concern for meeting -the approval of adults,

conformity to adult ideals, and high achievement.
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II.

OTHER FACTORS

A~n)

THEIR COMPLEXITY

Why 40 the homes of high-IQ children who are not creati va follow

this particular pattern? We suggest that since high-IQ children have

a natural capacity for creativity, precisely these patterns are neces
sary to produce a non-creative child.

A high nurturance level estab

lishes the parent as a reinforcer-shaper, and prevent.s the child from
becoming a highly creative rebel or psychopath.

A high control level

keeps the child from internalizing his reinforcers, and developing
independent behaviors.

High expectations-keep him engrossed in achieve

ment by a method of conformity and acceptability. Without control, he
might exhibit autonomy, or spontaneity.

It could happen, then, that

most bigh-IQ children who do not have homes engendering creativity,
have homes which produce compulsivity--because the factors which must
be present to repress "natural" creativity are also those l"lhich are

.necessary for campulsivity.

MBny children mBnsge to survive uncreative home (and school)
environments with their creative behaviors more or less intact.

But

we suggest that for the child of more or less average intelligence, who
is not hyper-sensitized to his environment, such a task is not as dif
ficul t a s it may be for the gifted child.

But this is not the

op~yway

to look at the problem.

A novel

approach (judged to be novel by the statistical rarity of its examples
in the experimental literature) would be to examine the effect of the
in~elligence

of a child upon his home environment.

by this writer of the intelligence literature,

~

L~

a recent survey

studies were found

which took as their concern this particularly fascinating problem.

Can
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this mean that the intelligence of a child, especially an extraordin
arily high il'lteiligence" has no effect upon the way his parents will

react to him?--upon the expectations they will have, or their uncer
.taintyat child-rearing, or their interaction with him? Would it not
be exceptionally easy to expect a precocious child to be "adul t n

s.ocially as well as mentally, and to demand more than he was capable
~!

performing?
Experiments show that ambiguous situations, or situations of fail

ure when a subject is accustomed to success" cause rigidity and con
formity (Himmelstein, 1958; Gelfand, 1962).

Is that, perhaps, the kind

o£ situation in which both the parents of gifted children and the
children themselves are found?

Parents face situations which are un

like their expectations abou.t children--a one-year-old c3plble of play
ing practical jokes, or a two-year-old who teaches himself to reado
And children may be presented with things they understand just as badly
--reinf~rcement

for mental prowess, but excessive physical or social

demands which they do not know how to meeto

Perhaps

rigidit~·

is the

response of both to amgibuity•
It is well to remember that children of high intelligence appear
well capable of controlling their own behaviors, of inhibiting them
selves, and of exhibiting moral behaviors (see Unger, 1964).
a

~rent

How does

,react to a child apparently so ready and able to perform in

ethical, socially acceptable ways?

fues the parent learn early to ap

peal to the child1s morality in controlling his behavior?--or is it
perhaps simply too easy to expect nearly perfect behavior of children
who seem to be capable of fulfilling that expectation, and to demand

from them the limits of their capability?
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The question of the effect of offspring intelligence on parent
child intera ctions is one tha t is i..11 desperate need of investiga tion.
Even attitudinal surveys wou.ld mark an improvement in the available

data.

~~at

are badly needed, however, are observational studies with

an approach as behaviorally specific as possible.

Parental actions

toward gifted children need to be compared with the behaviors exhibited
by parents of average children.

The difficulties in specifying differ

ential behaviors which are the effect of a child's individual differ
ences, and not the causes of them, are very large indeed•. But they
must be attacked.
Other difficulties involved in specifying the

envir~nmental

causes

of creativity and compulsivity among highly gifted children can be easily
gleaned from existing research.

Sex differences (in both children and

parents) are of critical il"11portance in investigating the effectiveness .
of models for oonformitory or imitative behavior O,fischel, 1971;
.Rosenblith, 1961), or the effectiveness of parental reinforcement
(Patterson, 1969; Patterson, Littman and Hinsey, 1964; stevenson, 1961),
or interactions of anxiety and achievemeJ?t (Feldhusen and Klausmeier,

1962) or the frequency of creativity among the very intelligent (Barron,
1969).
Age differences interact with sex differences in some learning
situations ·(stevenson, 1961). In fact, age may be a

high~y

critical

variable. We have suggested that there is a time when the child's
schemata for cognitive and gross behavioral tendencies are formed, mora
or. less to stability_

Thus, it is possible that children undergo a crit

ical period for learning creative behaviors, or that there are stages
involved Ll1 the learning of

creativity--lik~

the decrement of amounts
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of external control, or increasing reinforcement
behaviors.

rate~

for independent

Hebb (1949) has made the point that the more intelligent

species take longer to develop to maturity--there may be an analogous
phenomenon at an intra-species level.

It could be suggested that highly

intelligent people are in part more socially sensitive because the,r re
quire longer to develop their neurological systems to maturity--to
develop their sche~ata--and are thus susceptible to environmental/
cultural influences for a longer period of timeo

It is clear (in spite

of-the fact that not enough data exists to make more than speculation
about details) that any theor.y of the interaction between creativity
and intelligence must make due consideration for age and developmental
variables.
A related area of concern is the question of reversibility of

schemata.

Since it has been partially demonstrated that creativity

schemata are by their very. nature reversible, the .real question is the
question of whether or not intelligent, noncreative adults can alter
their schemata in the direction of creativity.
since schemata are

not~imple

It is predicted

th~t

:responses, but complexes of learned re

sponses and executive cognitive structures J they will be relatively

stable and not easily reversible.

It is very likely that a concerted

effort at rennovating environmental contingencies, modeling, and shap
ing creative behaviors would be

n~cssary

to produce creativity as a

set of spontaneous behaviors in adults with
creative schemata.

well-established~

non

If, however, there is anything hopeful presented

in this paper, it is the conviction that creativity, within the limits

of intelligence, is dependent upon environmental contingencies, and
can be encouraged and shaped.
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. - Many suggestions have been made as to how to encourage creativity
in growing children (Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Torrance, 1962, 1965).
Torrance, most especially has been involved in an admirable dual at
to investigate empirically the effectiveness of modeling and

tempt:

reinforcing creativity, and to instigate

L~ediately

the

which are found to be effective--in as many situations as

techniqu~s,
possib~e.

This is part of the work which needs very much to be done, and a read
ing of Rewarding Creati,:re Behavior (Torrance, 1965) will provide more

insight into global methods for producing creativity than there is room
here to

eA~lore.

But these

kin~s

of studies are necessarily molar and

nonspecific.
Of course, we have seen that approaches which t.oo heavily empha
size isolated, specific aspects of creativity are not successful.

It

has become clear through our review of the creativi i:(r-training liter
ature that the training of extremely molecular Itcreativef1 behavj.ors is
unlikely to result in spontaneous

gene~lization

or transfer.

Many dif

ferent creative behaviors must be reinforced at once III many different
ways, so that new discriminative ,stimuli are provided the individual
for behaving creatively at different times in a different place.

Thus,

it is the interaction of wAny reinforcement patterns which results in '
c~eativity--at

least during experimental training, and we can'wager

that the same thing is true in nonexperimental settings.
We know, then, that

th~

evolution of creative behavior is deter

mined globally, by the interaction of many patterns.
nature of the approach taken by Torrance and others.

And this is the
But at present,

when we wish to make use of suggestions for enhancing creativity, we
must rely on what our own culturalization allows us to derive and act
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out behaviorally fTom phrases like, nBe respectful of questions."

A

suggestion of this verY .. general nature tends to result in the appro
priate, intra-culturally uniform, specific behaviors.

But we should

not forget that "respect" is a specific behavior pattern, if it is
anything, and should be specifiable; and

we

must, specify, if we are

to understand creativity and reach the limits of our ability to enhance
it.
The optimal approach is a combination of specific and global ap
proaches.

Behaviors of parents which act as discriminative stimuli or

reinforcers of creativity among their children must be specified as
clearly as possible, as well as the elements of the creativity itself.
But specification of a few creative responses and their contingencies
is essentially useless--it is the total pattern of such interactions
which is significant.

Therefore, enough behaviors must be tapped, and

fine enough distinctions made, so that these over-all patterns are not
lost.

CHAPl'ER X

A THEORY OF THE CREATIVITY-INTELLIGENCE INTERACTION:
AN ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPRESSOR VARIABLE

It has been our argument that highly intelligent children, be
cause of the complex intera ction of thail high-level a rousal and :inhi
t

bitory systems, have a great capacity for differentiation and complex
ity in their cognitive systems, and that this capacity has a natural
tendency to produce creative behaviors. _In fact, these covariables
with intelligence are necessary, although not sufficient, for creative
production at any significant level of abstraction.
We have also argued that because of the veri same meohanisms which

predispose the gifted child toward creativity, he is extremely suscep
tibIa to envirorunental influence.

He is capable of being more highly

aroused or motivated in a given direction, and capable by his complex
inhibitory systems of limiting his attention only to directions shaped
and reinforced by his environment, perhaps during a
lus life.

Cl~tical

period in

Not only are his response tendencies at a cognitive level

(attending, and the like) environmentally selected, but also the overt
responses made to the stimuli to which he does attend.

All of these

response tendencies might be considered part of creative or noncreativa
schemata

which direct his behavioro

Presumably, creative schemata differ from noncreative schemata

in that they allow for rapid and temporary reorganizations of associs
tional elements into new generalizations or search categories; they

196
must be heavj.ly overlapping, in order to allow for such rapid recombin
Also incorporated in the schelnata are hierarchies of reinforce

ation.

ment contingencies or expectations for certain behaviors in certain sit
uations~these, too, will discriminate betWeen the creative and the non

creative.

It is argued that noncreative -schemata will have a higher

susceptibility to ongoing social reinforcement, while creative schemata
may have inhibitory processes in effect for incoming social stimuli,
and depend for direction mostly on already-experienced and -internalized
reinforcements.
The highly intelligent child might be guessed to be more adept

at analysis of the contingencies of his environment and accurate in per
formance of the behaviors which will meet the criteria for

~~inforce

ment in that environment--no matter what the nature of the environment,
or in what, direction it shapes him.

Therefore, but for a faw qualifying

evidences, it could easily be argued that the highly intelligent per
son is equally sensitive to all directions in which he might be shaped,
except for his tendenc.y at a cognitive level to perform creatively.

Any behavioral tendency other than that toward creativity might be
assumed to be completely open to the random selection of his surroundings.
As expected from these assumptions, and as we have already

seen~

there is a high incidence of creativity among the highly intelligent.
Torrance (1962) estimated that approximately thirty percent of those
students above the eichtieth percentile intellectually in the public

schools are also above the eightieth percentile in

cre~tivity.

This is

an estimat,e based upon many different studies in different schools, all

with about the same results.
a

t~rd

Therefore, we can safely guess that about

of gifted school-age children have reached their potential in
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c~ativity

or have come near to reaching it.

This 1'5 an acceptably

heavy loading, given the assumption that high intelligence leads nat
urally to high creativity-since we have never argued that environmental
influences do not have great effect in determining the direction in
which a child will invest his potential.

If, however, all the other possible.behavioral .tendencies have a·
random probability of occurrence, they should have a more or less evan
distribution.

tendencies.

We shall not have to identify all the other possible

A simple evaluation of the few we can identify should be

sufficient to find if there is an even or uneven distribution of occur

rence among them.
For example, let us examine the general pattern of rebelliousness,
intractability, and low aChievement, which often occurs in children of
average or below average intelligence.

Of course this pattern is not

unknown among children of high intelligence; and when it does appear,
it may be manifest to an axtreme degree, true to our expectation that

any tendency will be more intensely followed by the gifted.

But the

overall incidence of any low achievement or antisocial behaviors among
the gifted is extremely slight (Terman, 1925; Terman and Oden, 1947;
Jaggers, 1934, and others).

The distribution of frequenc.y does not ap

pear to be an even one at all.
Wbat constructs can we invoke to provide explanation for the ap

parent avoidance of underachievement among the highly intelligent as an
overall strategy?

It is wise to think almost in terms of econoll'.ics if

we. wish to understand what we see.

It is the natural dispoSition of

all organisms to get the most reinforcement (primary or secondar,y) pos

sible from the smallest possible investment· of energies.

The growing
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human being, in the process of evolving and developing his own behav
±oral schemata, is no exception to this rulee

The child will do what

'he must in order to get the most social reinforcers for the least ef
fort invested.
,e~ficiently.

This means that he must use his particular abilities
Underac~evemen~,

most effective

v~ay

disobedience, and rowdiness may be the

of gaining attention for the average or below-average

child--an investment in school work and obedience is most likely to
,bring only partial failure and punishment.
For the gifted child, the situation is quite different.
vestment of energies in

~chool

An in

work, obedience, and responsibility has

a high probability of paying off well in social r einforcernent from the
teacher--and therefore, from the peers.

In point of fact, there is no

other means of response which has as high a probability of success and
;rewerd for him as does responsibility and scholarship--not even cre
ativity.

Any child is capable of making an original response, and eval

uations and judgments of creative products are more subjective and un
.predictable than those of factual products.

All in all, the child has

a much lower hope of success in competing with his peers creatively than
. he has in ftacademic lt competition.

He will very naturally play to his

comparative strengths.
Of course, if the school system were structured in such a way as
to demand creativity above encyclopaedic knowledge of facts, the highly
~telligent

child would' be forced to adapt hi-mself to the new set of

contingencies.

He would invest his complex cognitive abilities in

,

. ,..
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creative responding, and very like1ywould be" better at it~than his
peers.?

In such Itcreative tt schools, flexibility could be as much a

part of the curriculum as reading-every subject could be taught from
n~ny

different points of view, instead of one.

Skinner (1972a) has

pointed out:
• • • we do not need to abandon subject matter in order to
teach discovery. It is not true that if we fill the stu
dent t s haa d with fa cts he will be unable to think for him
self. He is not damaged by fa cts but only by the ways in
. which facts have been taught (p. 338).
As things stand in our society, however, creativity is not the
preferred mode of response, and
facts are taught.

stu~ents

are being harmed by the way

The school system seems excessively guilty in this

regard, with its strong emphasis on conformity and control. 8 Although
it is easy to make intuitive and experiential judgment that creativity
is not reinforced in the school system, we have also seen more objective
data supporting our suspicions (Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Torrance,

1962).

Evidently, the extra "disruptiveness" and playfulness of cre

ative children is more bothersome to the teacher than their creativity
is valuable.

With such risks attached to creative behavior, it is no

wonder that only the student who "has a lesser certainty of strictly
academic Sllccess can afford to invest his efforts in creativity and

<

.rely upon the sparse schedule of reinforcement it represents.

?There is evidence that in very "creative fl school systems," corre
lations between IQ and creativity are higher than elsewhere. Refer to
data of schools nA" and flD" in Torrance. (1962) although he does not
draw these assumptions from the data.
BIt is perhaps no accident that the high IQ-low creativity sub
jects of Getzels and Jackson (1962) were in many cases the children of
teachers or professors.
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If the intelligent child does not have the necessary envi~l1-

mental contingencies outside the typical classroom, from early

~

I

his

I

li£e--eontingeneies specifically counteractive of school reinfor~a~ent

patterns-he will almost assuredly choose to behave in a patter.n:lof
responsible, compulsive attention to scholarly alld factual achievement.
He will choose a pattern of

uconve~gence, It

in a very real sense, be

cause he will constantly be looking for the "right, ft and acceptable
behavior with a high probability of being reinforced.

This may well

generalize into moral and social areas--he may extend the pattern, and
seek in these domains as well the "rightlt' and accept.able behavior, as
reinforced by those in authority.

The compulsive child of high intel

ligenoe will attend constantly to those social, verbal and nonverbal
cues that tell him which behaviors to emit.

His inhibitory capaci

ties will enable him to limit his attention to these cues, and to con
trol his other behaviorso

He will become the vigilant, responSible,

.moral, socially-sensitive, high-achieving, gifted child we have so

often bean shown in research results.

The more he is reinforced for

social reactivity, the more this pattern will affect him. 9
Unfortunately, susceptibility to this pattern may be heightened
by higher and higher levels of intelligence•. Although the gifted per

son's potential for creativity is undoubtedly greater with extremely

9 It is very significant that girls, who are known to be much more
socially responsive in nonverbal ways (Exline, 1963) than boys, are
also more responsible and more achievement-oriented than boys, until
late adolescence. In a study of creative women, Barron (1969) found
th~t they were very much unhappier than their noncreative peers, lead
ing to speculation that creativity is not an acceptable pattern for
female behavior in our society.
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high intelligence, so, too, is his potential for compulsive attention

to detail and success in meeting the expectations of others. If. this
is true, we should expect to find not only that the extreme case of
flexibility (high creativity) has a high concentration of the 'highly
~telligent,

but also that extreme compulsivitywould have a higher

tha~-expected

frequency of occurrence among the highly intelligent.

Before we evaluate the data on this point, let us make note of
the fact that extreme coropulsivity is not very likely to be thought
unusual in our culture.

In its inflexibility, it might be expected to

be an undesirable thing, its disadvantages socially recognized.

But

-it is this end of the continuum which is preferred; given the alterna
tivas of creativity or coropulsivity, our culture will choose and rein
force comvulsivity.

Therefore, individuals with even a marked degree

of compulsivity--well.beyond any margin of adaptability--will not be
.readily recognized as "devianto" Rather, they will more likely be
.labeled tlmodel, tt or "ideal. It
.~he

It

Deviant" subj ects will represent only

very most extreme cases, and their namber will appear smaller than

. might be accurately estimated, were the facts known.
In comparing compulsivity and IQ, there is an additional problem.
Highly intelligent subjects have been shown to be capable of more fac
ilitative response patterns under conditions or states of stress.

We

can very easily assume that they might also be better at handling. a
compulsive behavior pattern or strategy, without overt emotional
"problems, It and would still less often than others be diagnosed as
deviant or neurotic.
With this in mind, let us attempt to define what psychological
pattern or ttsyndrome tf might be representative of marked compulsivity.
I
"

I

I;
I
"":

,

I
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The

Diagno~tic

and Statistical

1~nual

of Mental Disorders of the Ameri

can Psychiatric Association defines the obsessive-compulsive personal
ity disorder in this manner:
This behavior pattern is characterized by excessive concern
with conformity and adherence to standards of conscience.
Consequently, individua~s in this group may be rigid, over
inhibited, over-conscientious, over-dutiful, and unable to
relax easily. This disorder may lead to an obsessive com
pulsive neurosis ••• (1968, p. 43).
With this qui te ext.reme degree of compulsiveness a sour

cn ter

ion, and with the stipulations we have stated in mind, it can be shawn
that intelligence is related to the obsessive-compulsive :p3rsona11ty
disorder.

Says Slater (1945):

It is also generally agreed that neuroses of different types
tend to occur among persons of different orders of intelli
gence: in particular, obsessional neuroses among highiy in
telligent persons (p. 40).

Although he found no evidence that other neuroses could be dif
ferentiated by any intellectual measure, the ngenerally a greed" upon
hypothesis that

obsessive~compu1sives

are on the average more intel

ligent than other neurotics was supported. Ingram (1961) obtained
corroborative results.
What we apparently find here is that their environment tends to

shape lughly intelligent people in one particular direction:
~ivity.

compul-.

Although they have natural itendencies toward creativity, at

a cognitive level, only a third of them approach their creative poten
tial.

The rest, with very few exceptions, choose achievement and com

pulsive, responsible, ongoing attention to social
authorities) as their life pattern.

re~forcements

(from

A few of these are higbly:respon

siva to an extremely demanding or restrictive environment, and they

will tend in disproportionate numbers to be clinically diagnosable as
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. obsessive-compulsives.

But most of them ara somewhere in between,

hav:i.ng been reinforced for some flexib!i.lity and 80:ne creativa behav
iors and falling at neither extreme of the croativity-compulsivity
continuum.
Although most of the gifted will fall batween the extremes, the
higher the individual's intelligence level the more pressure toward
compulsivi ty is exerted upon him by his surroundincs.

He may la ck the

common viewpoint or experience of those less intelligent, he may find
himself only marginally accepted because of his uniqueness, and he may
find that success at concrete learning is simply too reliable to give

up.

Therefore, as his potential for creativity grows, so do the en

vircnmental influences against creativity.

This environmental influ

anee, stronger on him the more intelligent he is, and far stronger on
him than on his peers of average intelligence, is responded to more
and more

int{~nsively,

with increasingly high intelligence.

,'-:

The higher

·the intelligence level, the stronger is this pressur~
compared to
'..
the increases in creative potential.
is our suppressor variable.

And this combination of factors

It is this matrix of variables which

causes correlational studies to indicate a ceiling to creativity in
creases with IQ elevations.

It is this group of variables which causes

zero correlations between IQ and creativity to appear in high IQ ranges.

It is this·variable complex which prevents extremely high IQ individ
uala from reaping, as a group, the benefits of their great creative
potential.
The suppressor variable does not appear to be biological in ori
gin (although it could not acc~~plish what it does wi til out certain bio

logical factors, like j ..IlJ.l.ibi tory processes). 'It is therefore environ
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mentally-based, and avoidable. There is no reason to assume, as Torrance
(1962) does, that intelligence in itself is inimical to creativitYe
Nor that highly intelligent children are hopelessly plodding and

encyclopaedic.
But special attention rrmst be given to highly intelligent chil
dren, so that they may be "vaccinated" against our culture, before :tt
destroys or maims their creative IX'tential.

We nmst find out how par

ents may be particularly susceptible to expecting hyperresponsibility

and conformity from them.

And, eventually, we must change the behav

ioral contingencies in our school systems and in the culture,

~enerally.

If these steps are taken, we shall be able to realize far greater crea

tive potential than we have yet gleaned from the brightest among our
children.
If the steps are not taken, we must make do with the creativity
we do get from the

fe'fl

highly intelligent children who are raised in

an effectively creative

enviro~~ent,

and from the less intelligent

children--who, having less to lose, are able to take the risks involved,
and behave creatively in spite of the dominant tone of their surround
ings.

)

.
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APPENDIX
A theoretical system is beneficial because it introduces order
where once there was chaos.

That is its most obvious benefite

But

the pro.cess of, theory construction has other signifi cant by-products.
Ey

assuming a theoretical position, one is led to approach the tasks

of experimentation and observation in a more systematic way.

In order

to carry out the process of theory testing-no matter what validity
the theory

may have--one

is led to choose certain areas of study over

others, to follow a pattern, to persist until a thing is either known
to be true, or known not to be true.
It is our purpose here to indicate the direction (or directions)
of research suggested by the present theory of the creativity-intelli
gence interaction.
theory:

Some of the areas suggested will be tests of the

others will not.

Some suggestions will indicate new or pres

ently underdeveloped research areast

others will indicate areas which

have been overdeveloped or in which new methods seem to be necessary.
Although the

~ginative

experimentalist will be able to

~erive

many more useful applications from the present theory than we might be

able 'to enumerate, some of the more obvious ones can be presented here.

They will be presented in terms of the specific area of investigation
they suggest.
The correlation of creativity with personality .tI.:traits.tt

Since,

as we have suggested, little foundation can be found for the Utrait lt
concept itself, the finding of relationships
variables is of extremely limited value.
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Furthermore, a great deal of
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this kind of research has already been done--it is probably the most
thoroughly explored aspect of creativity--and what value it has had
in the past can now easily be superseded by other areas, of critical
significance, which remain untouched.
The anxiety research. Although it suffers from the same difficul
"ties as the st?dy of personality traits, the
particular problems of its own.

a~~ety

research has a few

Anxiety must be specified in terms of

situation, individual, and response tendencY if research results are
to be readily usable.

Although much has been irrvested in investigating

the -interaction of anxiety and intelligence, little more will be gained
through further investigation unless the kinds of responses made to
anxiety are clearly specified, anxiety is clearly defined, and intel
ligenca is consistently accounted for in research design.
The achievement
inata achievement

as

rasearch~

It is not proposed here that we

an area of significant concern--only that

elL~-

limit

we

our observations to behaviors which can be defined as achievement, and
~xclude

concern with need for achievement until this concept has a

stronger and clearer theoretical and methodological foundation.

1~ny

problems ,(such as the confusion of independence from parents with the
"independence lt corresponding to need for achievement) make the"
~f

design~

present achievement research almost inapplicable to investigations

of intelligence.

If we are a c~ura te in our prediction that intelligent

children have a kind of social sensitivity but also achieve in extra
ordinary measure, the field of achievement .!1"esearch

n~eds"

drastic re

vision before it will be able to prese!lt an adequa.te test of the theory.
91:eativity and generalization. It is the suggestion of this paper

that creativity is

represent~tive

{ s

in part of an ability at the cognitive

,tC',

t,

t

r
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level to generate and regenerate useful generalizations containing
different populations of elements.

This is closely related to Bruner's

(1964) suggestion that creativity actually is a kind of generalization
or abstraction.

It would thus be helpful to determine whether or not

creatiye subjects are better at forming generalizations rapidly.
example, do

cr~ative

For

subjects more, efficiently provide a common title

for' a group of miscellaneous objects?

And are they then better able to

invent another title, when some, but not all, of the objects are sub
st~tuted?

Or, do creative subjects construct a larger number of cat

egories into which a group of objects can be classified, and do these
show a greater overlap in category construction?
Computer simulations. Although Schroder (Karlins, 1967; Karlins
•
at a1., 1967; Schroder, et al., 1967) has initiated a great daal of
research comparing

c~eativity

to certain kinds of structures and opera

tions in computers, little has been done to extend this research to
. include intelligence.

This may be the most promising (and perhaps the

only) means for discovering the differences between creativity and
intelligence at a cognitive level.
sign executive

prograrr~

An attempt should be made to de

wruch can simulate creative or intelligent but

noncreative behavior, or to tap these phenomena by observing what
computer resources are used and how they are used differentially by
subjects who are intelligent or creative.
Flexibility of creativity.

~~though

the strong implication of

several research results (McDonald and Martin, 1967; Walla ch and Kogan"
1965a, 1965b; Duncan, 1959) is that creative subjects are able to respend well in ways that are both typical and atypical for them, while
noncreative subjects cannot respond in atypical ways without great.

t.t

Ot
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difficulty, there is little direct evidence of the idea that creativity
schemata are mostly instructions of flexibility at a high "executive"
level of cognition.

An experimental study needs to be designed spec

ifically to test the idea, so that we need not depend upon the by
products of research designed for completely different purposes.

The

McDonald and Martin (1967) method could be used-an approach in which
creative subjects were taught a pattern which would not characteristic
ally be chosen by them, and noncreative subjects taught a ttcreative"
pattern, and both were compared for rate and efficiency of learning.
Intelligence and stimulus

Although there are many,

complexit~.

many studies in which creative subjects have been fOund to prefer vi
sual stimuli which are asymmetrical and complex, (Barron, 1957, 1958),
this format has not been applied to the question of intelligence.
Beck (1968) has found tentative evidence of this kind, working with the
Rorschach.

And it might be predicted from our theory that intelligence

would covary with a preference for complex, asymmetrical stimuli-
although the suppressor variable which limits creativity might also
have its effects on stimulus preferences.

Nevertheless, research in

this area would indicate how much of Barron S s results is due to the
effects of intelligence, and it might help to clarify hmv

exte~~ive

are the effects of the suppressor variable.
Delay of gratification and creativity.
have been discovered

be~leen

Although correlations

ability to delay gratification and

intelligence, it has not been related in anyway to creativity.

It

might be predicted that creativity would be enhanced by ability to
delay gratification, and, although not crucial to the theory, such a
result would tend

t~

remove further any suspicion that intelligence

f .. Z
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(or covarying ability to delay gratification) is intrinsically opposed

to creativity_
Vigilance and IQ.

It will be impossible to investigate the true

relationship (if any) between intelligence and the vigilance phenomenon,
until methods are devised to present stimuli to experimental subjects
which are complex enough so that information-processing ability can
actually be used to advantage in a "vigilant" response mode.

The use

of dramatic or narrative films rather than stimulus cards as the source
of stimulus input might be a beginning of the process of complication

which must be carried out in the vigilance research, if intelligence
is ever to be fully investigated.
Success, rigidity, and intelligence.

In order to determine if

a high probability of academic success can stunt creativity and result

in compulsive adherence to academic pursuits among the highly intelli
gent, some experiments of a slightly less global nature might be of
potential relevance and use.

For example, do subjects who have a high

probability of success at a task (that is, history of successes for
the task during the experimental treatment) show a rigid adherence to
that task when given the choice of other tasks?

Do they manifest a

tendency to remain steadfastly in one particular mode of response on
~

<

single task, when that mode has proven successful, as compared with

those who have experienced a few failures?

The smaller questions, if

anmvered, would provide a good basis, for conjecture about larger ones.
Self-reinforcement and creativity.

and Norbert (1970) description of

Although fr~m the Heilbrun

e~fectively

self-reinforcing subjects

and their mothers, we might well assume that self-reinforcers are more
creative than other subjects, this has not been specifically tested.

,#tm
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Therefore, a design must be constructed in which creative subjects
(who are known to be more independent and more self-valuing) can be
determined to be more or less efficient at self-reinforcement than
others.

Vlhen given a task and told to reinforce themselves, will they

do so more often? Will they respond more to their

~Nn

reinforcement

·than other subjects do? Will they respond more to their own

reinforce~

ment than they respond to reinforcement from others? The answers to
these questions will help us establish the kind of learning history
human beings must have in order to behave creatively.
Explicit specification of creativity variables.

Research must be

done on the specific behaviors, and the total patterns of specific be

haviors, which result in creativity.

This can be done only with a com

bination of observational research and creativity-training experiments.
Training experiments could well be elaborated to a broader scale than
they have been as yet.

Groups could be chosen whose parents would

. undergo extensive training in how to train their children to behave
creatively, and observations made over a long period of time.

With

intensive creativity training, over long periods of time, high-IQ
children would be expected (according to the "present theory) to make
greater gains in creativity than children with

l~ler

IQts.

The effects of intelligence 'in children upon their parents.

Although it is not now clear to this writer how the problems involved
can be solved, research must be carried out on the effects of intelli
gence upon the parent-child interaction.

That this kind of research

could best be served by observational methods is clear--how the effects

of the child's intelligence could be distinguished from other variables
is not at all clear.

The results of such

r

~esearch,

hrnY6Ver, would pro-
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vide many of the fine-grained elaborations needed ,by the theoretical
system as lie have presented it.

